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2  ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I present and defend a theory of empathy, and then apply 
that theory of empathy to understanding how we engage with stories.  
I argue that empathy should be understood as a well-grounded 
demonstrative ascription of the form ‘[the target] feels like this’.  I take 
the well-groundedness of such an ascription to consist in a series of 
‘proto-empathic’ imaginings, which justify our ascription to a target by 
virtue of being congruent with one another.  In laying out my 
conception of empathy I argue against several prominent theories of 
empathy, including those favoured by Preston and de Waal and Alvin 
Goldman.  I argue in particular against the idea that empathy should 
be understood as aiming primarily at a matching of affect between an 
empathiser and their target.   
Moving on to narrative engagement, I argue that when audiences 
engage with stories they empathise with an implied narrator of that 
story.  I make this case by showing how empathy can prima facie be 
employed to solve two outstanding philosophical problems about 
stories by virtue of its employment of perspective shifting.  I sketch a 
conception of ‘perspectives’ and go on to argue that every story 
features what I call a ‘narrative perspective’, and by process of 
elimination conclude that the holder of the narrative perspective must 
be an implied narrating agency.  I then show how an empathic theory 
of narrative engagement can help us understand how stories can help 
or hinder our moral education.   
Finally, I outline a theory of how audiences engage with interactive 
artworks such as videogames, drawing out the consequences of that 
view for how we might apply my theory of empathic engagement to 
furthering the understanding of interactive art. 
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6  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this project is to give a theory of empathy that is both 
plausible on its own terms, and useful in forming the basis of a theory 
of narrative engagement. 
Part I – Empathy, Emotion and Understanding offers a critical 
analysis of contemporary theories of empathy and outlines my own 
suggested view, which I call the ‘Complex Theory of Empathy’. 
Chapter 1 discusses the place of empathy in modern ‘folk’ philosophy 
and psychology, and finds that many of the disagreements apparent 
between the ‘folk’ regarding the nature of empathy are shared to some 
degree by the refined theories offered by empathy researchers.  I offer 
a definition of sympathy as a starting point, noting how it is 
commonly conflated with empathy in common usage.  I then offer 
some criticisms of the current most popular theories of empathy.  
These include the ‘Perception-Action Model’ due to Preston and de 
Waal, who advocate a broad definition of empathy encompassing 
several observed psychological processes, and the ‘Two Routes View’, 
due to Alvin Goldman, but widely endorsed, which posits that 
empathy, principally conceived of in terms of affective matching, can 
be achieved in two distinct ways.  I argue that the Two Routes View 
fails because the conditions on each route necessary to secure 
understanding of one’s empathic target make the other route 
impossible to use. 
In Chapter 2 I spell out the Complex Theory of Empathy, so named 
because it involves a complex of imaginative activity as well as because 
it is a view that conceives of empathy as relatively cognitively 
demanding.  According to the Complex Theory, empathy is the 
making of a well-grounded demonstrative Ascription to a target of the 
form ‘[the target] feels like this’.  I detail the conditions that make 
such an ascription well-grounded and offer some thoughts on how 
congruence between imaginings can secure justification for an 
empathic ascription.  
7  Chapter 3 is relatively short, and concludes my thoughts on empathy 
specifically.  I argue, contrary to most current views, that affective 
matching should not be considered the primary function or ultimate 
goal of empathy, and suggest some implications the Complex Theory 
has for the moral value of empathy and future empathy research. 
Part II – Empathy and Narrative Engagement details a theory of 
empathic engagement with stories, according to which an audience 
engages with stories by empathising with an implied narrator. 
Chapter 4 begins this task by laying out how my argument will 
proceed, and offering an account of perspectives, which I conceive of 
as relatively stable sets of dispositions that generate ways of seeing, 
which is to say that perspectives lead us to characterise events and 
objects in particular ways.  I show that perspectives are promising as a 
tool for understanding how we engage with stories by showing how 
they can form the basis of solutions to both the problem formerly 
known as ‘the puzzle of imaginative resistance’, and what I call the 
‘problem of disparate response’, which is the problem of why we 
respond to events in stories differently than we think we would 
respond to the same events in other circumstances. 
I devote most of Chapter 5 to exploring the nature of the narrative 
perspective, by way of examining the different figures who feature in 
our engagement with stories and exploring how far the narrative 
perspective could plausibly be held by each.  I finish the chapter with a 
statement of my theory of empathic engagement with stories. 
Chapter 6 comprises some thoughts about how my empathic theory 
of narrative engagement might impact on related questions around 
the philosophy of stories, in particular the issue of how we might 
understand the idea that stories contribute to our moral development.  
I criticise a proposal by Shen-Yi Liao which would, if it held, make the 
empathic theory of narrative engagement unproductive on this 
subject. 
8  Chapter 7 is something of an oddity in the context of the wider thesis.  
In this final chapter I offer the beginnings of what, I hope, will form a 
future research project, and examine the role of the audience of 
interactive stories, its consequences for the art-status of videogames 
and how we might apply a theory of empathic engagement to better 
understanding them. 
  























I wish that for just one time you could stand inside my shoes. 
You’d know what a drag it is to see you. 
– Bob Dylan 
10    
11  1. THEORIES OF EMPATHY 
 
1.1 Introduction: Conceptions of Empathy 
 
Empathy is currently enjoying a fascinating prominence in our culture.   
Articles are frequently published in the online and print media about 
how our personal capacity for empathy can be improved by, among 
innumerable other things, reading literature, using more social media, 
using less social media, meditating, and being poor.  Such is the regard 
in which empathy is held that those articles that make 
recommendations on how our empathic skills can be improved rarely 
feel the need to make the case for an increased capacity for empathy 
being a good thing.  An entirely separate raft of articles, however, 
assures us that increased empathy can help us become successful 
entrepreneurs, be better parents, provide better healthcare, popularise 
political parties and create effective advertising campaigns1.  
As one might expect given empathy’s apparent place in ‘folk’ 
philosophy as a moral panacea, the conception of empathy appealed to 
varies greatly between, and sometimes within, articles such as these.  
Empathy in popular discourse is variously conceived of as a capacity to 
feel as another person feels, a disposition to have morally appropriate 
responses to suffering, a way of understanding another person’s 
emotional states, or some combination of these.  The following are 
some definitions of empathy from the popular press: 
                                                 
1 Those claims are found in Bury (2013), Brosterman (2015), Quenqua (2013), Kristof (2015), Reynolds (2015), McBride (2011), Ficarra (2011), Mulgan (2015) and Barrow (2015) respectively.  
12  E1: “Empathizing with [someone] is feeling what they are feeling and 
acknowledging those feelings…it is the art of compassion and 
sensitivity, as well as the ability to give moral support.”2 
E2: “Empathy is walking a mile in another's shoes, or trying to 
understand the feelings and perspectives of an individual. It isn't pity 
or kindness, and it certainly isn't treating someone as you would like 
to be treated.”3 
E3: “Empathy means not just that we care about what another person 
is feeling. Empathy means that we understand and feel what they're 
feeling. It means hurting like they hurt.”4 
E4: “Empathy involves being moved by another's 
experiences…[and/or] the act of correctly acknowledging the 
emotional state of another without experiencing that state oneself”5 
These examples are instructive for a several reasons.  They confirm 
that ‘the folk’ don’t agree on what empathy is and also indicate 
potential areas of disagreement.  However, one of the things I am 
interested in exploring in this thesis is whether and how far our best 
theories of empathy can perform the functions that the ‘folk’ credit it 
with.  With that in mind, the examples above, contradictory though 
they may be, also give us some idea of what a refined concept of 
empathy needs to look like in order to be recognisable as empathy 
under a common conception.   
As far as the above popular definitions of empathy agree, I think it is 
fair to offer the following as an initial suggestion of a working Folk 
Theory of empathy:  
                                                 
2 Burg (2011) 3 Reynolds (2015) 4 Barron (2015) 5 Ficarra (2010) (N.B. The original article is unclear as to whether the first and second parts of this definition are intended to complement or contrast one another). 
13  Folk Theory of Empathy: Empathy is the activity of coming to 
understand another person, in particular (though perhaps not only) 
their feelings in a way that makes distinctive use of one’s own feelings. 
While the suggested Folk Theory doesn’t by itself serve as a 
satisfactory definition of empathy for the purposes of a philosophical 
enquiry, it is nonetheless important to keep the Folk Theory in mind 
when discussing the various conceptions of empathy proposed by 
philosophers and scientists.  I take it that it is a desideratum for a 
theory of empathy (and indeed for any theory of a concept commonly 
deployed by the ‘folk’) that a refined theory should provide a picture of 
empathy recognisable to those familiar with the folk theory alone (or, 
if it is severely at odds with the Folk Theory, that the refined theory 
gives compelling reasons why it is so).  A further desideratum of a 
Refined Theory of empathy is that it settles any confusion or 
disagreement between various strands of Folk Theory of empathy, as 
illustrated in E1-E4 above.  I suggest that a Refined Theory of empathy 
should be able to shed light on the following questions raised by the 
individual definitions above: 
Q1. Does empathy entail compassion, pity or sympathy for the target 
of the empathy? (E1, E2, E3) 
Q2. Does empathy require that the empathiser feels the same as their 
target?  If so, the same in what sense? (E3, E4) 
Q3. What kind of understanding does empathy provide, and what 
capacities does that understanding grant the empathiser?  Must it, for 
instance, allow the empathiser to respond appropriately, or to lend 
moral support to the target? (E1, E3) 
Q4. How is empathy distinct from cognitive mind-reading (deploying 
a theory of mind to determine a target's mental state)? (E1, E4) 
So how close are we to having a Refined Theory of empathy capable of 
answering the above questions?  The world of academic research has 
devoted a great deal of energy to understanding the potential benefits 
14  and applications of empathy, and discovering how we might be able to 
increase people’s capacity for empathy (indeed, many of the public-
facing articles I have cited are inspired by particular pieces of 
academic research).  This being the case, it is remarkable that there 
remains significant disagreement about what precisely empathy is. In 
fact, many of the disagreements between strands of the Folk Theory of 
empathy also appear in some form in the academic literature.  As a 
result, those who wish to contribute to our knowledge of how 
empathy can best be developed or employed are still in some danger 
of speaking at cross-purposes.  Although there has been much 
rigorous work, especially from philosophers and cognitive scientists, 
devoted to developing a sound concept of empathy, there continues to 
be no standard view either across or within disciplines.  As well as the 
debates that echo disagreements between the strands of Folk Theory, 
there remain outstanding questions particular to the academic 
research community. 
Debates of the former kind derive from more general questions about 
how empathy should be defined, and the latter from more esoteric 
concerns about which psychological or neurological processes underlie 
or constitute empathy.  One interesting feature of the former debate, 
about how empathy should be defined, is that empathy is a rather new 
psychological concept.  Although contemporary understandings of 
empathy certainly owe something to the motivator of moral 
sentiments that Adam Smith and David Hume discussed under the 
name ‘sympathy’ in the 18th century, empathy as a distinct concept has 
its deepest roots in the 19th and early 20th century works of the likes of 
Theodor Lipps, Vernon Lee and Edith Stein.6  The relative newcomer 
status of empathy as a philosophical concept can perhaps partially 
explain the dramatically different approaches to defining empathy that 
have been taken even in recent times. 
                                                 
6 Hume (1751), Smith (1759) 
15  Contemporary research tends to take one of two broadly different 
approaches to empathy, seeing empathy as primarily an 
epistemological or a psychological phenomenon.7  Proponents of the 
epistemological approach to empathy conceive of empathy primarily 
as a route to or form of knowledge about another person.8  The 
psychological approach to empathy is concerned principally with 
defining empathy as a particular kind of psychological or neurological 
process that allows people to share mental states with another 
person.9  Neither of these approaches are exclusive; a view that 
empathy is a special form of knowledge about another person will 
need to accommodate plausible theories about the psychological and 
neurological processes that make that knowledge possible.  
Conversely, a view that empathy is a neurological process that allows 
one person to share the mental state of another will be strongest when 
it can allow that the neurological process in question can perform the 
epistemic functions that are commonly ascribed to empathy. 
1.1.2 Introducing the Complex Theory of Empathy 
I will be arguing for an epistemic conception of empathy; empathy as a 
way of gaining a special kind of knowledge about another person, the 
knowledge of what it’s like to be another person in a particular 
situation.  To be precise, I will be arguing for what I call the Complex 
Theory of empathy: 
 Complex Theory of Empathy: Empathy is the making of a well-
grounded demonstrative ascription to a target of the form ‘[the target] 
feels like this’. 
The details and motivations for the Complex Theory of Empathy will 
be discussed throughout the first two chapters of the thesis, but it will 
                                                 
7 Smith (2015)  8 Ibid., Coplan (2011)  9 Preston and de Waal (2002)  
16  be helpful to first offer some clarification on what the Complex Theory 
involves.  A ‘target’ is the object of empathy; typically the person with 
whom I am empathising.10  When I say that empathy is a 
demonstrative ascription, I mean that it is a matter of ascribing a 
property on the basis of a demonstrative act, which for now we can 
think of, following Walton, as using one’s own feelings as a sample of 
how the target feels (in a sense of ‘feeling’ that includes the broad 
phenomenal character what it’s like to be that person, and not just 
emotions or affective states).11  A demonstrative ascription is well-
grounded when we are the various imaginative activities that we must 
undertake to justify that ascription are congruent with one another.  
The imaginative activities that we must undertake to justify empathies 
I name proto-empathies, and I will identify three that I believe are 
jointly sufficient to ground an empathic ascription: feeling-with, being-
with and doing-with.  Feeling-with is a way of imagining that I share 
the affective state of another, being-with is a way of imagining that I 
share the same character as another, and doing-with is a way of 
imagining that I am in the same situation as another.  
In arguing for this position I will describe some popular approaches to 
empathy, both those in ordinary use and from empathy researchers, 
and offer some criticisms of them; in particular I will argue that they 
do not offer an empathiser sufficient understanding of their target to 
perform the minimal epistemic role empathy ought to play.  I will also 
argue against the common view in modern empathy research, that 
empathy is primarily or solely a matter of affective matching, that is, of 
coming to share an emotional or other affective state with another 
person. 
                                                 
10 Which is to say that sometimes the target of my empathy is not a person. 11 Walton (2015).  My view shares many similarities with Walton’s, though there are significant differences between us in what we take to be sufficient grounding for an empathic ascription.  
17  There is one other significant difference between the Complex Theory 
and most other contemporary views on empathy that it is worth 
pointing to before I proceed further.  The first is that the Complex 
Theory does not view empathy as a ‘success term’ in the way many 
other views do.12  This is largely due to my rejection of the centrality of 
affective matching in empathy.  According to most views of empathy, 
empathy occurs when the subject and object share affective states, and 
where the affective states do not match there is no empathy.13  I also 
take empathy to be a success term, but I attach the success to the well-
groundedness of the empathic ascription rather than the similarity of 
feeling between the empathiser and her target.  It could well be that 
this is not much more than a semantic distinction, but I think the 
point is interesting nonetheless.   
Empathy is a way to gain a special kind of knowledge about another 
person, the knowledge of what it’s like to be them.  I take it to be 
analogous with other ways of gaining knowledge, in that for a method 
of knowledge acquisition to successfully occur (for example, reading a 
book or conducting an experiment), one does not need to reach a 
justified true belief, but merely to have properly used the method in 
question.  If I read a book by a usually reputable author, but it turns 
out the claims in her book were false, I may not have successfully 
gained knowledge, but I have successfully followed a method that 
generally produces it (no one would say that I had failed to read the 
book!).  Similarly, to successfully empathise is to attempt to gain 
empathic knowledge of another person in the proper way.  Empathy 
ought to usually result in knowledge (since any epistemic view of 
empathy needs to hold that it is a reliable way of gaining knowledge), 
but if my well-grounded demonstrative ascription turns out to be 
false, I take it to be in spite of a successful empathising, not to 
constitute a failure.  It is more helpful, when thinking of empathy in 
                                                 
12 Walton (2015), Smith (2015) 13 E.g. Vignemont and Singer (2006) 
18  epistemic terms, to consider empathy to have failed when the 
mechanisms that justify the beliefs that empathy produces have failed, 
and not when the beliefs that empathy produces turn out to be false. 
1.1.3 Introducing psychological approaches to empathy 
When we think of empathy in psychological and/or neurological 
terms, the broadest divide in current theories comes down to whether 
empathy should be thought of as a sub-personal, automatic process, a 
higher-level, cognitive process, or a disjunctive concept operating over 
both of these other options.  Several observed psychological 
phenomena have been suggested as being identifiable with empathy; 
these are Emotional Contagion, Low-Level Simulation, High-Level 
Simulation, Perspective Shifting and In-His-Shoes Imagining.   
Emotional Contagion: a phenomenon whereby the emotional state of 
one person is transferred to another who, by virtue of some perceptual 
process, automatically adopts the perceived emotion as their own and 
thus their own emotional state converges with that of the first 
person.14   
Low-Level Simulation: A neurological process whereby the perception 
of a mental state in another causes, in the perceiver, the activation of 
neural systems (mirroring systems) that would activate if they were in 
possession of the mental state perceived, leading the perceiver to 
adopt a state isomorphic to that of the target.  Low-level simulation 
can be used to recreate a class of mental states broader than emotion-
states, including pain-states and action-planning states, which 
distinguishes it from emotional contagion.15 
                                                 
14 Davies, S (2011); Dimberg (1982); Bavelas et al. (1987); Hatfield, Rapson, and Le (2009); and Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1994). 15 Goldman, A (2011)  
19  High-Level Simulation: The creation in one’s own mind of a selected 
mental state through the faculty of imagination.  The mental state in 
question can be one identified in another person, but need not be.16 
In-His-Shoes Imagining: An imaginative project in which we 
experientially and centrally imagine from the inside (imagine in 
various sense modalities, from the perspective of someone within the 
imagined scene) that we are in the situation of another, but not that 
we are that other.17  
Perspective Shifting: An imaginative project in which we experientially 
and centrally imagine from the inside that we are both in the situation 
of another and that we are that other.18 
Those who offer definitions of empathy tend to use some or all of the 
above processes as a way of underpinning it. Hence, the definitions of 
empathy one tends to find prefacing contemporary papers on the 
subject do not often stray far from the mould exemplified by the 
following, due to Hoffman, Iacobani and Vignemont and Singer 
respectively: 
Hoffman: “[Empathy is any emotional response involving] any processes 
that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with 
another’s situation than with his own situation.” 19 
Iacobani: “Empathy is commonly defined as the ability to understand 
and share the feelings of another”20 
                                                 
16 Goldman (2006) and (2011), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 17 Some philosophers have used the phrase ‘in-his-shoes’ imagining to refer to what I have called ‘perspective shifting’ (e.g. Gaut 2006 p.118).  I suppose the difference in usage can be put down to whether one takes the metaphor of the other person’s shoes to refer to only their situation or also to relevant aspects of their psyche.  There is in any case obviously enough of a distinction between the two imaginative projects to warrant two labels.  See Wollheim (1984) pp. 71-3 and Art and the Mind p. 54) and Ninan (2010) for usage similar to mine. 18 Wollheim (1984) pp. 71-3, Goldie (1999), Coplan (2011) 19 Hoffman (2000) 20 Iacobani (2011)  
20  and, 
Vignemont and Singer: “There is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective 
state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another person’s affective state; (iii) 
this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another 
person’s affective state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the 
source of one’s own affective state.”21 
There will be much to say about these accounts of empathy as we 
progress.  The rest of this section will consist in a critical overview of 
how these different approaches to empathy can answer our questions 
Q1-Q4 above, with the dual purpose of introducing the different 
dominant approaches to empathy and the principal issues and 
concepts that will become recurring themes throughout the first half 
of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Folk-Empathy and Sympathy 
 
I want to begin by getting as clear an idea as possible of what Folk 
Theory of empathy we want to operate with before finding out which, 
if any, Refined Theory can be best mapped onto it.  I want to clarify 
that the idea here is not that having something in common with a 
concept that closely reflects ordinary usage by itself makes any 
Refined Theory more plausible than any other.  However, I take it that 
having something in common with a clear Folk Theory is nonetheless 
a beneficial feature of a candidate for a Refined Theory, and a Refined 
Theory which looked substantially different to our best Folk Theory 
would be under an obligation to explain why it was so. 
Abstracting from the sample definitions of empathy from the popular 
press, I suggested the following as a rough outline of what a Folk 
Theory of empathy might look like: 
                                                 
21 Vignemont and Singer (2006)  
21  Folk Theory of Empathy: Empathy is the activity of coming to 
understand another person, in particular (though not only) their 
feelings in a way that makes distinctive use of one’s own feelings. 
As it stands, the Folk Theory fails to distinguish between two 
commonly conflated concepts in popular discourse: empathy and 
sympathy.  Empathy is typically thought of as a way of understanding 
another person by sharing their emotions, sympathy as a way of 
feeling particular emotions about another person that indicate that 
the object of sympathy is in need.  Clarifying the phenomenon of 
sympathy and distinguishing it from empathy is a good first step 
towards developing a Refined Theory of Empathy and addressing some 
of the questions raised in my discussion of the Folk Theory in the 
introduction; whether empathy entails sympathy and whether 
empathy entails feeling, in some sense, the same as the target of the 
empathising.  
Although people do commonly confuse, conflate, or just synonymise 
empathy with sympathy, there are some clues even in ordinary 
language that the terms refer to different things (although these clues 
are not as straightforward as some have maintained).  Expressions of 
sympathy are often reserved for situations in which the object of the 
sympathy are grieving or have experienced a loss (and, I would 
tentatively suggest, where the object of sympathy is blameless for their 
own situation).  It’s often suggested that empathy can be distinguished 
from sympathy in common usage by virtue of being applicable to a 
much broader variety of circumstances, both happy and not.  
However, I do not think this distinction between common use of the 
terms holds up under scrutiny.  Nor does another frequently suggested 
distinction, that sympathy can be commonly spoken of as a distinct 
emotion alongside others such as joy, jealousy and frustration whereas 
empathy is commonly held as a way of feeling other emotions, as 
22  opposed to an emotion in its own right. 22  Against the former claim, it 
is rare to find people proclaiming their empathy with people whose 
situation would not merit sympathy; people are generally only liable to 
declare empathy with those who are having a bad time of things.  
Against the latter, it is also very common to hear people speak of 
‘feeling empathy’ in the same manner in which they would speak of 
feeling sympathy, or other more straightforward emotional states. 
This is not to say that these distinctions do not manifest themselves 
between Refined Theories of empathy and sympathy, only that they 
are not reflected in common usage.  Discussing these and other 
possible distinctions between sympathy and empathy will help us 
clarify both concepts shortly, but for now I want to draw attention to 
an interesting distinction that I believe does hold between the 
ordinary usage terms of empathy and sympathy.  That is, that 
sympathy entails an attitude that the sympathetic object is pitiable.  
Pitiable, that is, in a way that invokes the idea of pity as demonstrated 
in high-handed judgement (in the way that Mr. T is habitually said to 
pity ‘fools’) more than pity as mere sorrow for the misfortunate of 
another.  In Jane Eyre, Rochester describes the variety of pity I have in 
mind in the following way: 
"Pity, Jane, from some people is a noxious and insulting sort of tribute, 
which one is justified in hurtling back in the teeth of those who offer it; 
but that is a sort of pity native to callous, selfish hearts; it is a hybrid, 
egotistical pain at hearing of woes, crossed with ignorant contempt for 
those who have endured them."  
—Rochester, Jane Eyre  
Charlotte Bronte, through Rochester, is nicely capturing the thought 
that pity is not merely a feeling that someone suffers, but also 
expresses a power relation between the pitier and pitied.  The implied 
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23  superiority of the pitier explains why, as Rochester says, people often 
feel slighted at being offered pity.  The one who pities affirms not just 
that they recognise the suffering of another, but also that they are in a 
superior position.  Indeed, often the power imbalance implicit in pity 
is created merely by the declaration of pity, as the pitied person 
becomes aware that the pitying person considers them vulnerable.23  
The power imbalance implicit in a declaration of pity also features in 
the ordinary use concept of sympathy, demonstrated by the fact that 
people are often insulted to be on the receiving end of sympathy in 
just the same way as pity, and the fact that those with whom people 
sympathise are often in an inferior position to those who do the 
sympathising. 
Pity is the emotion that we most often associate with a sympathetic 
state, but pity and sympathy are not coextensive, even in common 
usage.  It may be an unusual occurrence, but we can still recognise pity 
as pity when it is directed towards somebody for whom one has no 
personal concern or affection, whereas sympathy generally requires 
concern at least.  Although this sense of pity has fallen out of style, it is 
perfectly coherent to suggest that you can feel pity towards one who 
has wronged you, and whom you freely, rightly and happily despise, 
but nonetheless pity out of a concern for, among other things, justice, 
the pleasure of another, your own sense of superiority or the security 
of your own salvation as reckoned against the damnation of another.   
A feeling of pity does not imply that the subject does not wish 
suffering on the pitied object (as in the King who pities the subjects he 
sentences to death), nor does it come packaged with a desire that that 
person’s condition improve (as in cases where the pitied object’s 
condition cannot improve). 
Such feelings, I contend, do not capture our ordinary sense of 
‘sympathy’, and so while pity might be the canonical sympathetic 
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24  emotion, and lend to sympathy the power imbalance that so often 
drives resentment by those with whom we sympathise, sympathy 
clearly involves more than only pity.  I will go on to give a fuller 
account of sympathy in the next section, but the preceding points give 
us a good starting point for that discussion, in that they mark a 
distinction between empathy and sympathy reflected in common 
usage far more reliably than the other two that were suggested (that 
empathy is thought of as applicable to a broader variety of 
circumstances than empathy, and that sympathy is commonly 
conceived of as an emotion, whereas empathy is not). 
To summarise, then, when commonly speaking of sympathy we think 
of it as being given from a position of relative superiority (whether 
superiority of social position, assumed moral superiority, or simply a 
greater degree of security and comfort), whereas empathy need not be.  
The one who sympathises is most often having a better time of things 
than the one with whom they sympathise.  The same is not true of 
empathy; empathy is commonly conceived of as, among other things, 
a way for people to demonstrate that they are sharing in another’s 
pain.  Sympathy, on the other hand, is not commonly conceived as a 
matter of sharing, but of offering solace, support, or even impersonal 
disapproval of circumstances, from a position of relative security. 
1.2.1 ‘Feeling’ sympathy and empathy 
Now that I have suggested one way in which the ordinary usage of the 
terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ can be distinguished from one 
another, I want to briefly discuss another common confusion in 
ordinary discourse which occasionally appears in empathy research.  
That is, that sympathy and empathy are feelings or emotions (or 
clusters of feelings or emotions) of the type we would usually 
recognise alongside fear, pity, joy and so on.  In what follows I will 
argue that if we are to preserve the common notion that affective 
25  matching is necessary for empathy,24 we must dispense with the less 
common, but still present, idea that empathy names one or a 
disjunction of several distinct emotions. 
If Avon claims that he “feels empathy with Omar”, what exactly should 
we take him to mean by this?  If Omar had recently lost his job and 
was angry about it, Avon might (in line with some common usage) be 
conveying that he has a feeling consistent with an overriding interest 
in Omar’s wellbeing, i.e. a feeling of concern.  Despite the fact that 
there are both laypersons and empathy researchers who would be 
happy to call such concern a state of empathy25 there are good reasons 
to resist such a commitment. 
In fact, it might be tempting to describe Avon’s state in such a case as 
an example of feeling sympathy rather than empathy.  This is more 
correct than the claim that Avon feels empathy, but it is by no means a 
completely accurate picture of what is going on here, and we must be 
precise. 
In what sense is the claim that Avon is feeling sympathy incorrect?  It 
is for the very same reason that Avon is not feeling empathy, in that 
neither empathy nor sympathy are, properly speaking, the kinds of 
thing one feels; they are not kinds of feelings that we can distinguish 
by what they feel like.  To explain what I mean, let us suppose that 
Avon and Omar are both angry at Omar’s unemployment.  This, some 
might say, is sufficient for Avon to be feeling empathy, but it is a 
simple matter to show that this is not true.  Omar and Avon are both 
feeling sad, and the quality of Omar’s feeling as the target – the 
affective component of Omar’s ‘sadness’ state – exhausts the affective 
features of the so-called feeling of empathy that Avon has alongside 
him.  The point is this: the supposition is that Omar is feeling sad, but 
that Avon is feeling ‘empathy’, and consequentially that empathy is the 
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26  kind of thing that can be felt, can only be justified if there is some 
relevant qualitative difference in Omar’s feeling from Avon’s.  What 
does Avon feel over and above sadness that marks his feeling as a 
feeling of empathy with Omar?  It is difficult to even know what to 
make of this question.   
To build a positive response we might look at the problem a different 
way.  Suppose that Omar is again sad, and Avon feels sadness 
alongside Omar so that their states are isomorphic in the relevant 
ways.  Further suppose that Lester is triumphant, and Jimmy feels 
triumphant with Lester so that their states are also isomorphic in the 
relevant ways.  What are those relevant ways?  I will cover the subject 
of what isomorphism should or must amount to for these purposes at 
a later stage.  I think we can assume, however, that they would at least 
have to include certain perceptible affective properties of the feeling.  
For now, it will suffice if Avon’s feeling is of the same kind (that we 
would ordinarily recognise; happy, sad, angry, jealous, petulant etc.) as 
Omar’s, and that Lester’s is of the same kind as Jimmy’s.  Questions of 
whether this isomorphism ought to involve sameness of intensity, 
duration, intentional object or the like I will leave open for now.   
So, assume following the above that Avon feels sadness with Omar 
and Jimmy feels triumph with Lester.  We know that there is no 
affective component of Avon’s or Jimmy’s states that marks them out 
as empathic.  So what else could Avon’s empathy Omar have in 
common with Jimmy’s empathy with Lester?  What is the common 
feature that makes it the case that Avon and Jimmy are both 
empathising? 
The intuition that empathy is a feeling might be defended by claiming 
that when Avon feels anger with Omar, there is a feeling of concern 
for Omar’s wellbeing in concert with that feeling of anger that marks 
out Avon’s feeling as one of empathy, rather than simple sadness.  This 
cannot be right either, in the first place because it is not plausible that 
we should require a feeling of concern to infringe upon Avon’s sadness 
27  in order for it to count as empathy.  It is perfectly conceivable that, 
although Avon’s sadness might have been partly caused by a concern 
for Omar’s wellbeing, that concern need not be occurrently felt 
alongside, or somehow mixed in with, Avon’s sadness.  For further 
evidence that empathy cannot simply mean a ‘concern-involving 
emotion’, consider a different case in which Omar is feeling concerned 
rather than sad that he has lost his job.  Avon’s empathy for Omar 
here will manifest in a feeling of concern, the affective component of 
which will itself exhaust the affective component of Avon’s concern-
state, leaving no affective work for the empathy to do.  While it could 
be true that such compounded concern feelings might result in a 
concern feeling of unusual intensity, the resulting affect could not be 
reliably distinctive in kind.  Not only this, but in fact to claim that 
empathy is something Avon feels would deny the possibility of 
empathy occurring in its most complete and successful form from the 
outset.  If empathy involves Avon feeling, in some suitably defined 
sense,26 the same thing as what Omar is feeling, then the claim that 
empathy itself carries some affective character implies that Avon could 
never feel Omar’s sadness in empathy – he could only feel sadness-
plus-empathy, which is certainly not what Omar is feeling.  In 
summary: what Avon feels by empathising with Omar is only that 
state which Omar feels.  
It follows from the above that we are mistaken if we say that Avon 
feels sympathy for when he feels concern any more than that he feels 
empathy when he feels sadness.  Just as his feeling of anger exhausts 
the affective component of the so-called empathy felt by Avon, so his 
concern exhausts the affective component of Avon’s ‘sympathy’.  The 
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28  confusion apparent in ordinary language, giving rise to the need for 
the preceding discussion, stems from the habit of using the term 
‘sympathy’ to describe a form of pity, which is indeed a feeling of the 
kind we would usually recognise.27  As we have just seen, however, the 
terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ are explanatorily impotent if they are 
deployed to describe the feelings felt as a part of an affective state – 
the affective component of my pity for one with whom I sympathise 
can be exhaustively described without reference to a feeling of 
sympathy.  This is not because sympathy and empathy are 
unanalysable terms; they are not.  Rather, it is because empathy and 
sympathy have no distinctive kind of affective state with which they 
are associated.  The same argument applies to any claim that empathy 
or sympathy name a cluster of emotions, such as the ‘constellation’ of 
emotions such as sadness, compassion, tenderness, upset, concern and 
grief, which have been suggested to disjunctively constitute ‘empathic 
concern’.28  For any instance of sympathy or empathy, it isn’t the type 
of emotion that marks the experience as sympathetic or empathic.    
1.2.2 Sympathy as Feeling-for 
 We have now established that there is a difference in the ordinary 
language application of ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’, in that they imply 
different power relationships between the subject and object, and that 
neither sympathy nor empathy should be identified with a particular 
feeling or emotion, nor a cluster of feelings or emotions. 
So what does sympathy consist in?  A typical definition has it that 
sympathy is “’feeling for’ someone,” and “often involves feelings of 
concern.”29  There is nothing unexpected in this, save perhaps that it 
ought to be emphasised that feelings of concern have a strong role to 
play, in that pity, as we have seen, doesn’t entail concern for its object.  
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29  As remarked in the previous section however, it is implausible to 
suggest that a concurrent feeling of concern is definitive of a feeling’s 
being either empathic or sympathetic.   
This definition, of sympathy as ‘feeling for someone’, points us in the 
right direction of what kinds of mental phenomena empathy and 
sympathy are, but needs a little unpacking.  Sympathy is ‘feeling for’, 
but as we have seen is not a feeling in itself, so sympathy must be 
some means by virtue of which a feeling becomes a ‘feeling-for’ – it is a 
mode of feeling.  What do I mean by a ‘mode of feeling’?  To answer, 
let us consider what makes Avon’s feeling of concern a feeling-for 
Omar, and not just a feeling as he might have if he were concerned 
about how he was going to pay his utility bills.   
The most obvious difference is in the intentional object of the feeling 
of concern – that object which the concern is, to borrow Peter Goldie’s 
term, “felt towards”.30  Omar’s feeling of concern about his bills is a 
form of his thinking about his bills, and his concern for Avon a form of 
thinking about Avon.  This alone does not make Omar’s concern for 
Avon sympathetic, however.  ‘Feeling-for’ and ‘feeling-towards’ are 
markedly different concepts, the former (we are assuming) being the 
hallmark of sympathy, the latter being a feature of emotions more 
generally; it is the way emotions are about things.  It cannot be the 
case that all emotion-states, or even all emotion-states that are felt-
towards another person (or features of that person or their situation) 
are sympathetic – Omar’s envy of Avon’s success could hardly be 
described as such.  Nor is it the case that only certain emotion-states 
felt-towards another person will always count as sympathetic, 
although this is closer to the mark.  This is not just because some 
emotion-states that are felt in the sympathetic mode can also be felt in 
non-sympathetic contexts - we might feel embarrassment on behalf of 
someone whose flies are undone, unknown to them, either 
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30  sympathetically (which might lead us to warn them), or not (which 
might lead us to joke about it).  That is enough to prove my point that 
certain emotion states are always sympathetic.  However, as we have 
already seen that pity, certainly the emotion most associated with 
sympathy, is not co-extensive with pity, we can make with confidence 
the stronger claim that no emotion is, by itself, sufficient for or 
otherwise definitive of sympathy.   
Although sympathy, feeling-for, is not to be identified with a feeling of 
concern or pity for another, there can be no doubt that the disposition 
to have those kinds of emotional states is closely correlated with the 
disposition to feel-for another.  The common thread between these 
two dispositions seems self-evidently to be a concern for the well-
being of the person about whom we feel pity, or feel-for in general.  
With this in mind, I propose the following: 
S feels-for O when:  
(1) S has some feeling F,  
(2) S values the wellbeing of O to some non-negligible degree, such 
that, all things being equal, S prefers that O is doing well.  
(3) (1) is true because (2) and  
(4) S believes that (3).  
So, Avon feels-for Omar just in case his feeling springs from a general 
concern for Omar’s wellbeing and he knows that to be the case.  The 
belief condition might give some readers pause: why should Avon be 
required to believe that his feeling was caused by his valuing of Omar’s 
wellbeing in order for it to count as sympathetic?  It is a common 
thought that sympathy has a particular conative force,31 in that it 
motivates us to alleviate the suffering, or generally promote the 
welfare, of the person with whom we sympathise.  In order to preserve 
that property of feeling-for, it is necessary that the subject be aware 
that his feeling-for is prompted by a concern for the wellbeing of his 
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31  object.  Avon, unaware that his sorrow for Omar is caused by a 
concern for his wellbeing, may lack the cognitive resources to direct 
the motivational force of his sorrow towards the alleviation of Omar’s 
anguish (or the continuation of his pleasure).  This is the case even 
when we can take Avon’s sorrow to include Omar’s situation as its 
object.  Take a case, for instance, where Avon is feeling sorry that 
Omar has lost his job, but that there are several reasons why he might 
feel that way; he cares for Omar’s wellbeing, and also cares more than 
most about the health of the local economy, and perhaps Omar also 
owes Avon money.  If Avon is not aware which of his concerns is 
causally responsible for his sorrowful state, it will not necessarily 
motivate him to act in a way that promotes Omar’s wellbeing in a way 
we would expect to be consistent with a sympathetic feeling. 
1.2.3 Contrasting Sympathy and Empathy 
By investigating and refining the ordinary usage concept of sympathy, 
specifically how it compares to the way people generally talk about 
empathy, we have arrived at a point where we can use what we have 
learned about the former to inform a sustained discussion of the latter.   
We have learned so far that neither sympathy nor empathy are 
feelings per se, but are rather processes that cause feelings to arise in a 
particular way.  The process of sympathy can be distinguished from 
empathy by virtue of the relative positions that the sympathiser and 
empathiser place with their respective targets; this is reflected in the 
common idea that sympathy is a matter of feeling for someone, while 
empathy is a matter of feeling with someone.   
What we take ‘feeling with someone’ to consist in has far reaching 
consequences.  I discuss the different ways we can consider to affective 
states to ‘match’ in the following sections.  Now, however, it is 
important to bring up what will turn out to be the most problematic 
feature of the most popular views of empathy; that is, what constraints 
we put on the matching affective states that suffices to mark them out 
as empathic.   
32  Even once we accept that successful affective matching was required 
of a state in order for it to count as empathic32, it doesn’t take much to 
show why empathy can’t solely consist in that.  There must also be 
some constraints regarding the cause of the matching state.  If Avon 
and Omar are both confronted with a bear, the fact that they are both 
afraid at that moment cannot by itself mean that they empathise with 
one another; their feelings have nothing to do with one another and 
everything to do with the bear.  To take the example further, claiming 
that affective matching by itself, even in its strongest form, is sufficient 
for empathy will entail that Avon and Omar, confronted with different 
bears some hundreds of miles apart from one another, will even then 
be empathising with each other, which is clearly not the case. 
The majority of empathy theorists acknowledge the lesson of the ‘bear’ 
case, and embrace it by building into their theories some constraint on 
the source of the affective states in question.  Hence Vignemont and 
Singer, in their definition, mandate that for a state to count as 
empathic it must be “(iii) elicited by the observation or imagination of 
another person’s affective state”.33  Hoffman suggests the narrower 
constraint that a state counts as empathic only if it is generated by the 
“attended perception of the object’s state”, that is, that we must both 
perceive and attend to the emotional state of the target of our 
empathy in order for it to count.34  There is much to commend 
Vignemont and Singer’s theory.  As we will see later it is not by itself 
satisfactory, but does clearly point us in the direction of one that is.  
Hoffman’s proposal, on the other hand, certainly seems too restrictive, 
particularly if we want to allow that we can empathically share 
affective states with people who are not present by imagining.  So, 
what is the correct constraint we should place on the source of an 
affective state in order for it to count as empathic? 
                                                 
32 On my view, such a feeling would strictly count as a part of a proto-empathy, but most others consider a successful affective match the ultimate goal of empathy. 33 Vignemont & Singer (2006) 34 Hoffman (2000) 
33   
 
1.3 Theories of Empathy: Higher and Lower 
 
At the heart of many disagreements about the appropriate causal 
constraint we should take to be definitive of a feeling felt empathically 
lies the fact that there are several psychological, neurological, 
behavioural and physiological phenomena that appear to share some 
empathy-like features in that they are capable of manifesting affective 
states that match those of another.  Prima facie they could all count as 
causal constraints that make an affective match count as empathy.  
This leads naturally to the questions of whether any of these 
phenomena counts as empathy proper to the exclusion of the others, 
whether all these phenomena are empathies of different sorts, whether 
they share a common feature that is itself empathy or whether 
empathy is a disjunctive concept ranging over them all.  Indeed, these 
options are not all mutually exclusive, which serves to further muddy 
the problem. 
To begin with I will outline what I take to be the phenomena claimed 
to be candidates for either solely, collectively, disjunctively or 
otherwise falling under the description of empathy; these are:  
(a) Emotional Contagion 
(b) Low-Level Simulation 
(c) High-Level Simulation  
(d) Perspective Shifting 
(e) In-His-Shoes Imagining, and  
(f) Prosocial Behaviours35   
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34  These six phenomena are our candidates for empathy.  One unified 
conception of empathy, according to which each of these phenomena 
are instances of empathy, is defended by Stephanie Preston and 
Francis de Waal.  In an oft cited paper they have explicitly argued that 
‘empathy’ ought to be considered a broad ‘umbrella’ concept.  They 
offer what they call a Perception-Action Model, ranging over all cases 
in which, and here Preston and de Waal borrow from Hoffman’s 
definition of empathy, “the attended perception of the object’s state 
generates a state in the subject that is more applicable to the object’s 
state or situation than to the subject’s own prior state or situation.”36  
Preston and De Waal’s major contribution to the debate is to propose 
that all cases that lead to a Hoffman-type empathic state in a subject 
can be distinguished by their shared neurological base in a process 
that can be described under a single model as follows:  
 
The Perception-Action Model (PAM): 
[Empathic states are the results of processes in which] attended 
perception of the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s 
representations of the state, situation, and object, and that activation of 
these representations automatically primes or generates the associated 
autonomic and somatic responses, unless inhibited.37 
 
1.3.1 The Perception-Action Model 
According to Preston and de Waal, the Perception-Action Model 
(PAM) provides a suitable grounding for a unified conception of 
empathy, in that our list of empathy-like phenomena a to f all share a 
distinguishing characteristic by being describable under the same 
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35  model.  Each phenomenon on our list, on Preston and de Waal’s view, 
can be considered a species under the genus ‘empathy’.   
In opposition to de Waal’s view that the differences between the 
various empathy-like phenomena have been “emphasised to the point 
of distraction”,38 Amy Coplan has argued that attempting to find a 
unified base for the various empathy-like phenomena is a fool’s 
errand.  For Amy Coplan, and those sympathetic to her, empathy does 
not properly name a genus of activity, different processes describable 
under the same model, but rather a species of activity, a single process.  
Specifically, in Coplan’s case empathy is to be identified with 
phenomenon (e): perspective shifting.  Coplan argues that, of the 
listed phenomena, only perspective shifting is capable of being 
completely mapped onto any adequate conceptual framework we 
might propose for empathy.  
Coplan claims that there are strong conceptual distinctions between 
our candidate phenomena that make it impossible to find a 
satisfactory definition of empathy that ranges over all processes (a) to 
(f), and that chasing such a definition will only cause problems for 
further research.39  Others press different conceptual distinctions in 
addition to those mentioned by Coplan, but the two sorts of difference 
most often called upon in the literature are the two that Coplan leans 
on most heavily.  The first is based on the observation that 
phenomena (a) to (c) are automatic, involuntary processes while (d) 
and (e) are voluntary and effortful activities.  The second is that 
empathy requires a clear self-other distinction.  In order for Avon to 
empathise with Omar, he must have an awareness that the purported 
empathic state originates in Omar and not in himself.  This is 
significant for two reasons: Avon must firstly be aware that the state 
did not originate in his own psychology, and secondly he must be 
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36  aware that the psychology that did produce it may have significant 
differences to his own.  Coplan argues that the only phenomenon in 
the above list that can meet these conceptual requirements is 
perspective shifting, and so that is this species of activity that Coplan 
identifies with empathy. 
 
 
1.4 Theories of Empathy: Broad and Narrow 
 
I take it that Coplan is obviously correct on at least one point; the 
various empathy-like phenomena listed above are conceptually 
distinct.  Emotional contagion and low-level simulation are both 
involuntary, automatic processes.  This distinguishes them sharply 
from high-level simulation, in-his-shoes imagining and perspective 
shifting, all of which are mental undertakings; they are mental events 
that occur as a result of, or are constituted by, a volitional mental 
activity.  Preston and de Waal admit that such phenomena as these 
last three (which they collectively label ‘cognitive empathy’) are 
“partially distinct from the more automatic…forms of empathy”40, but 
nonetheless propose that the Perception-Action Model can account 
for them.  Their reasons are vague, and suggestive more than decisive, 
but the argument seems to turn on the idea that the automatic and 
reflexive systems of Emotional Contagion and Low-Level Simulation 
promote development of areas of the prefrontal cortex that are also 
essential to these varieties of ‘cognitive empathy’.41  As a hypothesised 
conceptual connection this is, I think, a non-starter, since although it 
is indeed highly likely that some of the systems that are automatically 
activated in cases of emotional contagion are also activated in cases of, 
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37  say, high-level simulation, that by no means shows that the processes 
are of the same kind.42  The system responsible for my blink reflex will 
undoubtedly share many features with the system I engage when I 
might bat my eyelids in a display of coyness, but the fact that one 
process is a reflex and the other is a volitional action remains a vital 
point of difference between them.  The developmental parallel, 
interesting though it is, does nothing to address the issue of how 
‘cognitive empathy’ can fall under the Perception-Action Model when 
the Perception-Action Model explicitly only covers automatic 
processes, which the varieties of ‘cognitive empathy’ are emphatically 
not.43   
The claim that prosocial behaviours can be conceptually collected 
under the same label as either cognitive or non-cognitive forms of 
empathy is even less persuasive, since while helping behaviour might 
well show strong correlation with empathic events, there is no reason 
to think that the impulse to carry out such behaviour (much less the 
behaviour itself) can only be caused by those events.  Furthermore, 
even if there were no other reasonable cause to be suggested for 
prosocial behavior, for reasons familiar from the standard refutations 
of behaviourism it would be implausible to suggest that a certain 
pattern of behaviour was definitive of empathy in a way that it would 
                                                 
42 The peer commentary following Preston and de Waal’s article suggests that many cognitive scientists and other empathy researchers share my scepticism of their attempt to overcome the conceptual challenge.  Some offer solutions, but none are very promising.  See, for example, Rochat (2002), Parr (2002), Hoffman (2002), Gordon (2002), Davies (2002) James et al. (2002) and also Ainslie and Montresso (2002). 43 Some studies have shown that in fact Emotional Contagion and Low-Level Simulation are not always automatic in the sense of being purely stimulus driven.  Singer et al. (2006), Lamm et al. (2013) and Vignemont & Singer (2006) discuss findings that Mirroring processes can be partially inhibited when, for instance, the subject believed the pain their target was undergoing was deserved or necessary.  This kind of inhibition does not seem amenable to being described as ‘volitional’, however.  Even if a case were made that it could, a difference still remains between an activity being embarked upon volitionally and being capable of being inhibited volitionally.  
38  not be to claim that of a particular mental process.  Empathy must 
name a possible cause of prosocial behaviour, not the behaviour itself.  
Because of the sharp conceptual distinctions cutting three ways across 
phenomena (a) to (f) – (a), and (b) are automatic, subconscious 
processes, (c), (d) and (e) are volitional and conscious mental actions, 
and (f) names a pattern of behaviour often resulting from (a) to (e) 
which are mental processes, and is therefore a different kind of thing 
altogether – it seems that Coplan is correct in her assertion that the 
attempt to bring all six phenomena under a single concept is futile.  
However, it might be objected, indeed it has been objected by some 
neuroscientists,44 that this particular difference I have pointed to is 
not sufficient to show that there is no sense in which cognitive and 
non-cognitive forms of ‘empathy’ (ignoring the question of helping 
behavior for the sake of charity) cannot be brought under the same 
concept.   
1.4.1 The ‘Two Routes’ View 
Alvin Goldman has suggested that the automatic and cognitive brands 
of empathy discussed above actually name two distinct ‘routes’ to 
empathy.45  There is a ‘mirroring’ route that makes use of mirror 
neurons, is automatic, sub-personal and often occurs unconsciously.  
There is also a ‘reconstructive’ route to empathy (equivalent to what 
Preston and De Waal called ‘cognitive’ empathy), where empathy 
results from an effortful imaginative process to reconstruct, in the 
subject, the affective state of the target. 
This kind of approach to defining empathy has many benefits.  The 
problem of providing a unified account of empathy that captures both 
the automatic and cognitive routes, as Coplan pointed out, seems 
insurmountable.  It is, however, plausible on the face of it that 
empathy can consist in either of these two processes, and furthermore 
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39  that these processes seem to provide at least the cornerstone of a 
sufficient causal constraint to counter cases like Avon and Omar’s 
bear.  The thought seems to be that, although the processes by which 
they come about might be distinct, there is enough in common 
between the states that result from these different processes that they 
ought to be considered of the same kind, viz. empathic.   So much 
seems to reflect a growing consensus among empathy theorists, but as 
it stands I believe this view faces some important difficulties.  
The problems facing the Two Routes View partly stem from the fact 
that nearly all current theories of empathy foreground affective 
matching, in that they often take an affective match between a subject 
and object, coupled with an appropriate causal constraint, to be 
necessary and sufficient for empathy.  I believe that the dominance of 
affective matching in the debate around the nature of empathy is 
unwarranted, resulting in problems for the Two Routes view on its 
own terms, and the neglect of the centrality of the epistemic function 
of empathy as a way of offering a distinctive kind of knowledge about 
another person.  The next section will offer some considerations of the 
place of affective matching in empathy research. 
 
 
1.5 Affective Matching and the History of Empathy 
 
Two of the definitions of empathy I quoted from the popular press 
suggested that empathy involves feeling what another person feels (E1, 
E3).  Another has it that empathy merely involves understanding 
another’s feelings, without necessarily sharing them (E2).  One even 
suggests that empathy does not involve sharing the feelings of another 
at all (E4).  This disagreement, echoed in academic debates about the 
nature of empathy, comes down to whether and to what degree 
empathy involves affective matching; that is, having an affective state 
40  that is isomorphic with (the same as or similar to) the affective state of 
another.46   
The recent history of empathy research has mostly focused around 
conceptions of empathy that foreground affective matching, such as 
those proposed by Hoffman, Iacobani and Vignemont and Singer.  I 
will argue later that this has been a mistake, but to explain why the 
mistake was made in the first place it is instructive to briefly rehearse 
the short history of empathy as a philosophical concept.  
Although the term ‘empathy’ is a relatively new addition to the English 
language, appearing for the first time as a translation of the German 
Einfühlung (“feel into”) in 1909,47 the use of the term to refer 
principally or exclusively to the sharing of another’s affective state is 
an even more recent development.  Before the resurgence of interest 
in empathy research in the mid-1980s, empathy was conceived far 
more broadly as a means by which one could ‘feel one’s way into’ 
another object, be it a person, sculpture or an animal.  One of the 
great so-called ‘empathists’, Rudolf Lotze, went so far as to claim that 
“No form is so unyielding that our imagination cannot project its life 
into it”,48 a sentiment echoed by much of the work of the empathists 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries such as Theodor Lipps and Vernon 
Lee.  ‘Feeling into’, in the sense used by the empathists, referred only 
to a method of understanding the object to be empathised with.  Once 
we had ‘felt our way into’ whatever object we had set our empathic 
sights on, the empathists believed that we could avail ourselves of a 
peculiar kind of understanding of what it was like to be the object in 
question.   Einfühlung is not a matter of reproducing the feelings of 
another object, most candidate objects obviously not being the kinds 
of things that have feelings of their own.  Rather, it is a matter of using 
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41  one’s own feelings to understand the being of the target object, be it 
human, animal, mineral or vegetable.  The idea of feeling one’s way 
into a thing seems to have been deliberately vague on the accounts of 
these philosophers, Einfühlung principally serving as a broad, 
romantically minded foil to the contemporary scientific attitude of 
prioritising empirical observation as a route to understanding the 
world, and not subjected to much in the way of prolonged analysis or 
description. 
The views of the early empathists are at various stages confusing and 
implausible, and I will not seek to defend them, but the point to be 
taken from this brief historical detour is that the concept of empathy 
as a route to understanding is by no means historically limited to the 
understanding of the affective states of other people (much less merely 
the sharing of those states).  Possibly the last great empathy theorist of 
the early 20th century, Edith Stein, herself saw empathy as “the 
experience of foreign consciousness in general”,49 a view considerably 
narrower than that of Lotze and Lipps, but certainly encompassing 
more than the modern definitions cited above.  Empathy in the early 
to mid-twentieth century was serving a much more focused role than 
it had previously; principally as the groundwork for a positive 
component of the phenomenological tradition’s rejection of an 
‘inference from analogy’ as the foundation of our perception of other 
people as minded, conscious subjects.50  While it may be true that 
empathy has always been taken to involve feelings (on the 
empathiser’s part at least), I think it is a mistake to take for granted 
that feeling the same as the object with which one empathises has 
always been thought of as the sine qua non of any empathic episode.  
The early empathists thought that empathy was a way for our feelings 
to inform our understanding of an object, some phenomenologists 
thought that our feelings gave us a way of understanding others as 
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42  conscious subjects.  Neither of these views of empathy require 
affective matching in the way we currently understand it, and yet 
affective matching has become the dominant criterion of empathy 
across almost all current theories. 
I believe there are two principal reasons why affective matching has 
become so central to contemporary empathy research.  The first is that 
the conceptual framework of this research has been somewhat 
contaminated by the continued closeness of empathy and sympathy 
both in the minds of ordinary people, and in the academic tradition 
that owes so much to the work of Hume and Smith.  In general terms, 
the common conflation of sympathy and empathy (of which more 
later) encourages a conception of empathy that is fundamentally or 
distinctively affective in nature, since sympathy is distinctly affective 
and is generally better understood than empathy.  In terms of the 
legacy of Hume and Smith, they originally credited the concept of 
sympathy with playing two distinct roles; first, with encouraging us to 
share the affective state of other people and, second, with motivating 
ourselves to alleviate the suffering of other people.  On most modern 
analyses, the motivational role is restricted to sympathy, whereas 
empathy is credited with our frequently sharing the affective states of 
other people.  This analysis is fine as far as it goes, but by describing 
empathy principally in terms of a partial role it played in Humean 
Sentimentalism we foreground its sentimental qualities in a way which 
is not necessarily warranted.  Empathy, for a modern reading of 
Hume, needs to allow people to understand that another person is 
suffering in order that we can then sympathise with them, and so be 
motivated to help.  Broadly speaking, it isn’t necessary that the 
understanding that empathy grants us is primarily based on affective 
matching. However, empathy is generally understood to primarily 
consist in affective matching anyway because, in part at least, our 
modern conception of empathy is descended from Hume’s conception 
of sympathy. Affective matching was a crucial component of Humean 
43  sympathy, because the one emotional state was required to both 
inform the subject that the object of their sympathy was suffering and 
motivate them to alleviate it.  The sharing of a negative affect achieved 
these two aims, but since we no longer think empathy and sympathy 
ought to be conflated, empathy no longer needs to consist in affective 
matching in order to play its role in Humean moral motivation.51     
The second reason I believe affective matching has become so 
ingrained in contemporary empathy research is that since affective 
responses are relatively easy to observe they have become the focus of 
much scientific work on empathy.  It is relatively easy to empirically 
observe whether or not one person is feeling the same way as another 
person, but very difficult to determine with the same level of clarity 
whether one person is identifying with another person in more 
psychologically rich ways (sharing their evaluative dispositions, for 
instance).  The ease of measuring brute affective states might easily 
have led to other possible facets of empathy being largely ignored.  
Furthermore, the discovery of mirror neurons, and related advances in 
the understanding of how our brains might be wired to automatically 
simulate the affective states of others, have attracted claims that these 
are the processes that ‘really’ constitute empathy, which the 
consequence that empathy can be effectively reduced to affective 
matching and nothing more.52  Many empathy theorists seem deeply 
impressed by these claims, to the extent that theories of empathy are 
engineered from the ground up to incorporate them in a way that is 
both at odds with much of the historical literature on empathy (as 
noted above), but also becomes unwieldy in combination with their 
own views, as I shall make clear in the following sections. 
Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that the fact that empirical 
observation of affective states is easy relative to observation of more 
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44  psychologically rich states means that empirical observation is a 
simple matter on its own terms.   As a specific example, it is typical of 
research from the sciences published on empathy or its cognates 
(mindreading, ‘emotional intelligence’ and the like) to measure the 
ability of people to empathise using the ‘Mayer-Salovey-Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test’.53  The test is based on identifying 
emotions expressed in photographs.  The test does not claim to tell 
whether its subjects are correct in the identifying of emotions 
expressed in photographs, merely whether subjects’ answers agreed 
with answers given by acknowledged experts.  If people were 
systematically unable to detect a particular kind of emotion from a 
particular facial expression, this test would be unable to detect that 
fact.54  Neither of these oversights is insurmountable, and indeed some 
work on empathy include neither,55 but the point remains that 
affective matching has become definitive of empathy in a way that I 
believe is unfortunate.    
The preceding few paragraphs gives me the first tentative basis on 
which to introduce one of the major claims of this thesis; that 
empathy is not, at root, a matter of affective matching.  I do not 
disagree that a successful empathising will involve affective matching, 
I merely dispute the idea that affective matching is empathy’s ultimate 
purpose or central feature. 
Recall that according to the Complex Theory, empathy is the making 
of a demonstrative ascription to a target of the form ‘[the target] feels 
like this’.  Importantly, the ‘feeling’ referred to in the empathic 
ascription isn’t intended to stand for merely the affective states or 
emotions of the target, but rather the indeterminately wide-ranging 
phenomenal character of what it’s like to be the target.  The emotions 
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45  and affective states of my target will certainly form a part of my 
demonstrative ascription, and will also inform my imaginings about 
what it might be like to be a person with those emotional states.  
However, the feeling I will eventually ascribe to you will (probably) be 
richer than a mere set of affective states.  The feeling I ascribe to you 
when I empathise will include the feeling of what it’s like to be a 
person like you with those emotions at that time, not merely the 
feeling of the emotions themselves. 
The view of empathy I am proposing is psychologically and narratively 
very rich.  That is, I am proposing that empathy is capable of 
delivering us an understanding of what it’s like to be another person 
that takes into account not just the emotional and affective states they 
may be experiencing, but also those states’ relationship to one another 
and to the object of empathy, as well as to their situation, personal 
history and character.  As such, the ability to affectively-match one’s 
target when attempting to empathise remains of crucial importance 
on my view; the type, intensity and object of the emotional states of 
one’s target provide much rich material from which to construct an 
experience to ascribe to them.  However, although I agree that 
affective-matching is a necessary part of empathy, I do not think that 
it is sufficient for empathy, nor do I think it is sufficient grounds on 
which to make the demonstrative ascription that I take empathy to 
consist in.  Affective matching, on my view, is one of several proto-
empathies; that is, imaginative projects which need to be undertaken 
in order to provide sufficient grounding for an empathic ascription.  
The next section will outline why I think that affective matching, even 
with appropriate causal constraints, cannot provide sufficient grounds 
for empathy by itself. 
 
 
46  1.6 Regularity, Reliability and Usefulness 
 
As I outlined in the previous section, it seems that historically affective 
matching has not been always been considered necessary for empathy.  
After all, one cannot match affects with an object that has no affective 
states, and since those early empathists thought that one could 
empathise with that kind of object, it can’t be the case that they 
considered affective matching necessary for empathy.  My 
disagreement with contemporary empathy theorists such as Iacobani, 
Hoffman and Vignemont and Singer is not, however, about whether or 
not empathy involves affective matching.  Rather it is my contention 
that what they have identified as empathy is actually a variety of 
proto-empathy, and as such something that is necessary to ground an 
empathic ascription (or, if we prefer, a necessary part of the empathic 
process), but insufficient for empathy as a means of understanding 
another person.  In what follows I lay out some desiderata for a theory 
of empathy, that it makes empathy regular, reliable and useful, and 
show how different conceptions of what constitute affective matching 
open to the Two Routes View struggle to meet them. 
Among the desiderata for a good theory of empathy must be that it 
allows that empathy can successfully occur with some regularity.  That 
is, although we need a theory that grants empathy sufficient causal 
constraints that we can evade the ‘bear’ challenge we must still make it 
plausible that a process occurring within those constraints could 
regularly lead to successful empathy with another person.  One way of 
making it more plausible that any given process will result in an 
affective match between an empathiser and their target is to adopt a 
conception of affective matching that requires only a very minimal 
standard of similarity for two states to count as isomorphic. 
There is some disagreement among various theorists as to precisely 
what isomorphism in empathic affective matching must amount to.  
Some propose that a congruence of affect between empathiser and 
47  target, nothing stronger than some qualitative similarity or identical 
valence between the two, is all that we need claim is involved in 
affective matching.56  Qualitative similarity is described in very loose 
terms by those who suggest it as a criterion for affective matching, so 
it is difficult to assess what precisely it amounts to.  I think it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that it might mean something like ‘involving 
some of the same perceptible affective properties’, such that Avon’s 
state counts as affectively matching Omar’s if Avon is feeling anger 
and Omar frustration, because they both might involve feelings of 
tension.  ‘Identical Valence’ as the criterion for affective matching is 
only slightly less vague; two affective states have identical valence if 
they are both ‘positive’ emotions (such as joy and pride) or are both 
‘negative’ emotions (such as anger and fear).  Again, the identical 
valence criterion for affective matching allows for some odd cases; 
your shame and my grief would count as matching affective states on 
this view, and it would be a stretch to suggest that we could be 
empathising with one another on the basis of our having two such 
different emotions, identical valence notwithstanding.  Others place 
stricter demands on what will count as affective matching, requiring 
that the feeling of the empathiser and the target are of the same kind, 
although accepting that the matching state can vary in degree or 
intensity from that of the target.57   
I think it is highly unlikely that a mere identical valence will suffice for 
the kind of affective matching that we need to play a role in our 
conception of empathy.  For one thing, evidence both from cognitive 
neuroscience58 and from our own experience tells us that empathy is 
capable of a great deal more precision than that.  For another, the idea 
that all empathy can reliably lead us to understand is the valence of 
another person’s affective state leaves us with a dramatically etiolated 
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48  notion of empathy.  A further desideratum for a good theory of 
empathy, in addition to allowing empathy to regularly occur, is that it 
must also posit the understanding that empathy grants us as in some 
way useful. If empathy were not useful, it would be extremely difficult 
to account for how so much evolutionary effort has been expended in 
developing the subtle and complex neurological systems that underpin 
it.  I think it is obvious that an empathy that could only reliably 
replicate the valence of another’s affective state could not be described 
as especially useful.  If Omar is feeling apprehensive and Avon, upon 
empathising with Omar (either automatically or cognitively), 
simulates anger, thus understanding Omar to be angry (an emotion of 
identical valence), Avon is liable to make some serious social blunders 
on the basis of that false belief.  For our current purposes I can afford 
to be pluralistic insofar as what ought to count as isomorphism in an 
affective match.  I am attracted to Coplan’s criterion that two people’s 
states affectively match only when they are the same kind, although 
they can vary in degree and intensity.59  That may turn out to be too 
restrictive, particularly if, as I suspect, that would necessitate the 
empathiser being aware of what type of feeling they were having.  In 
any case, I think it is clear that in order to preserve the usefulness of 
empathy, it ought to consist in something more than identical valence. 
Once we do assume affective matching to consist in something 
stronger than emotions of identical valence, Goldman’s ‘two routes’ 
view becomes problematic.  Unfortunately for the Two Routes view, it 
turns out that when one route is taken, affective matching is ruled out 
if it consists in something stronger than identical valence.  Even worse, 
if the other route is taken affective matching is guaranteed, but useful 
understanding of the target is ruled out.  In what follows I will spell 
this criticism out in detail. 
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49  Goldman’s view is explicitly based on Vignemont and Singer’s 
definition of empathy.  That is: 
“There is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is 
isomorphic to another person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited 
by the observation or imagination of another person’s affective state; 
(iv) one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own affective 
state.”60 
  Their view suits Goldman well as a starting point, firstly because it is 
in itself an initially plausible (if ultimately flawed) account of empathy 
as affective matching.  Secondly, because the disjunction built into the 
condition of their definition governing appropriate sources of 
empathic states gives conceptual space for either route to be taken in 
any given case of empathy.  However, their conception of empathy 
ultimately fails because the additional constraints necessary to ensure 
that sufficient understanding is granted in each ‘route’ to empathy 
makes it highly unlikely that either one could be successfully 
navigated.   
1.6.2 Automatic ‘Empathy’ is not Useful 
Whatever else empathy is, it is clear that one of its functions is as a 
method of coming to understand the inner life of another person.61  In 
order for it to serve this purpose it is not sufficient that we merely feel 
the same way as another person, nor even that we also feel the same 
way as another person because that person feels that way.  There must 
be some intentional attitude linking the empathiser’s state with that of 
her target; if I am going to form beliefs about another’s inner life, it 
must be based on information that I have access to.  Vignemont and 
Singer prescribe a knowledge condition; we must know that we feel 
the same way as our target because they feel that way.  More precisely, 
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50  we must know that the target is feeling the same way as we are, that 
our feeling is suitably caused by our target’s feeling that way, and that 
the feeling in question was originally a product of the target’s 
psychology, and not of ours.  I do not think we need to go as far as 
prescribing knowledge; a justified belief will do the work just as well.  
In either case, these stipulations are warranted by the regularity, 
usefulness and reliability criteria that I referred to earlier; if we want 
empathy to be useful to us (specifically, useful in forming beliefs about 
the inner lives of others), then it must happen, we must know that it is 
happening and it must provide us with some useful, and one would 
assume accurate, information.   
The knowledge condition, which is captured in part (iv) of Vignemont 
and Singer’s definition, has very different effects on the overall picture 
of empathy offered depending on which route offered by the disjunct 
in condition (iii) applies in each case.  If one was to attempt to 
empathise following the reconstructive route it seems that one could 
not fail to know the identity of the target of one’s empathy.  It does 
not seem possible that Avon could attempt to imaginatively 
reconstruct in himself Omar’s affective state without knowing that it 
was Omar whose state he was reconstructing.  The same is true if we 
replace the knowledge condition with a justified belief; if Avon is 
attempting to reconstruct himself in Omar’s affective state, then he 
will always have a justified belief that it is Omar’s affective state that 
he is reconstructing.  It seems, therefore, that the knowledge 
condition is somewhat redundant if the reconstructive route is being 
taken in any given case.  
The condition is necessary, however, if the automatic route to 
empathy is taken.  The Perception-Action Model (which I take to be a 
good description of the automatic, if not the reconstructive, varieties 
of empathy) does not entail that the empathiser be aware that her 
state is causally related to that of another person. PAM does specify 
that it must be attended perception of the object’s state that triggers 
51  the automatic simulation of that state.  It is unclear precisely what is 
meant by ‘attended’ perception here.  It could plausibly mean that one 
has to be aware of one’s perception of, say, the empathic target’s facial 
expression or that one has to be aware of what kind of expression it is 
that one is perceiving in the target.  I’m not convinced that either 
interpretation allows certain documented cases of emotional 
contagion that Preston and de Waal would certainly want to include 
under PAM.62 These cases include such instances as a person talking 
to someone who smiles, and whose smiling triggers an automatic 
mimicking of that precise facial expression in the subject, causing the 
subject to feel the same kind of emotion as their interlocutor.  In such 
cases it does not seem that the subject cognises their perception in any 
sense; they do not need to recognise that they have perceived a smile 
in order for it to have the effect noted.  It seems to be generally 
accepted that there is no requirement that the subject consciously 
register the expression being perceived in order for some automatic 
mirroring process to occur.63 
However, even if the perception of a target’s state does have to be 
attended to in such a strong sense, there is no reason to think that the 
conscious realisation that one’s target is in a state identical to one’s 
own will lead one to the belief that the one state is causally related to 
the other.  Imagine that Avon and Omar are once again both facing a 
bear, but that Avon is generally not afraid of dangerous wild beasts.  If 
Avon sees that Omar is afraid, and then himself becomes afraid as a 
result of an automatic mirroring process, he would be entirely justified 
in putting his fear down to a change in his attitude towards bears and 
not a sub-personal, automatic mimicking of Omar’s fear.  If Avon 
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52  knew something about the psychology of social cognition he might 
make the causal connection between his state and Omar’s, but failing 
that it may well be more reasonable for him to believe that his fear is a 
straightforward affective response to the bear he sees than that his fear 
has its source in Omar.  
The condition that an empathiser must know that her affective state 
has its source in the target of their empathy, as suggested by 
Vignemont and Singer, successfully blocks some cases that we would 
not want to call empathy.  If Avon contracts Omar’s fear via emotional 
contagion, but believes the state originates in himself, we may resist 
calling Avon’s fear empathic.  However, that condition also seems to 
block other cases that we may want to call empathic.  If Avon 
contracts Omar’s fear via emotional contagion, but believes that it 
originates in Lester, who is also present, the knowledge condition 
seems to prevent that being counted as empathy.  Is there really no 
empathy in such a case?  Is it not rather that Avon is mistaken about 
the target of his empathy?   
It is precisely these kinds of worry Alvin Goldman (2011) had in mind 
when he wrote, of Vignemont and Singer’s definition: 
“I think it is fair to require a receiver to have some sort of intentional 
attitude directed toward the target by which the resonating state is 
linked to him. Otherwise, it doesn’t seem like a case of empathy. I 
suspect that condition (iv) is too strong an intentional condition of this 
kind, but I don’t have a wholly suitable replacement for it.” 
Replacing the knowledge condition with one requiring a justified 
belief would evade this problem, since Avon, although mistaken, may 
be justified in believing that his fear originated in Lester rather than 
Omar. I am sceptical, however, of the possibility that a replacement 
for the knowledge condition can be found that avoids the worst of the 
above problems.  A justified belief condition, rather than a knowledge 
condition, will still be too strong to allow the vast majority of 
instances of automatic mirroring to count as empathy.  This is simply 
53  because the nature of the empathic project we are trying to capture 
requires the kind of intentional state that can justify an ascription of 
the feeling one has to another.  There are, as I will show, other ways of 
justifying such ascriptions than by requiring knowledge.  However, I 
think it is highly implausible that any such justification can be found 
by proposing some intentional state that is unconsciously brought 
about along with the mirrored affect, and that is what Goldman’s 
intentional state would have to be in order to fulfil its proposed 
function.64  
1.6.3 Reconstructive Empathy is not Reliable 
The reconstructive route to empathy guarantees that condition (iv) of 
Vignemont and Singer’s definition is met, but the automatic route 
does not.  Interestingly, the reverse holds of condition (ii).  No matter 
how strictly or otherwise we define ‘isomorphism’ it will always be the 
case that the automatic route is more or less guaranteed to result in an 
affective match between subject and target, whereas the 
reconstructive route to empathy is liable to misfire.  Automatic 
mirroring processes, often activated by ‘microexpressions’ in the target 
(which are by their nature nearly impossible both to consciously 
mimic and consciously perceive), are not susceptible either to 
fraudulent emotional expression or to inept interpretation of 
emotional expressions in the same way as their reconstructive 
counterparts.65  Reconstructive empathy relies on the empathiser 
being able to consciously garner what information they can about 
their target’s emotion in order to simulate their mental state as 
accurately as possible.  The reliability of the reconstruction therefore 
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54  depends on the reliability of the methods by which we come acquire 
that information.     
The reconstructive route to empathy can misfire in a number of ways.  
Avon, attempting to empathise with Omar, may be mistaken about 
several features of Omar and his situation that could lead him to 
imagine having an affective state that is not isomorphic with Omar’s.  
Avon might simply not be good at consciously reading people’s body 
language or other physical expressions of emotion and may thereby 
mistake Omar’s experience of guilt for anger, leading him to imagine 
the wrong type of emotion in himself in his effort to empathise.  Avon 
would not even have to be unusually bad at picking up on physical 
cues to make this kind of mistake.  Facial expressions are one of the 
major sources of information concerning the mental states of those 
who bear them.  Even though people are generally accurate in their 
reporting of the kind of facial expression they perceive in another (a 
smile, a frown, a gasp), they are far less reliable when it comes to 
determining the emotion state that is being expressed in that way.  A 
widely reported study conducted at MIT showed that people often 
smile as an involuntary expression of frustration.  Their trial involved 
one group of participants who were video recorded carrying out a 
frustrating task, and later video recorded doing their best to 
deliberately express frustration with no frustrating stimulus.  Another 
group of participants was asked to judge what emotion was being 
expressed in each case.  It was discovered not only that people who 
perceived frustration-smiles on video stills of the participants 
performed no better than chance at identifying the emotion expressed 
(from a list of three options), but also that when asked to act 
frustrated only 10% of participants smiled in the course of their 
pretence.  A final interesting piece of data from the experiment is that 
people tended to be significantly better at identifying pretended 
55  emotions than genuine ones.66  This suggests that people are in 
general fairly unreliable at determining precisely what emotions are 
associated with what facial expressions, especially in cases where they 
are genuine expressions of some emotion.  The fact that people seem 
to be significantly worse at identifying genuine emotions than feigned 
ones certainly seems to threaten the idea of reconstructive empathy 
being a reliable route to understanding.  If anything, it suggests that 
we are more likely to identify the emotions people wish to be 
perceived as experiencing, and not what they actually do experience. 
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56  2. THE COMPLEX THEORY OF EMPATHY 
 
2.1 Introduction: What we need from a New Theory 
 
It would seem to follow that the reconstructive route to empathy, 
unlike the automatic, cannot be reliably embarked upon solely on the 
basis of perceived facial expressions.  The issue here is one of 
justification: if the end goal of empathy is to come to some 
understanding of the feelings of another person, we need some way to 
justify the ascription of those feelings to that other person.  We need 
justification of two different sorts.  The first, which reconstructive 
empathy always provides, but automatic empathy rarely if ever does, is 
some reason for thinking that the feeling being felt is not an affective 
response to the situation in which we find ourselves, brought about by 
our usual affective response mechanisms.  The second sort of 
justification, which automatic empathy does provide, but which we 
might say is impotent absent the first sort of justification, is some 
good reason for thinking that the state we are experiencing is 
isomorphic with the state being experienced by the target. 
I have given some evidence that people generally perform poorly at 
identifying the type of emotion indicated by any given facial 
expression, however that is certainly not the only source of 
information we can call on in order to determine the type of affective 
state one would have to conjure in oneself to bring about an affective 
match between ourselves and our target.  Despite our propensity to 
mistakenly identify the particular emotions associated with certain 
types of facial expression, we may nonetheless be justified in taking 
our judgement in a given case as accurate if we have some additional 
support for it.  Recalling once again Avon, Omar and the bear, we 
might think that, despite not being generally reliable in identifying 
emotion types by their expression, the fact that Omar is faced with a 
bear, a plausibly fear-inspiring experience, lends credence to Avon’s 
57  belief that the fear state he imagines in himself is isomorphic with 
Omar’s. 
It seems to follow from Avon’s belief about the object of Omar’s fear 
that the content of his imagining will change to incorporate it.  
Consider the kind of imaginative project that Avon is engaging in 
when he attempts to imaginatively reconstruct Omar’s state.  It is not, 
primarily, a matter of propositional imagining, of Avon ‘supposing’ 
that he is in a state isomorphic with Omar’s.  Rather, it is an example 
of ‘sensory imagining’, that is, of imagining from the inside a sensory 
experience.67   Given that, we should understand Avon’s imaginative 
project to reconstruct in himself Omar’s affective state as an effort to 
imagine having an experience of being in that state.  Avon, in this case, 
is trying to imagine having Omar’s experience of being afraid.  I 
contend that for Avon to successfully complete such an imaginative 
project would entail that he not only imagine feeling afraid, but feeling 
afraid-of-a-bear, where the object of the fear is a part of the imagined 
experience.  It might be claimed here that I am requiring too much to 
be included in the content of the imagined experience; why could it 
not be the case that one experientially imagines only the feeling of 
fear, while propositionally imagining, of that fear, that it was caused by 
facing off to a bear? 
There is a general, though not unanimous, consensus among 
philosophers that emotions are intentional states; that is, that 
emotions are directed towards objects or states of affairs.68  If we 
agree, it seems that we must require that if Avon is to successfully 
imagine having an experience relevantly similar to the experience 
Omar is having that Avon must not just imagine ‘being afraid’, but 
‘being afraid of’ the object or state of affairs towards which the fear is 
directed.  I am uncertain about the possibility of imagining the 
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58  experience of being afraid without also imagining the experience of 
whatever the state is directed towards.  My intuitions have it that if it 
is possible to merely imagine experiencing being in the affective state 
one would have if one were afraid, without imagining some object 
towards which the fear is directed, then one is simply not imagining 
the experience of being afraid; that fear is intentional is, I think, one of 
its essential features.  
It should be noted that I do not claim that Avon must necessarily 
visualise the bear that is the object of his imagined fear.  In order to 
empathise with Omar, Avon does need to experientially imagine 
fearing a bear, but it is not clear to me that this essentially involves the 
sensory imagination of the bear that is the object of the fear.  I can, 
after all, imagine being angry with my father without visualising, or 
sensuously imagining of any sort, that I perceive him doing something 
to anger me.  I am still, in such a case, experientially imagining being 
angry at my father though, and not merely experientially imagining 
being angry and propositionally imagining that the imagined anger is 
directed at my father.  There is clear introspective evidence to be 
found on this point, for if I imagine the experience of being angry at 
my father for forgetting my birthday, and then the experience of being 
angry at my roommate for the same offence, that most minimal 
change in content noticeably changes the emotion as I imagine feeling 
it.  It is not the case that each time I am simply imagining being angry 
and then tacking on an intentional object via a propositional 
imagining, but the feeling of each is itself partly determined by its 
object.  The intentional object of the emotion can, therefore, be safely 
considered a part of what is experientially imagined, even if the 
perception of the object is not a part of that imagining. 
Even if we do not want to take such states as fear to be essentially 
intentional, for purely practical purposes it is plausible that we should 
expect the empathiser to include in the content of her imagining some 
details of the situation to which the imagined state is a response.  In 
59  the interests once again of making empathy useful, it seems that any 
advantageous understanding of another’s feeling must include some 
details of how it came about.  How much more useful than simply 
knowing that Omar is afraid is knowing the kinds of situation that 
make Omar react that way?  If indeed the point of empathy is to come 
to some sort of understanding about Omar himself, rather than one of 
his many temporary affective states, then it follows that what would be 
interesting about this particular empathic experience would not be 
that Omar feels fear, but that he feels fear in this type of scenario.  A 
simple experiential imagining of only the affective component of 
Omar’s fear divorced from any object, even if it were supposed it could 
be so imagined, could not be described as revealing anything whatever 
about Omar besides his current affective state.  All Avon could learn 
from such an imagining is what it is like to feel as if one is afraid, 
something Avon may well need to know already in order to simulate 
the fear. 
Interestingly, while it is (arguably) impossible for Avon to imagine 
feeling Omar’s fear without also imagining that it is fear-of-a-bear, if 
Avon is experientially imagining being in the situation to which Omar 
is responding it does not appear to be necessary that he thereby 
imagines being afraid.  So, while Avon cannot experientially imagine 
being afraid without thereby experientially imagining being afraid-of-
something, his experientially imagining being in a bear-facing 
situation does not entail that Avon imagines any affective or 
emotional response to that situation whatever.  
This tells us something interesting about experiential imagining in 
general; that imagining an experience of an F does not necessarily 
involve imagining a full experience of an F.  By this I mean that 
imagining an experience of a given object, or a given scenario, does 
not entail imagining that experience in all sense modalities; imagining 
seeing an F does not necessarily involve imagining hearing an F, 
smelling an F and so on.  Given this, why should we think that 
60  imagining an experience of an F entails imagining one’s affective 
response when confronted with an F?  Although the imagined 
experience will be a unified one, it seems that the sensory content of 
any given imagining is subject to the imaginative engagement of those 
sense modalities that would, in the case of a real experience, be 
responsible for the perceptual content of that experience.  In short, if 
Avon were to imagine himself in Omar’s situation, that of facing a 
bear, he does not thereby necessarily imagine an affective response to 
that situation.  So, even if Avon knows for a certainty that Omar, when 
confronted with the bear, is afraid of it, Avon is at liberty to 
experientially imagine being in Omar’s situation without also 
imagining that fear.  If, however, Avon is just imagining Omar’s fear, it 
seems that the bear-facing situation must make some appearance in 
the content of the imagining, if only as the intentional object of the 
imagined fear. 
This is important because it means that there are at least two distinct 
imaginative processes that need to be engaged in order to complete 
Avon’s imaginative project.  Avon must engage what we might call his 
somatosensory imagination in order to reconstruct the feeling that he 
takes Omar to be experiencing, and he must also engage some variety 
of imagination that will provide an imagined object towards which the 
fear is directed.  This will, in the most successful cases of empathy, be 
one or more varieties of sensory imagination (though not in all or even 
most cases of empathy in general).  That is because, I think it is 
reasonable to assume, the more sensuously replete the imagined 
situation is the more fine-grained and intense the imagined affective 
response to that experience is able to be.   
These two distinct kinds of imaginative process I will call feeling-with 
and doing-with.  Feeling-with is imagining being in the same affective 
state as another, while doing-with is imagining being in the same 
situation as another.  Feeling-with and Doing-with are both kinds of 
proto-empathy; they are the imaginative projects we must undertake 
61  in order to properly ground a demonstrative ascription to our target.  
By understanding empathy to consist in more than one kind of 
imaginative process we can begin to see how reconstructive empathy 
can be a reliable method of coming to understand a target’s affective 
state.  Let us modify the case of Avon and Omar a little so that Omar 
faces the bear alone, then runs away and meets Avon a short time 
later.  Suppose Omar tells Avon he has just seen a bear, and Avon 
perceives that Omar seems more than a little shaken.  Where Avon 
has not seen the bear himself, it is perhaps less certain that Omar has 
seen a bear, and certainly less certain that Omar’s fear was in response 
to the bear.  However, that is still probably a reasonable set of beliefs 
for Avon to adopt in this situation.  Now, obviously Avon does not 
need to empathise with Omar in order to make the judgement that 
Omar’s apparent state, fear, is an affective response to his reported 
situation, facing a bear.  Avon may, however, want to attempt empathy 
with Omar in order to understand what it is like to be afraid of a bear.  
Remember that our problem in this section was how to ensure that the 
affective state brought about in reconstructive empathy can reliably 
track the affective state of the target, but here we must be a bit more 
specific about what that means. 
 
 
2.2 Making Reconstructive Empathy Reliable 
 
Without empathising, but with the information about Omar’s 
situation and physical state, we could justifiably ascribe to Omar the 
state of fear.  However, when Avon empathises with Omar he ascribes 
not the type of state he experiences to Omar, but the quality of that 
experience.  At the conclusion of Avon’s empathic project, he will not 
necessarily be in a position to say that Omar feels angry, but rather 
that Omar feels like this.  The goal of empathising is to be able to 
make this kind of demonstrative ascription; to arrive at an 
62  understanding of what it is like to be the target in their current state.  
How is that kind of ascription justified by an empathic imagining? 
One might think that the justification lay in some tacitly accepted 
principle of analogy; whereby if I imagine feeling as you do in your 
situation, the quality of my feeling can be judged to be reliably similar 
by virtue of the fact that we operate with relevantly similar 
psychological mechanisms.  This can’t be the whole story.  It is a 
common thought among empathy theorists that reconstructive 
empathy requires what is known as a ‘self-other distinction’.69  That is, 
if Avon is to gain some kind of understanding of Omar by empathising 
with him, he find some way of quarantining his own psychology from 
the imagined stimulus and response of Omar’s situation.  If we recall 
once again the variation of Avon’s story where he is not typically afraid 
of bears, we can see why this must be the case.  Avon is not generally 
afraid of bears or bear-facing situations, so if he imagines from the 
inside the experience of a bear and the experience of being afraid of a 
bear there would be something incongruous, possibly even incoherent, 
about this imagining.  Just as Elizabeth Anscombe and others have 
observed the difficulty inherent in imagining desiring a saucer of mud 
if there is nothing about mud that I find desirable; by the same token 
it seems difficult to conceive of imagining being afraid of bears if one 
did not find anything about bears fearful.70 
It is important to consider the end goal of such imaginings.  The 
empathic imagining is intended to produce understanding, to solve a 
mental puzzle that will lead us to knowledge of the experiences of 
others.  The imagination of the saucer of mud, likewise, may be 
intended to lead me to an understanding of what it might be like to 
eat it.  Both kinds of imagining plausibly involve measures of aesthetic 
sensitivity, but in the case of empathy that aesthetic sensitivity is 
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63  tuned to determining how ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘pleasing’ or ‘not pleasing’, 
‘congruous’ and ‘incongruous’ are a given combination of a feeling-
with, doing-with and being-with.  Although there are ways that we can 
appeal on a cognitive basis to the fittingness of our proto-empathic 
imaginings (such as whether a fear of bears is consistent with being 
unafraid of a bear), we can also judge the level of harmony between 
the various elements of an imagined experience by exercising our 
aesthetic sensibilities. 
For these reasons, I am tempted to understand empathic incongruity 
as an aesthetic sensitivity to the consistency of a set of proto-empathic 
imaginings.  I believe that, conceived this way, empathic incongruity 
will turn out to be familiar to us from at least two excellent sources.  
The first of these is John Dewey, for whom aesthetic sensibility plays a 
crucial role in unifying ‘experience’ (of sounds, images, feelings etc.) 
into ‘experiences’; that raw experience wrought into some narrative 
form through which we can understand it as a unified event.  Dewey’s 
experiences are typified by “internal integration and fulfilment 
reached through ordered and organised movement”.71  Indeed, for 
Dewey this aesthetic character, exemplified by ‘integration’ and 
‘organisation’, pervades all experience, and has a special place in 
intellectual inquiry.  It is the aesthetic sense of tension that exists 
when there is a problem to be solved, that motivates the drives and 
directions one takes towards the solution, and it is the aesthetic sense 
of resolution that brings that problem solving experience to a close.  It 
is the aesthetic, for Dewey, that drives the sense of progression 
through any inquiry or the solving of any puzzle, which will certainly 
include the empathic puzzles that are our concern here.  If, in the end, 
we were to say that empathic ascriptions are justified by virtue of their 
aesthetic qualities, we would be keeping them in good company.     
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64  The second source is Immanual Kant, who writes in his discussion of 
humour in the third Critique: 
“In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there must be 
something absurd (in which the understanding, therefore, can find no 
satisfaction). Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden 
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing. This 
transformation, which is certainly not enjoyable to the understanding, 
yet indirectly gives it very active enjoyment for a moment. Therefore, its 
cause must consist in the influence of the representation upon the body, 
and the reflex effect of this upon the mind.”72 
In this passage Kant is endorsing something like the still popular 
incongruity theory of humour, according to which something is funny 
when it creates and then resolves a tension in understanding.  
Although he does not use the term, I think the notion of the 
incongruous as ‘that in which the understanding can find no 
satisfaction’ is an illuminating one to apply to the case at hand.  
Compare again imaginative resistance, where our imagination strains 
against our will, with a feeling felt-with alongside an incongruous 
character trait in the imaginer, such that the empathiser would not 
usually feel that feeling.  In the latter case, the imagining seems to get 
off the ground easily enough, but there is something in tension, 
something ‘unsatisfying’ about holding it in mind.  If empathy were a 
joke this tension, this unsatisfying element in the experience, would 
collapse in on itself, leaving only laughter.  Empathy is, perhaps 
obviously, more profitably compared to a conventional puzzle than a 
joke.  Empathy is, as we have described it, a route to understanding, or 
even a mode of inquiry.  We have a question to be answered (‘what is 
it like to be Omar at this moment’, for instance) a set of tools and a 
method to follow.  We have puzzle pieces (the imagined experiences), 
a puzzle box (the empathiser’s imagination), and there are only a very 
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65  few correct ways to arrange the pieces in the box.  Our sense of 
empathic incongruity is analogous to feeling the pressure as one slides 
a piece in the wrong slot, or seeing the inelegant pattern that results; 
the tension it detects is the disharmony of ill combined proto-
empathies.  This disharmony, ‘unsatisfying to the understanding’ as it 
is, motivates us to alter our imaginings until a satisfyingly harmonious 
experience is the result.   
This kind of incongruity in imagining, or rather the lack of it, is what 
serve to justify the demonstrative ascription of the empathiser’s 
experience to their target.  If Avon were generally afraid of bears, then 
the attempt to imagine experiencing being afraid in response to a bear 
would not be accompanied by that sense of incongruity.  This is 
because there would not be any relevant difference between Avon and 
Omar’s character (which I take to be something like the mental 
dispositions that, among other things, constrain their reactions to any 
given situation73).  This in turn means that the quality of Avon’s 
imagined experience of the bear is likely to closely resemble that of 
Omar’s.  This justificatory power of the congruity of proto-empathies 
can itself be justified simply by considering how difficult it would be 
to have congruous proto-empathic imaginings that could not be 
truthfully ascribed to their target.  Here is where an inference from 
analogy comes into play: while we cannot take for granted that Avon 
and Omar’s psychologies function in analogous ways when it comes to 
predicting whether they will react in the same way to the same 
situation, we can take for granted that people, in general, do not have 
such incongruous inner lives. 
 Now, in the case of Avon, Omar and the bear it could be wondered 
whether the possible understanding Avon will gain from this project 
will be worth his effort.  If Avon understands that Omar is feeling ‘like 
this’, where ‘like this’ refers to Avon’s imagined fear towards the 
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66  imagined bear, and it is no different to how Avon himself would react 
in that situation, what has Avon learned?  He has learned that Omar 
has responded in much the same way as Avon himself would in the 
same situation, which could be useful to know, but probably not very 
surprising to learn.  Perhaps this is not the most interesting of 
empathic projects, but it is hardly a typical case; one would generally 
not need to embark on a difficult imaginative project in order to 
understand what it would be like to be afraid of a wild bear.  However, 
if we take, for a final time, the scenario in which Avon is not typically 
afraid of bears, what must Avon accomplish in order to rid his 
imagining of the incongruity that blocks his justifiably ascribing that 
state to Omar? 
 
 
2.3 Making Automatic Empathy Useful 
 
The sub-personal, automatic route to affective matching fails to meet 
the standards of usefulness in a theory of empathy in two ways.  First, 
there seems to be no available practical reason why anyone would 
think that a feeling that they themselves felt did not originate in them, 
but rather in someone else.  Secondly, even if one did believe that 
one’s affective state did not originate in oneself, how could the 
demonstrative ascription of that state to another ever be justified?74 
Such concerns are supposed to be blocked by the fourth condition in 
Vignemont and Singer’s definition of empathy, that one must know 
that one’s affective state originated in the target of the empathising, 
but the possibility of that condition being met in any given case 
seems, prima facie, a very small one. 
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67  It could be argued that I have set the bar for usefulness too high.  
Perhaps empathy need not be useful in the sense that it adds to our 
understanding of the inner lives of others.  It is doubtless plausible 
that there are many evolutionary advantages to the tendency to 
spontaneous sharing of affect with our fellows, even if those affective 
states are never thought of as having originated in anything other than 
the ‘usual’ way.  Even so, it is hard to swallow the idea that simply 
having a feeling that was caused (in a particular way) by the feelings of 
another, with no intentional state to link the feeling to that other, 
counts as empathy at all.  
I can, however, hypothesise two scenarios that could plausibly lead to 
somebody having a reason to question the source of their affective 
state.  As far as I know there is no empirical evidence that speaks to 
the plausibility of these explanations.  Perhaps neither of them ever 
actually occurs.  However, if we are to preserve the notion that the 
mirroring route is indeed a form of empathy, then the following 
suggestions seem like they would be worth considering. 
Scenario 1: O is angry, S becomes angry via a mirroring process.  S’s 
anger is incongruous with regards to certain other features of S.  S 
begins to reason counterfactually about her own psychology, asking 
herself questions such as “what kind of person would I have to be to 
respond in this way?”  S reaches the conclusion that she would have to 
be very much like the sort of person O is and, knowing what sort of 
person O is, ascribes the state to O. 
Scenario 2: O is angry, S becomes angry via a mirroring process.  S’s 
anger is incongruous with regards to certain other features of S.  This 
incongruity leads S to think in general terms about her anger, and in 
the course of this wonders if anyone present might be feeling the same 
way.  S imagines herself as each other person present in order to 
satisfy her curiosity and, upon finding that her state could plausibly be 
occurring in the psychology she imagines of herself when she is 
imagining herself to be O, ascribes the state to O. 
68  In both suggested cases I am once again employing the notion of 
‘congruity’ of affect with situation and character, though this time its 
epistemic role is to motivate the whole empathic project, and not just 
a belief in the verisimilitude of the imagined experience.  The ‘features 
of S’ that I mentioned could be features of either S’s character or 
situation that would make her mirrored anger appear as an 
unexpected, perhaps jarring, feature of her experience.  Finding 
oneself experiencing an unexpected feeling does seem to prompt one 
to, and give one a reason for, thinking about it in general terms (“Why 
do I feel like this?”  “Why would one feel as I do?” etc.).  Although it is 
also plausible that in both cases many people would just dismiss their 
feelings as irrational, or as the product of some underlying mood that 
they had not previously attended to.  However, someone who is not 
given reason to be curious about the feelings of others is someone who 
does not have a reason to empathise, and scenarios such as the ones 
above seem to provide such a reason.  Someone who is not made 
curious about their mirrored state, because it is absolutely congruous 
with their own character and situation, is not empathising and nor 
should we suppose they would try.  Not only would they have no 
reason to doubt that the affective state in question was generated by 
their own psychologies in the usual way, but it would likely be of 
benefit to them to consider it as such.  If those around you are angry, 
afraid, joyous, etc., and there is nothing in your situation or character 
that would conflict with your finding yourself with the same feeling, 
then it is probably appropriate for you to have that state at that time.  
That state would neither prompt nor form a part of an empathic 
process, since it would never be considered anything other than a 
product of your own psychology. 
 I think that scenarios such as these two could plausibly occur with 
some regularity.  If one undergoes n mirroring episodes per day, then I 
am suggesting that only and all those that feature incongruity will be 
candidates for empathy, while all those congruent with one’s current 
69  situation will just be taken as one’s own affective responses.  Since I 
can see no way that congruent feelings stemming from mirroring 
processes could be candidates for empathy in any case, I believe I have 
provided the largest possible set that could serve some role in an 
empathic imaginative project. 
One important thing to note, however, is that both of the scenarios I 
put forward involve the use of proto-empathies in order to justify the 
concluding ascription.  Indeed, this is true of any scenario that could 
both plausibly occur and involve demonstrative ascription (as opposed 
to the mirrored feeling prompting a purely cognitive ascription; ‘Omar 
feels that he is afraid’ rather than ‘Omar feels like this’).  Any scenario 
in which the bare bones of an empathic understanding are gained 
from a mirrored response (that is, an understanding based on the 
sensory experience of the mirrored feeling) will necessarily involve 
some experiential imagining against which to test the feeling’s 
congruity.  Since the only reason for using the mirrored feeling as a 
prompt to embark on an empathic project lies in its incongruity with 
the empathiser’s self or situation, it will not become any less 
incongruous without bringing into imagination some other beings-
with and doings-with that may make a better fit.  Indeed, no matter 
how we come by the state that, at the end of an empathic project, we 
will demonstrably ascribe to our target, it seems the only way to justify 
that ascription will be to engage in some variety of proto-empathic 
imagining. 
In the light of these thoughts I suggest that automatic empathy should 
be considered as distinct from empathy proper.  Even if we can find a 
reason to suspect that a feeling given to us by emotional contagion did 
not originate in ourselves, it seems that the only way to empathically 
ascribe it to another is to engage in proto-empathic imaginings.  Since 
proto-empathic imaginings are the preserve, are in fact definitive of, 
the reconstructive route to empathy, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that when automatic empathy is to behave like empathy, it must 
70  become reconstructive empathy. 
 
 
2.4 Congruity and proto-empathy 
 
The difference between Avon imagining being afraid of bears when he 
imagines being confronted with one, and imagining that he isn’t (or 
just importing details of his real character, that he isn’t disposed to 
fear bears, into the imagining) is the difference between in-his-shoes 
imagining and perspective shifting.  Richard Wollheim has marked the 
distinction between the two in the following way: If I am centrally 
imagining (imagining from the inside) that I am Sultan Mahomet II 
entering Constantinople then I might imagine that I am doing as the 
Sultan did on that day, or I might imagine that I was him doing as the 
Sultan did that day.  In the former case I am imagining ‘being in the 
Sultan’s shoes’; I am not imagining that I am the Sultan, and it is 
therefore coherent that I could imagine coming face to face with the 
Sultan himself in such a case.  By contrast, if I am perspective shifting 
and thereby imagine not only doing what the Sultan is doing, but 
being him while he is doing it, it is incoherent that I could imagine 
coming face to face with the Sultan, because it is incoherent to 
imagine the experience of coming face to face with oneself.  When in-
his-shoes imagining we imagine experiencing what another 
experienced, but when perspective shifting we imagine having the 
experiences of another person.75 
Empathy involves the latter kind of imagining.  Only then can Avon 
imagine experiencing Omar’s situation as Omar would experience it, 
some understanding of which is supposed to be the aim of the 
empathic enterprise.  In imagining Omar’s experience Avon must 
adopt, in imagination, all those mental dispositions of Omar’s that in 
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71  some way constrain his experience of the bear; the most obvious of 
these being the disposition to fear bears.  This kind of imagining is the 
final kind of proto-empathy I will discuss here; it is called Being-With.  
If Avon’s feeling of fear during his empathising with Omar (Avon’s 
feeling fear-with Omar) is congruent both with his imagining of 
himself in Omar’s situation (Avon’s doing bear-confrontation-with 
Omar) and his imaginative adoption of the mental dispositions that 
govern Omar’s response to the bear (Avon’s being afraid-of-bears-with 
Omar), then he will be justified in demonstrably ascribing his 
imagined experience to Omar.   
It may seem to some that the requirement that the empathiser adopt 
in imagination all mental dispositions governing the experience of the 
target at issue is too strong.  Indeed, Peter Goldie has very eloquently 
articulated this worry, in a discussion of the work of Richard 
Wollheim.  The story of Avon, Omar and the bear is a very simple 
example of an empathic project.  One that in all likelihood nobody 
would embark upon, as I have already mentioned.  Goldie discusses a 
more complicated case, that of empathising with Salieri, particularly 
regarding his envy of Mozart.  Goldie also stresses the importance of 
adopting what Wollheim (1974) calls the repertoire of the target of 
one’s empathy in imagination.  That is, the set of mental dispositions 
that will constrain his actions in the imagined scenario.  Goldie claims, 
however, that although the repertoire of the target needs to be 
adopted as a proto-empathic imagining, the practical barriers to 
succeeding at being-with one’s target in a sufficiently robust way make 
it very unlikely that one will succeed in any given case.  His pessimism 
is motivated by a similar view of the intentionality of emotional states 
to that which I argued for in section 4.4, that emotions are essentially 
directed; imagining that one is experiencing Salieri’s envy is to 
imagine being envious-of-Mozart, where the intentional object affects 
both the content and qualities of the imagining. 
72  Where Goldie becomes wary of the prospects of anyone successfully 
being-with Salieri is when he notes that the project of empathising 
with Salieri’s envy of Mozart is exponentially more difficult than that 
of, say, Omar’s fear of the bear.  This is because:    
It is Mozart, in all his particularities, with all his idiosyncrasies, that 
Salieri envies, not just a successful person in the same field of 
endeavor who happens to be Mozart but who might just as well have 
been someone else.76 
So while we might substitute, in imagination, any old bear for 
imagining the actual one Omar faced and come out with much the 
same result, the same cannot be done in the case of empathising with 
Salieri.  We cannot substitute Mozart in our imagination for any old 
composer, nor even for any young rival upstart from our own life 
towards whom we are disposed to feel envy.  The crux of the issue is 
that the dispositions that make up Salieri’s repertoire are also 
essentially directed, not just the emotional experiences that they effect 
when combined with particular stimuli.  Salieri’s disposition to envy 
Mozart is every bit as directed at Mozart as is the experience of envy 
that Salieri undergoes when he hears of Mozart’s latest triumph. 
While I am sympathetic to this worry, I do not think it warrants the 
pessimism that Goldie seems to take from it.  It is true that, since I 
never knew Mozart, much less have experience of being his bitter 
rival, I cannot be in a perfect position to imagine having the kinds of 
dispositions that would constrain Salieri’s various emotional 
experiences of envy.  However, I do not think there is any problem 
with admitting that, while still claiming that my attempted being-with 
Salieri, my adopting his repertoire to the best of my ability, so long as 
the resulting imagined experience is congruent and harmonious, will 
be so far from Salieri’s actual experience as to be useless.  Indeed, it is 
reasonable to expect even successful instances of empathy, by which I 
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73  mean empathic projects that produce some useful understanding of 
the target, to vary in exactly how accurate the imagined experience is 
as a representation of the target’s own experience.  A related worry, 
also voiced by Goldie as well as Coplan and others, is that most 
instances of attempted empathy will turn out to be cases of ‘pseudo-
empathy’, where an empathiser is successfully feeling-with and doing-
with, but insufficiently quarantines their own character from their 
being-with, so that the response imagined will be their own and not 
the target’s.  Again, I do not believe this poses anything like a fatal 
problem with the idea of empathy being reliable and regularly 
occurring.  For one thing, if I am right about incongruity playing a 
justificatory role, any instance where one’s own dispositions would be 
incongruous with the imagined experience will show themselves as 
such.  Flawless empathy, the precisely accurate ascription of the 
imagined experience to the target is, obviously, very improbable, for 
the reasons Goldie suggests.  However, there can certainly be 
successful cases of empathy that don’t quite manage to meet that 
extremely high level of accuracy; cases where the understanding of the 
other person gained is still accurate enough to be useful, and still 
furnishes some genuine, and accurate, new understanding of the inner 
life of the target.   
74  3. CONCLUSION 
 
So, we have arrived at the following conclusions: firstly, that the 
automatic route to empathy requires some input from the 
reconstructive route in order to be properly attributed to the target of 
that empathy.  Secondly, in order to reliably achieve an affective 
match, the reconstructive route to empathy requires imagining from 
the inside not just the affective state of one’s target, but also their 
situation and relevant aspects of their character.  Finally, that 
congruity of proto-empathic imaginings can serve as a justification for 
an empathic ascription of the imagined experience to the empathy’s 
target.  Vignemont and Singer’s definition, although it has been widely 
endorsed and is prima facie a strong one, appears to be insufficient as 
a conception of empathy that is at once useful and reliable.  In order 
to be useful we must introduce an element of reconstruction into the 
automatic route to empathy, and in order to be reliable the 
reconstructive route must involve imagining far more than simply the 
affective state of the target.  Both the processes of automatic and 
reconstructive empathy have epistemic deficits that block their being 
useful as a tool for understanding without introducing constraints that 
make the other nearly impossible to undertake.  I contend, therefore, 
that we should simply avoid understanding automatic mirroring as a 
kind of empathy. 
Empathy, as I have presented it, is a method for coming to understand 
the inner life of another person.  We have seen that it consists in a set 
of experiential imaginings (proto-empathies) that, by virtue of their 
congruence in imagining, justify a demonstrative ascription of the 
form ‘the experience that I am imagining having is like the experience 
that O is having’, or more succinctly, ‘the target feels like this’.   
I want to finish by returning to my claim that, at bottom, no good 
reason to think of empathy, properly understood, as being solely or 
principally concerned with affective matching.  That is, empathy as we 
75  have come to describe it, comes with no reason to see feeling-with as 
primary in any sense in relation to other forms of proto-empathy.  
This is because the question of how my target feels, or rather, what it 
is like to feel as my target does, is by no means the only kind of 
question we can answer using empathy.  Consider the following 
examples: 
Scenario 3: 
Avon seeks to understand how Omar feels. 
Avon imagines being Omar in Omar’s situation (being-with, doing-
with). 
In imagination, Avon emotionally reacts to Omar’s situation in the 
way Omar would (feeling-with). 
Avon’s imagined reaction is not incongruous with respect to his 
imagined character or situation. 
Avon ascribes that emotion to Omar. 
Scenario 4: 
Avon seeks to understand why Omar feels as he does. 
Avon has good reason to believe that Omar feels a certain way (verbal 
report, an automatic response which Avon has already figured out is 
not his own, etc.) 
Avon also knows the situation that prompted this response. 
Avon imagines feeling the way Omar does in the situation that Omar 
is in. 
Avon imaginatively reconstructs the necessary character traits that 
would make Omar’s reaction in that situation congruent. 
Avon ascribes those character traits to Omar. 
Scenario 5: 
Avon seeks to understand why Omar feels as he does. 
76  Avon has good reason to believe that Omar feels a certain way (verbal 
report, an automatic response which Avon has already figured out is 
not his own, etc.) 
Avon has good reason to believe he can reliably simulate Omar’s 
character (they have been friends a long time, he has empathised with 
Omar as in example (3) many times previously etc.) 
Avon imagines being Omar and feeling the way Omar does. 
Avon imaginatively reconstructs a situation that is congruent with his 
imaginings of Omar’s state and his character. 
Avon ascribes Omar the property of having been in that situation. 
 
These scenarios all seem to be consist in imaginative projects we 
might reasonably expect people to carry out.  All use proto-empathies; 
in each case one has a good reason to believe that they can accurately 
replicate two proto-empathies and, on the basis of that, is able to 
determine the congruence or otherwise of their imagined answer to 
their initial question.  Using the same kinds of imaginative projects, 
and in the end making the same sort of empathic ascription (‘Omar’s 
experience is like this’), there seems no reason to call scenario 3, where 
one seeks to discover the feeling of the target, an empathic project, 
but scenarios 3 and 4, where one already knows or understands how 
the target feels, but wishes to understand other features of the target’s 
inner life as something other than empathic.   
Empathy is not, according to the Complex Theory, all about coming to 
share the feelings of another.  It is all about coming to understand the 
inner life of another.  To do this it is not sufficient that we simply 
mimic their affective state, nor only adopt their characters or 
situations as our own in imagination.  To arrive at an empathic 
understanding of another we must figure out not just the states they 
are in, but also how these states are related to one another.  Avon 
understands what it is like to be Omar, in fear for his life, only when 
77  he has some experience of how Avon’s encounter with the bear, 
filtered through his repertoire, results in the fear that he feels.  
Empathy is more than mimicry, it is a method not just of 
understanding what people are going through, but also, and more 
importantly, why they are going through it. 
 
 
3.1 The Complex Theory of Empathy: Applications and Implications 
 
3.1.1 The Moral Value of Complex Empathy 
 
The theory of empathy we adopt will have implications for the role it 
can play in our understanding of ethics, moral psychology, aesthetics, 
and the various other issues in which empathy has been suggested to 
play an important part.  Here I want to offer some brief thoughts 
about how the theory of empathy I proposed in the previous chapters, 
what I have called the ‘Complex Theory of Empathy’, fares in 
comparison to some of the other theories I have discussed when it 
comes to the moral and other values of empathy that are so commonly 
attributed to it. 
I agree with Helen Battaly77 that empathy, under any of the 
conceptions I have discussed (The Perceptual Action Model, the Two-
Routes View, and each of the individual psychological processes that 
were candidates for empathy in section 1.1), cannot constitute a moral 
nor an intellectual virtue.  Empathy, on the understanding of these 
views, lacks a number of the conditions sufficient for virtue.  Virtues 
are habits or dispositions, indicating what one would do under certain 
circumstances.78  Empathy on any of the views discussed is clearly not 
a disposition, it is an action (unconscious, in the case of the Perceptual 
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78  Action Model), a kind of action which we might well say we are 
disposed to engage in, but not a disposition in itself.  If there is 
anything virtuous about empathy, it must be that empathy is the kind 
of action we might expect a virtuous person to frequently undertake. 
The Complex Theory, however, like any of the other conceptions of 
empathy as a voluntary, imaginative activity, is not at liberty to say 
that any empathising will always be a morally good thing.  Empathy 
can, of course, be used for nefarious purposes.  If I wanted to know 
how to undermine your confidence, scare you, or otherwise make you 
miserable, empathising with you may well give me some 
understanding of how to make that happen.  On the other hand, it is 
possible that the more demanding conceptions of empathy, such as 
the Complex Theory, are less susceptible to being used for morally 
wrong ends than other, more simple kinds.  This is because the effort 
that it would take for me to empathise with you in a way rich enough, 
accurate enough and deep enough that I would be able to determine 
your emotional frailties might expose me to enough of your inner life 
that I would find it difficult to go through with it. 
One moral value of empathy on the Complex Theory, however, which 
I believe it can make use of more than any other theory of empathy I 
have discussed, is as a way of contributing to the development of the 
virtue of open mindedness.79  Empathy with others, according to the 
Complex Theory, may avail us of the experience of imagining different 
congruent sets of proto-empathic imaginings, which I would affirm are 
a way of developing open-mindedness in a very interesting way.  
Someone who empathises a lot isn’t open minded because they 
necessarily understand how a lot of different people feel.  However, 
they might become more open minded in virtue of learning that 
several different proto-empathic combinations can be experienced as 
congruent, and therefore that there are several different ways of 
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3.1.2 The Complex Theory, The ‘Folk’ and Empathy Research 
 
I have now described the Complex Theory of Empathy, by way of 
describing how one can appropriately ascribe a collection of mental 
states to a target by engaging in congruent proto-empathic 
imaginings.  I call this view the ‘Complex Theory’ not because it makes 
empathy relatively cognitively demanding (although it does), but 
rather because it takes empathy to involve a complex of imaginative 
states justifying an ascription.  The Complex Theory meets the 
desiderata of making empathy reliable, useful, and able to occur 
regularly.  
I want to finish this section by revisiting the questions I gleaned from 
the disagreements between the ‘folk’ theories of empathy I outlined at 
the start.  I said that a good theory of empathy should be able to 
address the following questions that were raised by both the ‘folk’ and 
current ‘refined’ theories of empathy: 
 
Q1. Does empathy entail compassion, pity or sympathy for the target 
of the empathy?  
Q2. Does empathy require that the empathiser feels the same as their 
target?  If so, the same in what sense?  
Q3. What kind of understanding does empathy provide, and what 
capacities does that understanding grant the empathiser?  Must it, for 
instance, allow the empathiser to respond appropriately, or to lend 
moral support to the target?  
80  Q4. How is empathy distinct from cognitive mind-reading (deploying 
a theory of mind to determine a target's mental state)?  
  
On the first question, we can say that no, according to the Complex 
Theory of empathy, empathy entails neither compassion, nor pity, nor 
sympathy for the target of empathy.  I distinguished empathy from 
sympathy in section 1.2, and the Complex Theory of empathy requires 
no attitude from the empathiser to their target, other than a curiosity 
about their inner life. 
The second question relates to one of the key claims of this thesis, 
which is that affective matching has been over-privileged as it relates 
to theories of empathy.  Empathy, on the Complex Theory, does 
require affective matching, but is quite clear that affective matching is 
merely a means to understanding, and not the final aim of empathy. 
As to the third question, the understanding granted to an empathiser 
on the Complex Theory does not necessarily imbue them with any 
particular capacities.  As I mention in the previous section, there is 
nothing in the Complex Theory to prevent someone using empathy for 
immoral ends.  However, we can say that the understanding granted 
by empathy on the Complex Theory is of a very useful kind; a 
successful empathiser will understand the inner life of their target to a 
significant degree, allowing them to socially (or anti-socially) interact 
with them in a competent way. 
The Complex Theory is also very well equipped to address the final 
question.  Cognitive mind reading, wherein one person deploys a 
Theory of Mind to understand the thoughts or actions of another, can 
be clearly differentiated from empathy on the Complex Theory by 
virtue of the Complex Theory’s focus on demonstrative ascription of 
feelings (broadly construed).  Whereas someone who employs 
cognitive mind reading will always be able to cognise the mental states 
they ascribe to their target (they will be able to say that Avon is afraid 
81  because he believes that there is a bear), the qualitative nature of the 
empathic ascription means that an empathiser will not necessarily be 
in a position to do the same.  They will, instead, be in a position to use 
the phenomenal character of their imagined mental states, created as 
a part of an empathic project, as a sample with which to understand 
the feeling of their target.   

























You think your pain and your heartbreak are unprecedented in the 
history of the world, but then you read. 
                                                     - James Baldwin  
83  4. PERSPECTIVES AND NARRATIVES 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: Proto-Empathies and Narrative Engagement 
 
In the previous two chapters I proposed a theory of empathy, 
according to which empathy is an imaginative process comprised of 
three proto-empathic imaginative projects; feeling-with, doing-with 
and being-with, undertaken with the aim of making a demonstrative 
ascription to a target of the form [the target] feels like this.  The rest of 
this thesis will show that this view of empathy gives us the resources 
to develop a powerful theory of how audiences engage with narratives.  
I will argue that engaging with narratives is an essentially empathic 
activity, and that understanding narratives in this way gives us a host 
of theoretical resources with which to explain our emotional responses 
to narratives as well as their effects on our moral and cognitive 
development. 
To show that narrative engagement is an empathic activity, on my 
terms, is to show that it involves proto-empathic imaginings, 
undertaken with the aim of formulating a demonstrative ascription to 
a target.  That is, that narrative engagement involves imaginatively 
occupying the thoughts, feelings and character of another person, with 
the aim of making an ascription of the form [the target] feels like this.  
In the case of narratives, I will argue that the target of empathic 
engagement is the implied narrator of that narrative.80 
It is tempting to think that the proto-empathic imaginings of doing-
with (imagining being in the same situation as another) and feeling-
with (imagining being in the same affective state as another) would be 
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84  easily incorporated into any account of narrative engagement.  After 
all, doing-with is one way of representing a state of affairs to yourself, 
and being told a story largely consists in having a series of events 
represented to you.  Similarly, feeling-with is a way of undergoing an 
affective response differently from how one ordinarily would, and 
engaging with stories frequently finds us in affective states that seem 
to differ from our usual pattern of responses.81  However, merely 
engaging with representations of events and undergoing affective 
responses different from those we would normally expect to have are 
not sufficient for doing-with and feeling-with. 
In the first place, doing-with and feeling-with are both kinds of 
imaginings, and it is not immediately obvious that all engagement 
with narrative representations is imaginative. However, if we have a 
suitably broad notion of imaginative activity encompassing such 
things as supposition and entertaining thoughts for the purposes of 
examination or enquiry, then narrative engagement can be said to be 
imaginative in at least that sense.82   Engaging with a story of any kind, 
fictional or not, involves at a minimum the entertaining of thoughts 
concerning the occurrence of the events described, and if this can be 
described as imaginative then they meet the imaginative criterion for 
doing-with.  Similarly, since feeling-with isn’t the imagining of any 
affective state, but an affective state brought about by a particular 
(empathic) imaginative means, then provided we can show that an 
affective response to a narrative has been brought about through some 
empathic activity, that response counts as a feeling-with. 
                                                 
81 This feature of narrative engagement gives rise to the ‘problem of disparate response’, which I examine in detail in section 4.5. 82 Friend (2012) and Matravers (2014) have persuasively argued that fiction cannot be defined by reference to the imagination (contra Walton (1990) and Currie (1990)).  I am interested in all narratives, however, not just fictions.  Indeed, the fact that all narratives plausibly involve imagining to some degree is a part of the reason Friend and Matravers are sceptical that imaginative involvement can be the sine qua non of fictional narratives as opposed to non-fictional ones.  
85  The crucial feature of feeling-with and doing-with that marks them 
out as proto-empathic imaginings, rather than discrete imaginative 
projects, is that they are undertaken with the aim of giving a 
demonstrative, qualitative ascription to a target (that the target feels 
like this).  This is what distinguishes doing-with from more simple 
ways of imagining events.  As such, for engagement with narratives to 
count as an instance of empathy, we have to be persuaded that the 
imaginings I have mentioned (imagining a series of events and having 
affective responses brought about by those imaginings) are 
undertaken with the aim of making a demonstrative ascription to a 
target.  This is even less obvious than the claim that engaging with 
narratives is essentially imaginative, but both can be persuasively 
argued for.  The latter, as I have suggested, merely falls out of the 
stipulation that we should consider supposing or entertaining the 
truth of various kinds of thoughts for the purposes of examination, 
enquiry or pleasure as ways of imagining.  The former claim, however, 
that engagement with narratives aims at a demonstrative ascription of 
a mental state to a target, requires a more robust argument. 
 
 
4.2 Being-With and the Self-Other Distinction 
 
One way to argue that narrative engagement involves an empathic 
demonstrative ascription is to show that narrative engagement 
involves the third variety of proto-empathic imagining, being-with.  
Being-with is the act of imagining having the character of another, and 
identifying it as such, with the aim of making a demonstrative 
ascription.  Feeling-with and doing-with are both imaginative 
activities that aim at a demonstrative ascription, however they are 
both kinds of imagining that can be undertaken in an etiolated, non-
empathic form.  I can, and often do, imagine series of events without 
thereby intending to ascribe the experience of those events to another.  
86  Similarly, I can also easily undertake an imaginative project that 
results in an affective response that is outside the realm of my usual 
response pattern without ascribing the resulting feeling to another.  In 
both of these cases I am imagining myself being in states other than 
those in which I naturally find myself.  Being-with, on the other hand, 
is a kind of imaginative project that isn’t amenable to being 
undertaken in a similar, non-empathic form.  If I am imagining having 
a character different from my own, then in several crucial respects, I 
am imagining myself being a person who isn’t me; in other words, 
imagining being in the possession of a different character entails the 
demonstrative ascription of the imagined experience of having that 
character to a real or hypothetical figure who 'actually' possesses it.   
To see why this is true we must consider the experience of being-with 
imagining, compared to the experience of doing-with and feeling-with.  
The experiential content of being-with imaginings is response 
dependent in a way that the contents of feeling-with and doing-with 
imaginings are not.  While I can imagine having a different character 
to that which I possess ordinarily, there is no phenomenal character to 
that imagining unless I carry it out as a part of a wider imaginative 
project that gives my imagined character traits a situation in which to 
manifest themselves.  Imagining myself as a kind of person who has a 
character more generous, more conservative or more snobbish than 
my own will, by itself, yield no experiential content unless I imagine a 
situation in which my imagined generosity, conservatism or snobbery 
can manifest themselves through different ways of understanding or 
responding to that situation. 
This means that if I imagine having, say, a more generous character 
than I in fact possess (perhaps as generous as some particular person, 
perhaps not), it can only be experienced if I imagine having a more 
generous character in a particular situation.  Let us say that I am 
imagining having a more generous character while offering to buy the 
first round at the pub.  What can we say about my attitude to this 
87  imagining?  I am likely to be surprised at how happy I am to make the 
offer of buying the first round.  Perhaps my usual character is so 
ungenerous that I am even surprised that the scenario of my buying 
the first round seems congruent with my character.  These are both 
responses it would be reasonable to expect me to have to this 
imagining, but importantly both of these responses require me to 
maintain a self-other distinction (recognising that some of my 
imagined feelings stem not from my ordinary psychological processes, 
but rather from a set of traits adopted in imagination).  I am surprised, 
so I recognise that my imagined experience is not what I would expect 
of my usual experience.  I am, of course, in one important sense 
imagining myself in the pub.  However, I am not under any illusion 
that my real self would respond so graciously to buying the first round; 
I know that a self-other distinction is appropriate.  Indeed, if I am 
imagining myself as having a different character I must maintain a 
self-other distinction, otherwise my imagining will collapse into my 
simply imagining being in a situation with a character that is in fact 
different to my real one, but which I don’t recognise as being different.  
In such a case I can’t be said any longer to be engaging in a being-with 
imagining, since I am not imagining having a different character.  I am 
instead mistakenly attributing to myself in imagination a more 
generous character than I, in fact, possess. 
To see the importance of a self-other distinction, we need to recall 
some of my earlier discussion of empathy between in-his-shoes 
imagining and perspective shifting.  In-his-shoes imagining is a form of 
what Goldie and Coplan termed ‘pseudo-empathy’, whereby I imagine 
being in the same situation as my target (doing-with), but due to the 
fact that I don’t imagine having the same character as my target 
(being-with), the resulting imagined experience does not mirror the 
experience of the target, and so the empathic project fails.  If I am 
attempting to empathise with Avon, who is confronted with a bear, 
but I am not afraid of bears and I fail to imaginatively modify my bear-
88  facing dispositions, then the demonstrative ascription I make to Avon 
will not be accurate.  Perspective Shifting is required for successful 
empathy, where the empathiser engages in a being-with imagining, 
thereby modifying the relevant features of their character and 
enabling the empathiser to respond to an imagined scenario as their 
target would, rather than as they themselves would.  A second crucial 
feature of perspective shifting, as well as the imaginative modifications 
of the relevant mental dispositions in the empathiser, is that the 
empathiser maintains a clear self-other distinction; meaning that the 
empathiser is able to distinguish between the states she is 
experiencing as a part of her empathic project from those which she is 
experiencing as a part of her standard pattern of psychological activity.   
Because any being-with imagining can only have experiential content 
when it is coupled with imagining an event that my adopted character 
can respond to, and any such imagining also requires me to maintain a 
self-other distinction, any being-with imagining entails making a 
demonstrative ascription to a target.  I must maintain a self-other 
distinction in order to prevent a being-with imagining collapsing into 
a different kind of imagining altogether, wherein I am simply 
imagining myself as I am in a situation, but am mistaken about my 
character.  In order to maintain this self-other distinction, I must 
postulate an other.  Furthermore, I must postulate that other with the 
aim of ascribing to them my experience in an empathic fashion.  In a 
being-with imagining I know that the experience feels like this, but I 
also know that the experience does not feel like this to me, by virtue of 
my self-other distinction I know that it feels like this to someone else. 
A brief sidebar is necessary at this point to address a possible concern 
about the way I am talking about making a self-other distinction 
between two versions of myself.  It isn’t difficult to see how there 
might be something a little troubling in the idea that I can imagine 
being a more generous version of myself who I can nonetheless 
consider an ‘other’.  The worry is simple to answer, however, by 
89  clarifying that the ‘self’ and ‘other’ distinguished by the ‘self-other’ 
distinction doesn’t strictly refer to any metaphysical self, of the sort 
that philosophers might worry would not survive a brain transplant.  
Rather, the self of the self-other distinction is merely the empathising 
agent as they are at the moment of their empathising, including and 
especially their ordinary psychological mechanisms and dispositions.  
All we need to capture in the self-other distinction is the idea that an 
agent engaging on an empathic project should recognise that their 
responses during that project may be the result of the imagined 
adoption of a different set of psychological dispositions, and not of 
their ordinary psychologies.  Those new dispositions can just as easily 
belong to an alternate version of oneself (past, future or purely 
hypothetical) as to any other real or hypothetical figure.  Indeed, it is 
highly desirable for an account of empathy to be able to accommodate 
such cases, in order that we can use empathy as a way of describing 
how we are able to feel alienated from our past, future or hypothetical 
selves, while at the same time recognising that those past, future or 
hypothetical selves are nonetheless continuous with the self who feels 
alienated.83      
These considerations help us to clarify the project of the bulk of this 
chapter: to show that narrative engagement is an empathic activity by 
way of showing that it involves being-with.  Since being-with is a kind 
of imaginative activity that essentially involves the postulation of an 
other, and cannot be undertaken in an etiolated form without the 
postulation of an other (unlike feeling-with and doing-with), if it turns 
out that narrative engagement routinely involves being-with 
imaginings, then by virtue of that we can confidently say that narrative 
engagement is an empathic activity with some hypothetical or actual 
figure who holds the imagined character as the target.  The target of 
the ascription needn’t be an actual person (it is completely coherent, 
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90  for instance, to empathise with a hypothetical version of yourself with 
significantly different character traits).  However, to imaginatively 
adopt a character is to ascribe that character to a real or hypothetical 
persona in a way that to imagine a series of events does not require 
one to ascribe the experience of those events to an actual or 
hypothetical agent. 
The second half of this thesis will proceed in three main parts.  First, I 
will discuss the phenomenon of perspectives, and how appealing to 
them can provide powerful explanations for familiar features of our 
reading stories.  Next, I will clarify and expand upon the notion of a 
‘narrative perspective’, its relation to a hypothetical author, and how it 
can serve as a target for empathy in narrative engagement.  Finally, I 
will conclude with some thoughts on how understanding engaging 
with narratives as an empathic activity gives us promising new 





A good story can make us laugh, cry, or think about things that we 
have never laughed, cried or thought about before.  One way a good 
story can become a great story is when it is capable of making us 
laugh, cry and think about things that we ordinarily could not laugh, 
cry or think about.  That is, stories can make us laugh at things we 
would ordinarily cry at, cry at things we might usually find 
inconsequential, and think about people and places in ways we 
ordinarily never could; not just because those people and places are 
perhaps the fictional inventions of some creative mind, but because 
we are not the sorts of people who would ordinarily think of those 
things in those ways. 
Here I want to describe the abilities stories have in affording us 
different ways of thinking about the world; the way they can afford us 
91  the opportunity to engage with different perspectives and ‘ways of 
seeing’.  I will also investigate the ways that stories can accomplish 
these various feats and argue that engaging with the perspectives that 
stories provide are instances of empathising, with an implied 
storyteller as the target of that empathy.  
Throughout my discussion of the powers of stories to help us 
experience different ways of seeing, I will develop an account of what I 
will call the ‘narrative perspective’.  Briefly, the narrative perspective of 
any given story is the general psychological outlook which it would be 
reasonable to ascribe to a flesh and blood teller of that story; it is the 
narrative perspective of a story that makes the story itself gloomy, 
cynical, optimistic or romantic, or that gives the story the capacity to 
frown on or applaud different characters.  I will argue here that not 
only can we talk of stories having perspectives in this way (distinct 
from the perspectives of their flesh and blood authors, audiences or 
fictional narrators) but that we must do so in order to properly explain 
some common kinds of response to familiar kinds of stories.  Before I 
move on to discuss narrative perspective, however, it will be helpful to 
get a clearer idea of what perspectives in general are, and how they 
feature in our experience of the world at large. 
4.3.1 Perspectives and Ways of Seeing 
Perspectives are something we refer to fairly freely in folk-
psychological explanations of things like moral and aesthetic 
disagreement, or in accounting for why people are disposed to attend 
to different features of social, political or other kinds of events.  We 
might diagnose a disagreement over hate speech legislation as being 
due to the fact that one person has a broadly liberal perspective on 
such things, and the other has a more conservative perspective: Fiona 
has a politically conservative perspective, and so disapproves of hate 
speech legislation, whereas Siobhan’s is more liberal, and so is more 
approving.  Of course, there may be reasons other than their 
respective political perspectives why Fiona or Siobhan might approve 
92  or disapprove of hate speech legislation.  If one of them was a political 
philosopher, they may have come to their conclusion in a much 
different way.  Perspectives are not the only way we form beliefs, and 
certainly not the only thing that determines our responses to 
situations, but they are what is responsible for how a situation, event 
or object strikes us; perspectives govern at least our immediate 
responses, and if those responses are not reflected on they will usually 
remain a principal determinant of them.   
It is this kind of perspective I want to give an analysis of, and 
particularly the perspectives of this kind that play an important role in 
the way audiences respond to stories; they may not govern our final 
responses to a story after serious critical reflection, but they do 
determine how the contents of a story strike us.  It is important at the 
outset to distinguish this sense of perspective from another common 
meaning; a perspective simply as a spatiotemporal location in a scene 
(or the appearance of the objects in that scene for an observer in that 
location).  The perspectives that I’m interested in are not visual 
phenomena, although they are sometimes referred to as if they were, 
not just as perspectives but also as ‘points of view’, ‘outlooks’ and ‘ways 
of seeing’.  The common visual terminology is a little misleading, but 
also illuminating in an important way.  Take the following example:   
If two people are standing at opposite sides of a statue they will each 
see it in a different way (they will attend to different physical features 
of the statue, they might interpret its meaning in different ways due to 
that fact, and so on).  Similarly, if one has a patient and thoughtful 
character, but the other is impatient and dismissive they will likely 
respond to the statue in very different ways then too (the former 
might think it provocative while the latter dismisses it as childish).  If 
we take the ‘seeing’ in ‘ways of seeing’ (or the visual association with 
the term ‘perspective’) to pick out not just the visual experience of a 
subject but rather the way the world seems to them in a more general 
sense, we can start to get an idea of how perspectives of these kind can 
93  influence us.  The statue-viewers each have different ways of seeing 
the statue in at least two important senses, both of which can be a 
significant influence on their response to the statue; they have 
different ways of seeing the statue in the sense that is due to their 
having different spatial locations relative to it, and they also have 
different ways of seeing the statue in the sense that they are each 
psychologically primed to respond to statues of this kind in different 
ways.   
These latter, psychological perspectives are what I want to show are 
central to a good understanding of narrative engagement.  
Perspectives are a very broad phenomenon, governing a great deal of 
our psychological lives.  Perspectives are psychological dispositions 
peculiar to a subject that affect the way the world appears (in a 
suitably broad sense) to them.  They are one reason that Fiona 
responds one way to the hate speech proposal, seeing it perhaps as an 
attack on individual liberty, whereas Siobhan sees it as a means of 
overcoming ingrained prejudice.  They are also a reason one person 
sees a statue as provocative and the other as childish.  These ways of 
seeing are the effects of perspectives on our experience; they are what 
is responsible for making some features of a scene strike us as more 
central or prominent, make us prefer some kinds of explanations over 
others, and leading us more broadly to organise our thoughts about 
subjects and events in particular ways.84 
4.3.2 Perspectives and Character 
Features of our characters, as the statue case example shows, can help 
to determine our perspectives (and, by virtue of that, our ways of 
seeing).  Thinking again in general terms, a person of optimistic 
character is likely to see things in ways that a pessimist will not.  An 
optimist takes a development as an opportunity what a pessimist takes 
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94  as a crisis; they see the same proverbial glass as half full that the 
pessimist sees as half empty.  Importantly, however, a person’s 
perspective is not identifiable with their character or personality.  
When philosophers speak of character, usually in the context of virtue 
ethics, they mean something like traits that dispose one to 
consistently act in a certain way (someone of a generous character can 
be expected to behave generously in various situations, for instance).  
This notion of ‘character’ is very broad, and a person’s perspective may 
form a part of what we call their character (in that it is one thing that 
might lead someone to consistently act in a certain way).  However, it 
is still helpful to prise apart the notion of perspective from the broader 
idea of character because while one’s character plausibly consists in all 
one’s stable psychological dispositions, a perspective consists in a 
narrower class of psychological traits which govern the way the world 
appears to the subject (their way of seeing), and thereby indirectly 
govern the way the subject acts in the world. 
Let me use the example of generosity further to illustrate those parts 
of our character that I think ought to be thought of as constituting our 
perspective.  To ascribe someone a character trait (like generosity) 
might be to simply make a claim about their behavioural dispositions 
(perhaps that they will tend to offer to buy the first round at the pub).  
It is often the case however that calling someone generous picks out 
more than this including, for instance, that they tend not just to buy 
the first round at the pub, but that they are happy to do so.  Neither 
the behavioural disposition nor the disposition to hold a certain 
attitude to that behaviour are elements of a person’s perspective, 
though both of them are parts of a person’s character.  To get at our 
generous person’s perspective we should look at what features of their 
character might cause our generous person to be happy to buy the first 
round.  The cause of their happiness is surely something to do with 
the way the idea of buying the first round presents itself to them, not 
as an onerous financial burden but perhaps as an obvious and easy 
95  way to make their fellow drinkers comfortable.  A generous 
perspective is here manifesting itself in this way of seeing the 
opportunity to buy the first round of drinks.  Doubtless perspectives of 
this sort form part of what it is to have a generous character, but it is 
an importantly distinct part.  If the possession of a generous character 
can be seen as possession of a collection of various dispositions that 
tend to result in generous behaviour and attitudes (which I think it 
must be), then a generous perspective is the subset of those 
dispositions which is responsible for the world appearing to the 
generous person as providing frequent occasions on which it is 
appropriate to behave in a generous fashion.  Similarly, a person of a 
pessimistic character will have, as part of that, a pessimistic 
perspective consisting in dispositions responsible for making the 
world appear such that pessimism is often appropriate to it; for every 
character kind there will be a corresponding perspective kind 
responsible for the way the world appears to a person with that sort of 
character. 
Now we have something of an idea of how I want to characterise 
perspectives and their function in the broader psychology of 
personality.  Next I want to say a little more about how they fulfil this 
function.  I have said that a perspective of any given kind is 
responsible for making the world appear a certain way to its holder, 
but what exactly does it mean for the world to ‘appear a certain way’?  
And how do perspectives achieve this? 
4.3.3 Generating Ways of Seeing 
The role of perspectives is to generate ‘ways of seeing’.  Recalling the 
statue example, a ‘way of seeing’ in my sense (a perspectival way of 
seeing) is analogous in some ways to a more strictly visual ‘way of 
seeing’ resulting from the position of a viewer relative to an observed 
object or scene.  For our statue viewers, their differing perspectival 
ways of seeing resulted in one thinking the statue challenging and the 
other thinking it childish, why might this be?  To answer, let me first 
96  suggest how exactly a statue might appear challenging to one viewer 
and childish to another.  Suppose that the statue in question is Henry 
Moore’s Horse (1984). 
Why might people have two radically different responses to the same 
statue?  The first viewer, in finding it childish, might plausibly have 
attended more to features like the Horse’s very simple facial features, 
it’s slightly bulbous outline, apparently broken tail and rough, 
unfinished surface.  The second viewer, finding the statue challenging, 
might attend rather to the way the graceful curves clash with the 
sharp edges of the broken tail and legs, and the fact that there is little 
that is distinctively equine about the figure other than the oddly 
simple head and grossly exaggerated withers and flank, perhaps 
emphasising the similarity between the muscled figure of a horse and 
other familiar Moorean subjects (such as nude human figures).  
Having given prominence in their thoughts to these different features 
of the statue the viewers would certainly appraise the statue in 
different ways; the first viewer thinking, for instance, that the 
simplicity of the head is a sign of absence of care or skill in the 
sculptor, the second that it is a sign that the sculptor thinks the head 
is unimportant other than as a signifier that the figure represents a 
horse. 
The different responses of our viewers of the statue are caused, in this 
case, by certain features of the statue striking one or the other viewer 
as more prominent or significant, and by our viewers tending to seek 
different sorts of interpretative explanations for those features that 
they do find prominent.  We might say that they have different ways 
of seeing or characterising the statue; they do not respond differently 
because they have different visual access to various features of the 
statue, rather they have different ways of organising their thoughts 
about the features of the statue to which they share visual access.  
Their perspective on the statue governs not just what they notice, but 
97  how they are disposed to characterise the statue and its sculptor, and 
by virtue of that, the response they are likely to have.  
Generalising from this example we can start to see the usefulness of 
this characterisation of perspectives as mechanisms for generating 
ways of seeing objects and scenes we encounter in the world.  Recall 
once again the case of the generous person who sees the opportunity 
to buy the first round of drinks as an easy way to make her 
companions comfortable.  Our generous person here has a 
distinctively generous way of organising her thoughts about the 
opportunity to buy the first round of drinks; the fact that doing so will 
make her drinking companions comfortable is a more prominent 
feature of the scene to her than the fact that she will likely bear a 
greater financial burden than some of those others present.  We can 
characterise all the other examples of perspectives I have mentioned in 
similar ways too; the pessimist sees an event in such a way as to 
emphasise its negative consequences for her, and will tend to give 
explanations for those events that perhaps rely on ascribing cynical 
motives to others; the liberal will tend to explain perceived injustices 
in terms of group rights rather than individual rights and will give 
prominence in her thoughts to features of events that emphasise 
wrongdoing by members of corporate elites, say, rather than members 
of disenfranchised groups. 
We have arrived now at an understanding of perspectives as 
collections of psychological dispositions that generate ways of seeing.  
Several philosophers have offered theories that suggest perspectives 
can be used to explain some interesting features of our experience of 
literature, especially fiction.85  Next I will discuss two of these 
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98  interesting features, the idea being to give some prima facie reasons 
for supposing that integrating perspectives into our theories of literary 
engagement will be illuminating and useful.  These features are firstly 
the fact that we sometimes find it difficult to engage with morally 
deviant stories (the problem formerly known as ‘the puzzle of 
imaginative resistance’); second, that we sometimes respond 
differently to fictions than we would to the same events in real life, 
sometimes called the problem of disparate response. 
 
 
4.4 Perspectives and the Philosophy of Literature: Imaginative Resistance 
as Transmission Failure 
 
The basic issue brought out by the so-called puzzle of imaginative 
resistance is the fact that we seem to find it difficult to engage with 
stories of particular kinds, as illustrated by the now infamous one-line 
fiction: 
G: “In killing her baby Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a 
girl”86 
There are several issues of philosophical interest that might apply to 
understanding why we find it difficult to ‘go along’ with a story like 
(G).  For instance, it might tell us something about the attitudes we 
have about our moral beliefs, or about the limits of our imaginative 
capacities, or about the kinds of things that can be made true in 
stories.  It is this last point that I want to focus on here, what has been 
misleadingly termed ‘the fictionality puzzle’.87 
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99  Derek Matravers has recently proposed a promising, but incomplete, 
solution to the fictionality puzzle, putting forward a view that I will 
refer to as the Transmission Failure View (TF).88  According to (TF), 
(G) and other stories that exhibit similar features (specifically, those 
that invite an audience to engage with a story that features the 
presentation of morally perverse truths), is just one way in which the 
following principle of narrative engagement can fail: 
M: For some proposition P and some narrative N, P is true-in-N if P is 
asserted in N 
Matravers claims that M can fail in (at least) the following ways:   
 ‘Determinancy failure’ (when the author or narrator has made a mistake or is not asserting P, or is asserting P ironically, and so on).    ‘Coherence failure’ (P is incoherent when taken with other propositions asserted in N such that understanding N in such a way that N is not incoherent is not worth the effort).   ‘Transmission failure’ (when P contains a judgement of the sort that an audience will not accept on the authority of the storyteller).89  
Of these three, (G) is an example of transmission failure.  According to 
(TF) it is not in the power of the storyteller to make it true in (G) that 
Giselda did the right thing by killing her baby simply by asserting it.  
This is because the kind of judgement contained in (G), a moral 
judgement, is not the kind of judgement that can be made true in the 
narrative by virtue of (M). 
Because Matravers rejects the account of fiction as prescriptions to 
imagine (familiar to us from Walton and Currie90) it is not open to 
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100  him to claim that storytellers cannot make us engage with (G) because 
of some necessary limitation on our ability to imagine morally deviant 
worlds.  This is just as well, since content-based principles regarding 
the limits of our moral imagination have proved difficult to defend.91  
This is partly because there seem to be plenty of counter-examples to 
the notion that we are unable to imagine morally deviant worlds as a 
matter of necessity.  Many works of fiction featuring morally 
questionable anti-heroes, such as V for Vendetta, The Great Gatsby and 
Crime and Punishment, seem to require imaginative flexibility 
regarding moral matters of the sort that we wouldn’t expect to be 
capable if we were unable to imagine morally deviant worlds.   
Philosophers have tended to prefer explanations of our apparent 
inability to imaginatively engage with (G) in terms of a related, more 
general inability to imagine conceptually incoherent sets of 
propositions, sets of propositions that the imaginer doesn’t 
understand, or similar limitations of our imaginative abilities.92  These 
kinds of explanations for imaginative failure when it comes to cases 
like (G) focus on contingent features of the examples (that there is not 
sufficient context given for the judgement in (G) to be comprehensible 
for instance), rather than claiming that imaginative engagement with 
(G) will fail simply in virtue of (G) containing a morally deviant 
proposition. 
Matravers, by contrast, has an easier time of it when it comes to 
defending content based principles to account for the failure of 
storytellers to make morally deviant propositions true in a story 
(although his easier time here results in a problem down the line, 
which I hope to help him solve).  Because, for Matravers, fiction isn’t 
defined by reference to imagination, there is no pressure to avail 
himself of a solution to the fictionality puzzle that makes reference to 
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101  the imagination either.  Instead, Matravers analyses transmission 
failures such as (G) in terms of the failure of certain kinds of 
testimony, in this case moral testimony. 
As we saw above, the reason (G) fails to engage the reader (according 
to (TF)) is because a storyteller doesn’t have it within her power to 
make it true in the narrative that Giselda did the right thing.  The 
analogy with moral testimony is clear; the storyteller, in telling (G) to 
an audience, is presenting the story as befitting a particular moral 
judgement.  However, this is precisely the kind of situation in which 
moral testimony is often said to be problematic.  Consider the 
following example from Alison Hills’ discussion of the subject: 
“Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat, but has recently realized that it raises some moral issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she asks a friend who tells her that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is normally trustworthy and reliable, so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is wrong.”93   
It seems open to us to question Eleanor’s acceptance of her friend’s 
judgement on the issue of vegetarianism.  Not because the view is 
mistaken, but because moral judgements are not obviously the kinds 
of things that we accept based simply on another’s say-so.  A story 
similar to (G) but borrowing the moral question at issue from Hills 
might help to bring out the analogy: 
G*: In raising her child on a strict vegetarian diet Giselda did the right 
thing; after all, animals need not suffer for her family to be fed.  
Somebody who was unsympathetic to vegetarianism might (if moral 
testimony is in fact problematic in the way Hills and others have 
suggested) experience transmission failure in (G*) for just the same 
reasons as more or less everybody (one would hope) experiences 
transmission failure in (G).   
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102  It is interesting to note that, according to (TF), an audience that 
experiences Transmission Failure in engaging with (G*) will do 
regardless of whether that story is presented as fiction or non-fiction.  
M is a way of making things true in any kind of story, and it is a way of 
making things true that depends on testimony.  When being told a 
story by a storyteller, an audience takes it on the authority of the teller 
that any assertions made are true according to the story, excepting 
only those cases where the testimony fails; which ought to include not 
only those exceptions laid out in (1) -(3), but also any other instance of 
assertion which, in general, testimony is not sufficient to warrant a 
belief in the hearer.  M is not sufficient to make the respective 
judgements acceptable to an audience of either (G) or (G*) because M 
is a way of making things true in narratives that depends on 
testimony, and (G) and (G*) are prime candidates for testimonial 
failure. 
4.4.1 Transmission Failure and Mildly Deviant Stories 
The Transmission Failure view is certainly appealing, particularly as a 
contribution to the larger project of explaining interesting features of 
our engagement with stories (including our inability to engage with 
stories like G) without relying on increasingly unpopular views about 
fictional stories being characterised by prescriptions to imagine.  
Given that transmission failure appears to occur across the gamut of 
narrative forms, fictional and non-fictional alike, it is far more 
satisfactory for an explanation to not rely on features that define one 
or the other (or neither, as the case may be). 
Matravers’ view does, however, come up against a potentially serious 
problem, which he anticipates in this way: 
“[This] solution works only if the reader of a fiction engages with a 
representation of non-actual events using their actual moral beliefs. 
However, this discounts a possibility. Why can they not assume a non-
actual persona (one who does not find the claims made in the narrative 
103  morally problematic) and get on with enjoying whatever fiction it is that 
they are reading?”94 
Matravers has explained transmission failure by analysing it as an 
instance of testimonial failure.  However, there are some important 
dissimilarities between instances of straight-forward testimony and 
testimony given as a part of a storytelling, specifically in the norms 
that seem to govern how we should receive that testimony.  When it 
comes to a great many stories, particularly fictions, much of the value 
in engaging with them is due to virtues of the work other than that 
they might accord with our existing beliefs.  We might be more 
interested in being entertained with suspenseful drama or dazzled 
with fine prose than in having the story function as a straight-forward 
source of testimony, moral or otherwise.  To that end, just as we might 
entertain the possibility of time travel in order to get at the literary 
value in Slaughterhouse Five, why would we not entertain the 
appropriateness of deviant moral judgements on the same grounds? 
Obviously we must beware of making too much of the analogy 
between entertaining the possibility of time travel and entertaining 
the rightness of infanticide.  For one thing, a story that failed to make 
the possibility of time travel true in the narrative would be an instance 
of either determinancy or coherence failure, and not transmission 
failure; the possibility of time travel is something that can be made 
true in the narrative by (M) provided it maintains both coherence and 
determinancy, the rightness of infanticide by contrast fails simply by 
virtue of its subject matter.95  The point remains, however, that we 
tend to be flexible about shelving our real-world attitudes about things 
like time travel for the sake of engaging with some worthwhile story, 
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104  so Matravers owes us an explanation for why that doesn’t routinely 
happen with stories like (G). 
I believe the Transmission Failure view can overcome this challenge, 
however the first step in showing how is to recognise that the problem 
goes deeper than Matravers anticipates.  (TF) as laid out by Matravers 
seems to preclude any story from making it true in the narrative by M 
that any moral judgement is appropriate.  Transmission failure in (G) 
is not due to how deviant the moral testimony is in (G), only to the 
fact that there is moral testimony at all.  This is a problem because 
there are many examples of less severely morally deviant stories in 
which no transmission failure appears to occur.  Earlier I mentioned 
that it has been difficult to show that imagining moral deviant worlds 
tout court is impossible, because we seem to be able to imagine 
without difficulty fictional worlds wherein morally dubious actions are 
praiseworthy and heroic.  Although Matravers is not committed to the 
notion that engaging with morally deviant fiction involves imagining 
morally deviant worlds, such stories still provide a problem for (TF) if 
the moral praiseworthiness of what we would otherwise consider 
immoral acts is attempted to be made true in the story by M.   (TF) in 
its current form seems committed to the implausibly strong claim that 
M cannot be used to present a morally bad thing as otherwise in a 
story without succumbing to transmission failure.  
It is, of course, open to defenders of (TF) as it stands to claim that any 
instance of an audience successfully engaging with a mildly morally 
deviant story is an instance of a storyteller making use of something 
besides M.  However, it would be difficult to spell out precisely what 
method besides M would be useful to a storyteller who wished to 
engage an audience in a morally deviant story.  In the most general 
terms, to make something true in a story a storyteller only has the 
resources of her own assertions about what is the case in the story, any 
relevant conventions of storytelling and any facts she might reliably 
expect an audience to import to the story from their stock of beliefs 
105  about the world.96  The first of these is captured by M, and we already 
know that (TF) predicts the failure of any attempt to use M to present 
a morally bad thing as morally praiseworthy.  Nor can a storyteller 
make a morally perverse story by the use of import, since she could 
only expect an audience to reliably import morally unperverse truths 
into any story she told.  The most promising option is, I think, that 
there might be certain storytelling conventions that permit an 
audience to engage with a morally perverse story.  Shen-Yi Liao and 
James Harold have both proposed views along similar lines; 
specifically, that the genre a story is presented as belonging to can 
alter the way we respond to the moral assertions made as part of that 
story.97  Taking their view as a starting point it might be possible to 
sketch a theory according to which conventions of genre or form 
signal to an audience that morally perverse truths are to be 
entertained in a given case.  However, I think it is doubtful that any 
such project could succeed.  I have particular worries about the view 
that Liao and Harold endorse which I will turn to at a later stage.  
However, for our current purposes it is sufficient to note that the sheer 
breadth of narrative genres and forms that feature mildly deviant 
stories makes it very unlikely that genre or form are what make 
audiences able to engage with them all.   
4.4.2 Perspectives and Moral Testimony  
The challenge for (TF) is, therefore, more serious than Matravers first 
claimed.  Not only does he have to explain why we cannot entertain 
alternative moral beliefs for the sake of engaging with a good story, he 
also has to explain how transmission failure does not occur in cases 
where (TF) predicts that it should.  That a solution to the first part of 
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106  the challenge will also provide an answer to the second is promising, 
since both are to do with explaining the scope of transmission failure; 
why we don’t prevent it the way we seem to prevent other kinds of 
failures of (M), and why it seems to not occur in some common kinds 
of cases.   
Matravers offers himself the start of a solution to the first part of the 
challenge by way of some thoughts on moral testimony by Alison Hills 
and Rob Hopkins.  Hopkins has argued that pessimism about moral 
testimony comes in two kindred forms; the view that moral testimony 
fails because it does not make moral knowledge available or, that 
moral testimony fails because it cannot make any available moral 
knowledge useable by the recipient.98  Hopkins argues that the second 
route to pessimism is more promising, in part because for that 
knowledge to be warranted for use in one’s operations as a moral 
agent (as opposed to merely knowledge about moral matters), the 
belief in question must meet the following requirement: 
The Requirement: having the right to a moral belief requires one to 
grasp the moral grounds for it.99 
Matravers does not say as much, but I take it that this thought from 
Hopkins is supposed to apply to the case at hand in something like the 
following way:  Moral testimony operating according to (M), that is, 
testimony to the effect that some moral fact obtains in a narrative, 
operates according to the same norms as moral testimony simpliciter.  
In (G) we have access to no moral grounds on which we could 
legitimately deploy the belief that Giselda did the right thing 
(although we may have reasons of getting at literary or other kinds of 
value for entertaining such thoughts).  Because we have no moral 
grounds for adopting or entertaining a belief that Giselda did the right 
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107  thing, we cannot use the belief that Giselda did the right thing as a 
part of our moral engagement with the story. 
This seems fine as far as it goes.  While it is not obviously true that the 
norms that govern real-world moral testimony should apply to moral 
testimony given as a part of storytelling I can’t think of any particular 
reason why they would not.  This solution only struggles when we 
start to think about how we should generalise from its explanation of 
(G).  I said above that it appears that Matravers is committed to the 
claim that any and all moral testimony given as a part of a storytelling 
is bound to succumb to transmission failure.  I am sure Matravers 
would want to deny that this causes his view problems in accounting 
for the kind of mildly deviant stories I have mentioned, but he does 
not directly address the issue.  The examples he deals with are all at 
least fairly extreme; besides (G), he illuminates the Hopkins 
requirement by affirming that “we cannot understand how something 
could be a moral reason for the denigration of non-white ethnic 
groups or the mass extermination of Jews.”100  By far the least morally 
deviant story he tests his theory on is Peter Fleming’s anecdote 
detailing how he shot an alligator simply to ease his frustrations, 
presenting that as a perfectly appropriate thing to do.  The fact that 
Matravers mentions, indeed focuses, on the less morally outrageous 
Fleming example indicates to me that he does not think the severity of 
the moral deviance in each case has much to do with why that case 
succumbs to transmission failure.  Besides, Matravers hasn’t furnished 
himself with the resources necessary to discriminate these cases on 
such grounds.  However, it is still telling that even the least morally 
deviant example he discusses expresses a moral belief that would be 
shared by very few modern readers (certainly very few readers of 
Matravers).  Focusing on these examples is unhelpful because it 
discourages the raising of a very important question that needs 
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108  answering in order for Matravers’ view to evade the challenge; what, if 
anything, could count as moral grounds for accepting moral testimony 
given as a part of a storytelling? 
This brings us on to the second challenge.  If Matravers lacks the 
resources to discriminate cases of moral testimony in storytelling on 
the basis of the severity of the deviance of that testimony, how can he 
account for cases where we appear happy to adopt minor changes to 
our moral outlooks in order to engage with a seemingly worthwhile 
story?  If we say that no story can provide moral grounds for the 
acceptance of any moral testimony given as a part of the telling of that 
story, then these cases simply cannot be accounted for.  There may 
well be cases where people already possess the moral grounds required 
to engage with what, it turns out, are morally deviant stories, but these 
are not the cases we are concerned with.  Furthermore, it doesn’t seem 
plausible to insist that wherever there does not appear to be 
transmission failure when mildly deviant stories engage their audience 
that is just because the audience already possess the moral grounds for 
those deviant beliefs; after all, people will generally not accept that 
they have moral reasons for believing what they think are morally 
deviant assertions.   
A satisfactory solution to both parts of the challenge can be found by 
incorporating perspectives into the Transmission Failure view.  Recall 
that Matravers’ challenge to himself was to explain why we don’t 
simply ‘adopt’ beliefs in line with morally deviant stories in order to 
engage with them.  My additional challenge was that (TF) needs to 
explain how transmission failure is sometimes overcome or avoided in 
order to explain the fact that we seem to be able to engage with stories 
that are mildly morally deviant.  The answers to both hang on whether 
and how morally deviant stories can give us Hopkinsian moral 
grounds for engaging with them.  In brief, my proposed solution is 
that adopting a perspective can provide moral reasons for adopting 
moral beliefs on the basis of testimony.  The first part of the challenge 
109  is evaded because, it turns out, we do habitually adopt morally deviant 
beliefs in order to engage with morally deviant stories (or, rather, we 
adopt a perspective according to which those beliefs are appropriate).  
The second part of the challenge is partly answered in the same way, 
but my solution can also explain why transmission failure will occur 
for some morally deviant stories and not others; transmission failure 
will occur when the story fails to provide the reader with a perspective 
that can ground that story’s moral content or when the invited 
perspective of the story is so different from the audience’s own that 
the expected value of engaging with the story is not worth the trouble 
of adopting that perspective. 
It is fairly easy to show that perspectives, as I have described them, can 
provide the kinds of moral grounds the Hopkins requirement 
demands.  In defence of the idea that someone may legitimately say 
that something ‘feels [morally] wrong’ even though they can offer no 
further moral reasons for thinking so, Hopkins gives the following 
examples of what may count as moral grounds: 
“In allowing the legitimacy of moral beliefs based on nothing more than 
‘feeling’ we are not, in fact, allowing beliefs in the absence of a grasp of 
the moral reasons for them. Rather, what the case shows is how broad a 
notion of a moral reason The Requirement should deploy. In allowing 
belief based on ‘feeling’ we leave room for such things as seeing the 
proposed action in a certain light, or finding that it conflicts with our 
settled moral dispositions to act and (in a stricter sense) to feel in 
certain ways. Someone reacting in such ways as these to the claim that 
some action is morally acceptable does indeed grasp what is wrong with 
it, for all that she is unable to articulate that wrongness.”101 
Perspectives are certainly able to contribute towards ‘seeing actions in 
a certain light’.  Recall that perspectives are standing dispositions to 
generate ways of seeing (to pick out certain types of features of scenes 
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110  as more prominent or central, etc.); perspectives generate particular 
ways of seeing events and objects.  Given that these ways of seeing 
involve favouring certain kinds of causal explanations and, crucially, 
evaluations, it is easy to see how they can provide the moral grounds 
that Hopkins describes.  A generous perspective, to recall my earlier 
example, will for instance provide moral grounds for thinking that 
buying the first round is a morally appropriate action for the reasons 
that it will dispose one to characterise an evening at the pub as an 
opportunity to increase the wellbeing of your friends, to show that you 
value their company, to rid anybody else of the burden of having to go 
to the bar, and so on.  These reasons are all moral reasons (and good 
moral reasons at that), and the fact that the generous perspective can 
furnish somebody with the disposition to characterise scenes in ways 
that make those moral reasons prominent gives us a simple way to 
show how adopting alien perspectives can provide moral grounds for 
adopting alien moral beliefs. 
Although I have shown that adopting an alien perspective is sufficient 
for granting moral grounds for adopting alien moral beliefs, it might 
be objected here that the former is not necessary to the latter.  
Perhaps there are other ways that stories enable their audiences to 
meet The Requirement, thereby evading Transmission Failure.  The 
most obvious alternative might be termed the information view, 
according to which all the necessary work to provide moral grounds 
for the reader is achieved by storyteller making other simple assertions 
in the story; that the storyteller makes the kinds of things true in the 
story that can serve as moral grounds for accepting perverse moral 
truths that are also asserted in the story.102  This objection can be met 
simply by observing that information on its own often 
underdetermines the audience’s response to a scene or story; indeed, 
                                                 
102 Keiren (2003) defends a version of this view. 
111  even altering the order such information is revealed can drastically 
alter an audience’s response to the events depicted.   
Daphne du Maurier’s Rebecca is a fine example of a story in which a 
principal character holds a dark secret.  What is important for our 
purposes is to note that the point at which Maxim’s secret (that he 
murdered his wife in a jealous rage) is revealed is just as significant a 
factor in determining our view of him by the end of the story as what 
the secret itself consists in.  If we had been told of Maxim’s murderous 
deeds in a prologue, having not yet established his clearly tortured 
conscience, an audience would be far less kindly disposed towards him 
than we end up being when we finally discover the truth.  The place in 
the story at which we are told Maxim’s secret strongly determines the 
way we respond to learning that secret.  The information given in a 
narrative is certainly among those features of a story that determines 
what perspective we are being invited to adopt on the events that 
transpire.  However, since the order that information is revealed 
doesn’t itself constitute information in the sense we’re interested in, 
and the order the information is presented clearly determines the 
audience’s response in at least some cases, the information view can’t 
sufficiently explain the audience’s response.   
A defender of the information view might at this point object that the 
order in which events are narrated or information revealed should, in 
fact, count as information presented to the audience.  The idea being, 
perhaps, that the order in which information is revealed to the 
audience is itself information that an audience gains as they progress 
through the story (call it ‘ordering-information’).  While it is 
undoubtedly true that an audience does gain ordering-information as 
they read a novel, and learn at what points certain crucial pieces of 
information are received, the ordering-information does no work in 
explaining the audience response to Rebecca as the story unfolds.  This 
is so because ordering-information is information concerning external 
features of a story.  That is, features of a story we speak of when we are 
112  not engaged with it as a story, but rather considering it as an artefact.  
It is an external feature of Rebecca that it was written by Daphne du 
Maurier, is around 150,000 words long, that it is a gothic mystery, and 
so on.  Internal features of Rebecca include things like the nervousness 
of the protagonist, the fact that Manderley has latticed windows and a 
gravel drive, and that Manderley’s housekeeper is named Mrs. 
Danvers.  Information narrated to an audience relates only to internal 
features of a story.  Ordering-information, on the other hand, is an 
external feature of a story because what order an author chooses to 
reveal information to us is information about the way the story is 
constructed; not information revealed to us about narrated events by 
their being narrated, but information revealed to us about the 
narration itself.  A response to an external feature of Rebecca, such as 
ordering-information, is a response to Rebecca as an artefact and 
might include such thoughts as “Oh, what an interesting literary 
character he turned out to be!”, but never “Oh, that poor man!”.  Our 
surprisingly soft feeling towards Maxim require that we think of him 
as a man, and not as a fictional character, which in turn requires us to 
take an internal perspective on him when we respond.  In short, 
ordering-information cannot determine our responses to events in 
stories as we engage with them, because ordering-information is not 
narrated information, but rather information about the narrative qua 
artefact. 
I will gloss over the question of how exactly a storyteller invites an 
audience to adopt a particular perspective; the methods seem to vary 
from case to case.  Some of the more obvious ways might include 
making use of metaphor in such a way that it leads to consistent 
characterisations of some kinds of characters or events in the story in 
ways consistent with a particular perspective.103  If a story kept 
referring to the actions of the Sheriff protagonist in leonine terms and 
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113  the actions of the Outlaw with, say, serpentine imagery, it might 
encourage the audience to adopt a perspective according to which 
lawmen are generally to be trusted, praised and so-on, and those they 
suspect of wrongdoing as being more than likely good-for-nothing 
varmints. 
What is more interesting to us now are the mechanisms by which a 
story can fail to get us to take up a perspective suited to engaging with 
that story.  I mentioned two: when the story simply does not provide 
us with an opportunity to take up a perspective appropriate to 
engaging with the story, or when the perspective offered to us is so far 
removed from our own that we don’t feel engaging with the story is 
worth the effort of adopting the perspective.  Stories can fail in the 
first way by at least two different means; they can offer us the wrong 
perspective or they can offer us no alternative perspective at all.  In 
both cases transmission failure occurs for the same reason; we are 
engaging with the stories with our existing perspectives and they do 
not allow us to characterise the narrative in a way that will furnish us 
with grounds for engaging with its moral content.  Stories can fail to 
engage us the second way by inviting a perspective so far removed 
from our own that the sheer psychological effort needed to think 
ourselves into that perspective, and make it coherent enough to be 
able to provide Hopkinsian moral grounds, does not strike us as 
worthwhile.  It is perhaps tricky to describe precisely what makes one 
perspective ‘far removed’ from another, but I think we can characterise 
the distance in terms of the specific mental states (especially beliefs, 
evaluations and feelings) in which perspectives partly manifest 
themselves.  If I find that an invited perspective on a story would 
involve me, for instance, responding positively to gender-selective 
infanticide, I am likely to disregard the project as a waste of 
psychological resources; the kinds of perspective shifting hurdles I 
114  would have to jump through to arrive at such a response are simply 
not worth the expected value of engaging with a story like (G).104 
We have arrived at a solution to the challenges facing the 
Transmission Failure view.  We can now, as we could not before, 
explain why transmission failure occurs in cases like (G) but not in 
what I have called ‘mildly deviant stories’ such as Crime and 
Punishment and V for Vendetta.  (G) will, I think, inevitably fail for 
both of the reasons I mentioned; it does not give the reader an 
opportunity to adopt a perspective that would furnish her with 
grounds to share the story’s moral content, and any perspective that 
could provide such grounds is so far removed from that of any likely 
reader that hardly anyone would even try to adopt it. 
 
 
4.5 Perspectives and the Philosophy of Literature: Disparate Response 
 
Transmission Failure is an example of the limits of authorial authority 
when it comes to making things true in stories, but it is important to 
recognise that storytellers can exercise a significant amount of power 
when it comes to determining how we respond to their tales.  Like the 
first objection to (TF), the problem of disparate response is motivated 
by the datum that we sometimes respond to events described in 
stories in ways other than we would if we encountered those events in 
different circumstances.  In this section I will examine several ways of 
conceptualising the problem of Disparate Response and conclude that 
any satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon will have to make use 
of perspectives. 
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115  There are countless examples of stories in the literary canon that 
appear to successfully induce audiences to experience emotional, 
aesthetic, humorous and moral responses to their represented events 
in ways that seem surprising, given how we would expect audiences to 
ordinarily react to those kinds of events.  Indeed, for some of the most 
(in)famous examples such as Lolita, inducing the audience to depart 
from their ordinary emotional and moral standards in engaging with 
the story seems to be one of the central goals of the author.  Entire 
genres of story, such as dark comedy, violent slapstick and almost 
anything featuring a morally questionable protagonist, depend for 
their success on getting the audience to laugh at what they would 
ordinarily find horrifying, hope for the success of plans they would 
ordinarily wish to be thwarted and cheer for characters whom they 
would ordinarily despise.  The problem of Disparate Response is why 
it should be the case that we would respond to representations of 
events in stories in ways that apparently depart from how we 
ordinarily would respond to those events.105   
4.5.1 The Problems with the Problem of Disparate Response 
The Problem of Disparate Response is simple to grasp at a surface 
level, and I would hazard that the effect is familiar to anyone who 
habitually reflects on their responses to stories.  However, when we try 
to analyse Disparate Response it becomes clear that it isn’t obvious 
what we should think of as the problematic feature of this 
phenomenon, or how we should understand the finer details of the 
phenomenon itself.   
In particular, it is difficult to nail down precisely which set of 
‘ordinary’ responses ought to serve as the comparator to the ‘disparate’ 
responses brought about by engaging with stories.  For instance, we 
might think that my support for Charles Ryder’s conversion to 
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116  Catholicism in Brideshead Revisited constitutes a fine example of 
Disparate Response, but by virtue of disparity with what expected 
response of mine does this support for Ryder’s conversion qualify as 
‘disparate’?  Going forward I will refer to responses that have 
supposedly been brought about as a result of the phenomenon of 
Disparate Response as ‘disparate responses’, and those responses from 
which disparate responses are different as ‘ordinary responses’.  Is my 
support of Ryder’s conversion a disparate response because: 
 I would respond differently to a non-fictional story relating the same events?  I would respond differently if I witnessed an exact real-world version of those events first-hand?  I would respond differently if I witnessed an approximately similar version of those events first hand?   If I myself were to write about these events I would invite a different response from my readers?    My response, on reflection, surprises me because it seems to run counter to my more general beliefs about the value of religious conversion?  
To begin to get a grip on which set of ordinary responses should be the 
comparison we should note that, as in the case of Transmission 
Failure, the phenomenon of Disparate Response is not confined to 
fictional stories; two different, non-fictional accounts of the same real-
world events can often provoke responses in their readers that are 
different both from one another and from our other candidate sets of 
ordinary responses.106  To take an example, Volker Skierka’s biography 
of Fidel Castro is broadly sympathetic, whereas Leycester Coltman’s is 
positively damning.  While both are reporting on the same subject 
matter, the life and work of Fidel Castro, a reader’s response to the 
events described is likely to differ wildly depending on how they are 
reported.  A reader of Skierka’s book is likely to respond one way, a 
reader of Coltman’s book quite another.  More to the point for our 
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117  current discussion, neither of these seems necessarily connected to 
any candidate set of ordinary responses.   
Disparate Response, therefore, doesn’t appear to be associated with 
fictional stories so much as stories per se.  As such, it would be difficult 
to suggest that my response to Brideshead Revisited counts as 
disparate because I would respond to a non-fictional report of the 
same events in a different way; firstly because it is not at all obvious 
that I would respond in a different way (if the report were the same in 
all possible respects while being non-fictional), and secondly because 
Disparate Response is a feature of engaging with non-fictional stories 
too, and we cannot therefore use our responses to non-fictional stories 
as a comparison class to determine what responses count as disparate 
for other non-fictional stories. 
Perhaps, then, what marks our responses to certain stories out as 
disparate is not that they are different to how we would expect to 
respond to other reports of similar events, whether fictional or not, 
but how we would respond if we came across similar events in real life.  
Thinking again about my response to Charles Ryder’s conversion to 
Catholicism, perhaps my support for his conversion counts as 
disparate not from my expected response to a non-fictional report of 
such a conversion, but from how I would respond to real-world 
experience of those events.     
However, using real-world experience as the benchmark of our 
ordinary responses is also problematic for the purposes of identifying 
disparate responses.  When considering a case like Brideshead 
Revisited there is an initial complication in that the novel is narrated 
in the first person.  What would count as a real-world experience of 
the events of Brideshead, therefore, might just be a real-world 
experience of seeing, hearing or reading somebody like Ryder 
recounting certain events of his (non-fictional) life.  This would 
amount to nothing more than an experience of being told a non-
fictional story, however, and as we have already seen, non-fictional 
118  stories are just as capable of eliciting Disparate Response as fictional 
ones.   
To obtain an adequate comparison class in order to usefully speak of 
Disparate Responses, we need to divorce the events of a story from any 
narrating of those events.  Because the phenomenon we are 
attempting to describe occurs in response to all kinds of story, to 
determine what our ordinary response to any narrated events might 
be, we must consider them in a non-narrated form.  This is, 
unsurprisingly, a rather difficult enterprise.  Part of what it is to 
narrate a series of events is to selectively include and disregard various 
elements of those events, to mark some out as especially central or 
worthy of attention, and to present those events as following on from 
one another in a coherent fashion.107  This means that, from the 
outset, it is impossible to gather a narrative-neutral collection of facts 
from a story to evaluate and respond to in your ordinary way; the 
collection of facts available in the narrative have already been selected 
to fit their existing narrative structure.  This is of course especially true 
of events narrated in fictional stories; because fictional events often 
have no existence beyond their presentation in a story, there is no 
narrative-neutral fact to be evaluated or responded to.108  
Even if we ignore the complications of first-person narratives and 
deciding what set of facts we need to hypothesise responding to, 
locating a sensible set of ordinary responses is far from a simple 
matter.  It is hard to make sense of the idea that we can hypothesise 
experiencing the events of Brideshead Revisited first-hand while still 
remaining ourselves in all those ways necessary to ascertain what our 
ordinary response to those events would be.  My ordinary responses 
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119  are doubtless partly determined by things that have happened to me, 
things I have been told, taught and learned to expect.  When I am 
hypothesising what my ordinary responses to the events of Brideshead 
would be I would presumably have to maintain those elements of my 
dispositions to respond which are informed by these experiences; I 
want to be able to say that my ordinary response to, say, Julia’s distress 
at being unable to marry Rex in a Catholic ceremony might be 
informed by my modern attitudes about the insignificance of such 
things.  However, if I want to maintain these kinds of responses in my 
ordinary repertoire, then wouldn’t my ordinary response to the events 
of Brideshead also include other responses informed by my real-world 
experiences, such as being surprised to find myself witnessing events 
that occurred some fifty years before my birth?   
It is tempting here to just stipulate that only responses to the details of 
the events and not the occurrence of the events per se should count as 
‘ordinary’.  This would rule out my being surprised that I was 
witnessing events taking place before I was born but include any 
modern influences on my responses to the things taking place.  
However, I am not convinced that there is a principled way to make 
this distinction, or if there is that it would even be a useful one to 
have.  In the first place it is often the occurrence of an event itself that 
is the subject of both ordinary and disparate responses (such as when 
we learn about the event of Kurt’s suicide, to take another example 
from Brideshead).  We would want to include such responses in our 
‘ordinary’ class, but the proposal on the table rules that out.  On the 
point of principle, it is not likely that we could have any response to 
any event sans detail, if details of events like Kurt’s arrest and suicide 
include things like the fact of Kurt’s death.  Even if we wanted to say 
that we can be surprised at the occurrence of events per se, a very 
difficult question is then raised as to how we can be surprised at the 
event of Kurt’s death without thereby being surprised at the fact of 
Kurt’s death. 
120  4.5.2 The Expectation View 
The lesson to take from all this, I think, is that there is unlikely to be 
any satisfactory way to determine our ordinary responses to stories 
along these lines.  Hypothesising coming into contact with the events 
of a story won’t reliably provide what we have in mind when we talk of 
‘ordinary’ responses, either because we can’t extricate the events from 
the narrative in which they feature, or because it will often be 
impossible to sensibly place ourselves within those events and respond 
in what we would think of as an ordinary fashion. 
It doesn’t seem possible to adequately delimit a class of responses 
along these lines that can serve as a comparison to determine what 
responses count as ‘disparate’.  However, this isn’t to say that 
Disparate Response is not a genuine phenomenon, nor that it is not 
especially prominent when it comes to our experience of engaging 
with stories.  Rather, I think we just need to make do with a more 
straightforward description of the phenomenon of disparate response: 
a response is not ‘disparate’ from what our actual responses to a 
narrated event would be if it were not narrated, but rather from what 
our considered expectations are of how we would respond to a 
narration of those events. 
Specifically, a response is disparate if it runs counter to my 
expectations of how I would respond to that story in virtue of my 
considered beliefs about my dispositions to respond to those kinds of 
events.  My encouraging response to Ryder’s conversion is disparate 
not because I would respond differently if I knew Ryder in real life, but 
because I would not expect, if I reflected on what I know about my 
own views on the value of religious conversion, that I would respond 
encouragingly to such a conversion in a story. 
This view of the problem of disparate response has several virtues 
when compared to what we may call the actualist position (the view 
that a response to a story is disparate by virtue of a comparison with 
how we would respond to an actual version of those events).  The 
121  most obvious advantages of the view I propose (let us call it the 
expectation view) are that it is not subject to the problems outlined 
above that face the actualist view; there is no need to delimit a class of 
responses that involves regarding events in a story in a non-narrated 
form, nor to answer difficult questions about what parts of myself are 
responding to what parts of the story.   
One interesting advantage of my proposal is that it gives us a way to 
refrain from having to decide whether a response counts as disparate 
when it deals with events that are completely removed from the 
experience of the audience of a story.  If someone had never given 
much thought as to whether they would be supportive or condemning 
in the face of a situation such as the illicit affair of Charles Ryder and 
Julia Flyte, then not much is gained by claiming that their response is 
disparate.  The actualist, however, is committed to claiming that such 
a response may well count as disparate, if it happened to differ from 
how the reader would respond to an actual event of the same kind.  
The expectation view is at liberty to avoid terming a response to an 
unfamiliar situation as either disparate or ordinary; it is simply new.  
Furthermore, the expectation view also permits us to say, quite 
sensibly, that our response to an event in a story might determine our 
expectations of how we might respond to a similar event in real life.  
The actualist view might struggle to follow the same thought, since 
our responses to stories are apparently so often ‘disparate’, and 
therefore unreliable as a way of setting our considered expectations of 
how we might respond in the future.   
The expectation view allows us a simple and plausible way to describe 
the relationship between the framing effects famously demonstrated 
by the psychological experiments of Tversky and Kahneman and the 
phenomenon of disparate response.109  Participants in these 
experiments were asked whether they would give their approval to one 
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122  of two policies which, in both cases, would save 200 lives at the risk of 
the loss of 400 lives.  Participants were more likely to give their assent 
to a policy which was described in terms of lives saved and less likely 
to give their assent to the same policy described in terms of lives at 
risk.  This experiment, and others like it, show that the way a narrative 
is framed (in this case, whether it a scenario is described in terms of 
lives saved or lives risked) has the effect of manipulating an audience’s 
response to it in predictable ways. 
Framing effects are certainly related to both the problem of disparate 
response and perspectives in general.  A shift in perspective from one 
scenario to the other, by emphasising lives saved in one case and lives 
lost in the other, gives us a good way to explain why the framing effect 
carries the force it does in determining participants’ responses.  As for 
disparate response, it has been suggested that the phenomenon of 
disparate response constitutes a special subclass of framing effects.110  
This characterisation works far better if we take the expectation view 
of disparate response rather than the actualist view.  On the 
expectation view we can simply say that disparate responses are those 
brought about by framing effects, and which run counter to a subject’s 
expectations.  It is not open to the actualist, however, to make an 
analogous claim (that disparate responses are those brought about by 
framing effects, and which are different from how the subject would 
ordinarily respond).  Firstly, because framing effects have only been 
observed as a feature of stories (broadly construed); participants in 
experiments are experiencing the framing effects of two different 
narratives concerning the same information.  Since, as I have 
previously shown, the actualist cannot use a response to other stories 
as a benchmark for what counts as an ordinary response, the actualist 
cannot claim that the response to any of the stories exhibiting framing 
effects counts as ordinary.  From this it follows that the actualist also 
                                                 
110 Currie (2010) 
123  cannot claim that any of these responses count as disparate, since 
there is no adequate comparison class to determine what counts as an 
ordinary response to being told any kind of story, including the 
minimal narratives exemplified by the vignettes frequently used in 
psychological experiments.  
Given that my goal here is to show that perspectives are essential to 
describing the phenomenon of disparate response, I might appear to 
have made things difficult for myself by rejecting the actualist account 
of the phenomenon.  It is relatively easy to show that perspectives are 
essential to a good description of disparate response in actualist terms.  
As the experiments concerning framing effects show, it is the 
perspective an audience is invited to adopt on a scenario that 
determines their response to it every bit as much as the scenario itself.  
This is a very important point, since by itself it fends off what is 
possibly the strongest objection to both the actualist and the 
expectationist views of disparate response, a return to what I have 
called the information view.  It has been suggested that perspectives 
have no explanatory value in explaining disparate response, and that 
the apparently different responses that we have to stories can be 
explained simply by the information we are given in those stories, and 
how that would differ from information we might have access to that 
would lead us to our ‘ordinary’ responses.111  Cases like the experiments 
of Tversky and Kahneman show that this cannot be the whole story.  
Assuming that framing effects are closely related to the phenomenon 
of disparate response (which the information view is not equipped to 
dispute), such cases prompt different responses with the same 
information, merely presented in a different way.  The presentation, 
therefore, must be what is doing the work to bring about the effects in 
which we are interested, and this presentation is best described in 
terms of perspectives.  It is also worth mentioning that, as with the 
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124  perspective centred approach to Transmission Failure, a perspective 
centred approach to disparate response gives us a way to predict that 
occasionally the invited (disparate) response to a story will not 
materialise in the audience; because adopting the required perspective 
to produce that response is too much effort for the expected value of 
engaging with the story. 
An actualist can explain disparate response in terms of perspectives 
very simply; we have different responses to stories than we do in real 
life because stories encourage us to adopt different perspectives than 
those with which we usually operate.  The expectation view must 
concede a certain advantage of neatness to the actualist on this point: 
the actualist can use perspectives to both explain when a response 
counts as disparate (when it is brought about during the adopting of a 
perspective that is not our ordinary one) and to explain how we can 
have different responses in different stories.  The expectation view 
concurs with the actualist that perspectives explain how we can have 
responses that count as disparate, but appeals to the confounding of 
our considered expectations to determine when a response counts as 
disparate.  The expectation view, in full, appeals to perspectives in 
something like the following way: we are surprised by some of our 
responses to stories because they run counter to how we would expect 
ourselves to respond to that story, given what we think our usual 
perspective is on those kinds of events.  Returning to the case of 
Ryder’s conversion, I might think that I would expect my response to 
be disapproving, because I think of myself as being the sort of person 
who tends to disvalue religious conversion, especially as a solution to 
the kind of problems Ryder is having.  However, when I reflect on my 
actual response to the closing paragraphs of Brideshead Revisited, I 
find that my perspective on these events is different to how I would 
expect it to be, which in turn has led to a soft-hearted response, 
bordering on supportive.  
125  And here is where I think the most significant advantage of the 
expectation view lies over the actualist view; in emphasising our 
reaction to our own responses, the expectation view opens the door 
for a powerful theory of the role of disparate response in accessing 
cognitive value in stories.  Disparate responses, on the expectation 
view, give us an opportunity to reflectively realise our capacity to 
adopt different, coherent perspectives on various situations; the 
surprise I feel at responding positively to Ryder’s conversion is 
cognitively valuable not just because it makes me realise that I am 
capable of seeing the situation in a way that merits that positive 
response, but because that perspective, and the response that comes 
with it, are experienced as consistent, coherent and natural.  
126  5. EMPATHY AND THE NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
5.1 Locating the Narrative Perspective 
 
I have shown that two thorny problems in the philosophy of literature 
can be both clarified and solved by appealing to perspective shifting.  I 
take it that the pervasiveness of these phenomena (particularly 
Disparate Response) is sufficient motivation to embrace the idea that 
perspective shifting is, therefore, a central part of narrative 
engagement.  This takes us half way to showing that narrative 
engagement involves being-with, and is thereby an empathic activity.  
What remains is only to argue that narrative engagement is 
undertaken with the aim of making a demonstrative ascription to a 
target. 
The first and most important question to address is the nature of the 
target of the proposed empathising.  Since we are looking for a target 
that is common across all kinds of narrative, a good place to start 
would be to identify the holder of the perspective that we appealed to 
in solving the problems of transmission failure and disparate response; 
what I have referred to as the narrative perspective. 
Recall that perspectives are collections of psychological dispositions 
that generate ways of seeing.  If we are looking for possible targets of 
empathy that plausibly hold the narrative perspective, we ought to 
start with figures who exist across all kinds of narrative and who have 
the capacity to possess perspectives as we have understood them.  
Furthermore, the narrative perspective, when held by this figure, must 
be able to perform the functions I have assigned to it in my discussion 
of Transmission Failure and Disparate Response; i.e. the narrative 
perspective must be able to provide moral grounds for moral beliefs (a 
la The Requirement), and be able to provoke disparate responses in 
audiences.  There are several figures of various kinds with which we 
127  are familiar from both philosophical and critical thought about 
literature who fit the bill, including authors and audiences (both 
actual and hypothetical), characters featuring in stories, and narrators 
of various kinds.112 
Let us first divide the candidate figures along lines that will be useful 
in order to compare them for their suitability for our purpose.  We can 
first distinguish some candidates from others by virtue of whether 
they are real (flesh and blood) people, figures internal to the narrative 
or hypothetical figures constructed from or implied by the text.  
Potential holders of the narrative perspective who are real, flesh and 
blood people include: 
 Flesh and blood authors (e.g. Daphne du Maurier)  Flesh and blood audiences (e.g. Me reading Rebecca)  Flesh and blood narrators (e.g. Anna Massey reading the audiobook edition of Rebecca)  
Flesh and blood figures of this kind, being real people, all have the 
capacity to hold perspectives that can provide moral grounds for 
moral beliefs and provoke disparate responses (if their perspective 
were to be adopted by another). 
Other potential candidates for the holder of the narrative perspective 
are internal to the narrative itself, including: 
 Narrators of stories related in the first person (e.g. Doctor Watson)  ‘Effaced’ narrators (narrators internal to a story who are not made explicit in the narrative, as in most stories featuring omniscient third-person narration).  Characters featuring in the story.  
First person narrators are also uncontroversially able to hold the right 
kind of perspectives since, along with characters in stories, they are a 
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128  kind of person that we can speak of as exhibiting the outlooks or ways 
of seeing which are the manifestations of perspectives.  The same is 
true of effaced narrators, though as I will discuss there is some 
controversy over whether they exist in all cases. 
The final group of candidates include hypothetical or implied figures, 
such as: 
 An implied/hypothetical/ideal author  An implied/hypothetical/ideal narrator  An implied/hypothetical/ideal audience  
Whether figures such as implied authors, narrators and audiences 
exist is, unsurprisingly, more controversial than whether the above 
flesh and blood or narratively internal figures exist.  However, I will be 
arguing that it is among these that the holder of the narrative 
perspective will be found, specifically by an implied narrator, who 
shares some features with the traditional implied author figure so 
often invoked in literary criticism.113 
Given the relatively controversial status of implied or hypothetical 
narrative figures, I will begin by showing how the other, less 
controversial candidates are unsuited to my purposes, before then 
going on to explain how an implied narrator works well as a target for 
empathic engagement in stories, without necessarily committing me 
to the problematic features of such implied figures that have caused so 
many to doubt their existence. 
5.1.1 Flesh and Blood Authors, Audiences and Narrators 
The Flesh and Blood candidates are fairly easily dismissed as holders 
of the narrative perspective.  Taking the simplest case first, to say that 
Flesh and Blood audiences hold the narrative perspective would not 
answer our question.  We accept that audiences possess an imagined 
analogue of the narrative perspective, and that this is part of what it is 
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129  to engage with something as a narrative.  What we are after, however, 
is an explanation of how they come to possess the narrative 
perspective in the first place.  Suggesting that a flesh and blood 
audience holds the narrative perspective is therefore true, but by the 
lights of the debate in question, only trivially so. 
A similarly simple refutation is available against the idea that the 
holder of the narrative perspective, the figure with whom we 
empathise in engagement with narratives, is the Flesh and Blood 
Author of the story in question.  It is far from uncommon to see a 
Flesh and Blood Author deliberately create a story featuring a 
narrative perspective far removed from their own.   
Wayne Booth reports that Saul Bellow once described to him the 
process of revising his novel Herzog as “wiping out those parts of my 
self that I don’t like”.114  It is clear that many authors think, along with 
Bellow, that the narrative perspective on a work is at least partially 
under their control, that they have the power to dictate the authorial 
voice that an audience takes as the originator of the narrative 
perspective with which they engage.  As Bellow erases from the text 
evidence of those attitudes of his he would prefer not to be expressed 
through the work he simultaneously constructs a narrative perspective 
lacking in those attitudes for the audience to engage with.   
Of course not every author’s process of revision will be similar to Saul 
Bellow’s.  It could well be that many authors revise their works in 
order to put as much of themselves into a story as possible, or to get 
clear on precisely what their attitudes are to the events related in the 
story.  However, just because a revision of a story may be made with 
the objective of ensuring a faithful presentation of the Flesh and Blood 
Author’s actual perspective on the narrated events, that is no reason to 
think that any particular story consists in such a faithful presentation.  
I would hazard a guess that most, and certainly a large proportion, of 
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130  authors have always put other, more artistic considerations before the 
strictly accurate rendering of their own perspective on a story.  Even 
though as a matter of fact the attitudes or perspective expressed in any 
given work may be very close to those of the Flesh and Blood Author, 
it is still the case that much, if not most, of the time there will be 
significant differences between them.    Hence, we are liable to be 
mistaken if we ascribe to the Flesh and Blood Author the attitudes or 
perspective expressed by their work.   
Ordinary readers, however, often do take the perspective of a story to 
be that of the work’s Flesh and Blood Author.  There is something very 
reasonable about this commonplace habit, and something very 
misleading about it.  What is reasonable about this, or rather the 
reasonable attitude it illuminates, is that when we read a story we are 
aware that it was written by a Flesh and Blood Author for some 
purpose.  An important part of our engagement with any work of 
literature is often taken to be getting to know the author through their 
work.  We speak of the ‘world’ of Austen, or Dickens, or Orwell; when 
we read their works we are aware that we are not just reading a story 
plucked from thin air, or randomly inscribed on a rock by the erosion 
of the sea, but a story written by a particular author according to a 
particular cultural tradition.  While I do not wish to suggest that 
getting at Orwell’s thoughts on the Russian Bolshevik revolution is the 
only reason we read Animal Farm, it is certainly among the reasons we 
might read it.  Similarly, it is plausible that a typical feature of our 
engagement with any work of literature involves the belief that, in 
reading their work, we are discovering something of the Flesh and 
Blood Author’s way of seeing the events described.  Indeed, we can 
find some evidence of this in the habit of audiences to mistakenly 
attribute views they have taken from authored works to their Flesh 
and Blood Author – such as when some readers of Animal Farm and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four assume that his books betray broadly anti-
131  socialist feelings on the part of Orwell himself, when Orwell was 
famously sympathetic to socialism throughout his life. 
However, because we have limited access to the Flesh and Blood 
Author’s actual perspective on events such as those portrayed in any 
given story, and because we have to allow for the possibility that their 
perspective could differ wildly from that implied by the text, we are 
forced to conclude that the author whose thoughts and feelings we are 
discovering cannot be identified with the Flesh and Blood Author of 
the work.   
Many of these points go double for the Flesh and Blood narrator of a 
story.  Let me be clear that in speaking of Flesh and Blood Narrators of 
stories I am including those who read aloud stories that others have 
authored, those who tell stories that they author or make up 
themselves, and those who fall anywhere between, such as those who 
recite folklore or bed-time stories, or narrative-minded stand-up 
comedians and orators.  Narrators who do not author their own 
material will obviously not always share the perspective of the 
narrative in question, and just as authors are capable of constructing a 
narrative perspective significantly different to their own, it is a simple 
matter for narrators to tell a story pretending to hold a perspective 
that they do not actually possess. 
Neither Flesh and Blood Authors, Audiences nor Narrators appear to 
reliably share the narrative perspective.  This means that they cannot 
serve as our postulated target for the empathic acquisition of the 
narrative perspective when we engage with stories.  The same basic 
fact about all these characters, that they are Flesh and Blood and 
therefore in no relevant sense have a psychology determined by the 
story, appears to underlie their unsuitability as reliable holders of the 
narrative perspective.  With that in mind, then, I now turn to figures 
internal to stories, whose features are determined by the storyteller, 
and in some cases the story itself, and therefore might conceivably fare 
better. 
132  5.1.2 Figures internal to the narrative: Characters 
Flesh and blood figures, then, seem obviously unsuitable to be 
considered as the holders of the narrative perspective.  This is not 
surprising, mostly because Flesh and Blood figures have determined 
features that are not under the control of authors or storytellers, and 
the narrative perspective of any given story seems to be, in principle, 
under the control of the author. 
Several philosophers have raised the question of how useful empathy 
is as a way of describing how we engage with stories.  Amy Coplan, for 
instance, has enlisted a great deal of evidence from neuroscience and 
psychology to show that we frequently imagine ourselves experiencing 
a scene we read about from the point of view of the main character in 
the scene.115  While this shows that empathy may well play an 
important part in how we orient ourselves in imagining narrated 
scenes, it by no means shows that empathy with characters is in any 
way central to our engagement with stories as a whole.  Indeed, this 
last suggestion has been forcefully rejected by Noel Carroll, who 
argues persuasively that empathy with characters cannot be the 
principal mode of engagement with fictional characters.116  The main 
force of Carrol’s argument on this is due to an empirical point; if 
empathy with characters were our main point of engagement with 
fictions, we would expect to feel markedly different emotions in 
response to stories than we actually do in the majority of cases.   
The opening scene in Jaws, for instance, provides us with two 
characters with whom we could plausibly empathise (three if we 
include the eponymous shark).  Chrissie, swimming in the sea, is 
happily waiting for Tommy to join her in the water.  The audience is 
made aware of a presence approaching Chrissy by the introduction of 
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133  a POV camera shot moving beneath her in the sea.  Tommy is 
exuberant at the prospect of swimming with Chrissie, and then passed 
out on the beach.  The anxiety of the audience in watching the (at that 
point unknown) presence approach Chrissie beneath the surface is not 
shared by anyone in the scene.  We even get to see from Jaws’ point of 
view, and we certainly don’t feel the same as way as Jaws does.  If 
audiences habitually engaged with stories by empathising with their 
characters, then we would expect their emotion to be one exhibited 
by, or at least ascribable to, one of the characters in the scene.   
Carrol rightly suggests that the mode of engagement we have in the 
majority of cases, exemplified by Jaws, is one of sympathy for the 
characters.  We care for Chrissie’s wellbeing, and so we feel anxious for 
her safety after we see her from Jaws’ point of view.  The same, it 
should be emphasised, goes for non-filmic stories too.  Many of the 
characters in most stories elicit sympathetic responses, and the 
audience empathises with relatively very few.  I don’t doubt that 
readers can be encouraged to empathise with particular characters, 
especially when one of them is serving as the story’s narrator.  
However, it should be noted that of course, many characters in stories 
are targets for neither our sympathy nor empathy.  Villains, bit 
players, anonymous crowds; we rarely sympathise or empathise with 
any of these.  If we argued that our main way of engaging with stories 
was to empathise or sympathise with characters, we would be left with 
the question of how we select which characters we sympathise with, 
which we ignore, and which we are hostile towards.       
How we select which characters to have which attitudes towards is a 
matter for the narrative perspective.  It might be argued that the 
narrative perspective does no explanatory work here; we can say that 
we sympathise with Chrissie because she is attractive and happy, or 
that we empathise with Oliver Twist because we spend so much time 
with him, or that we’re hostile to Gradgrind because he is described in 
such unpleasant terms.  However, there are no general principles of 
134  this sort which hold across all cases.  Cersei Lannister is attractive and 
at times happy, but we do not sympathise with her; we spend a lot of 
time with Jason Voorhees but we don’t empathise with him; and 
Gollum is described in very unpleasant terms, but we aren’t especially 
hostile to him at any point.  The question of what narrative techniques 
can encourage us to take what attitudes towards the characters is 
interesting, but it is not our question.  We are interested in 
contributing to a general model of how we engage with stories and we 
can’t extract general principles from these kinds of narrative 
techniques.   
Furthermore, narrative techniques like describing a character in 
attractive or grotesque terms, or having a character appear in a 
majority of scenes, underdetermine our responses to those characters.  
Our responses to a character are often not principally determined by 
how they are described in the current scene, but rather by the 
characterisation we have formed of them from previous descriptions.  
It does not seem right to say that it is the previous descriptions 
themselves which are proximate causes of my current attitude, since I 
may well have no memory of the descriptions per se, merely the 
impression of the character that they gave me.  Even if we denied this, 
there are also many cases where it would not even be right to say that 
my response to a character is proximately determined by the sum of 
the descriptions of that character, nor by the direct effect of having 
one description contradict or contrast to a previous one.   
As an example we might think of a character, similar to Rebecca’s 
Maxim, who we have grown to like over a long story in which he is the 
protagonist, and who is consistently described in a pleasant way.  
Then, in one chapter, in a moment that springs naturally from a 
pending frustration in his life, he does something morally 
reprehensible.  Now, it is tempting to say that our resulting revulsion 
is due to the description of this character being hitherto pleasant, but 
now involving him in terrible misdeeds.  However, this isn’t quite 
135  right.  Our revulsion is caused by our kind feelings towards this 
character and how they contrast with his surprisingly evil deed, it is 
not caused by the contrasting descriptions.  
So we can see that our attitudes and responses to characters owe 
something to our standing dispositions to characterise events and 
people in particular ways; to the ways of seeing the story that the 
narrative perspective generates.  While I have shown that we can’t 
accurately say that we will always sympathise or empathise with any 
particular character, there is certainly one who we might think that we 
empathise with more often than not (where they appear).  That is the 
internal narrator of the story, and it is to them that I now turn. 
5.1.3 Figures internal to the narrative: Internal Narrators and Unreliability 
Characters who narrate the stories in which they appear do seem to be 
able to direct our attention in the way we would expect of the 
narrative perspective.  The way a narrator thinks about the story is 
often the way that the audience thinks about the story.  So although 
not all stories are narrated by one of their characters, it will still be 
profitable to determine what features of an internal narrator’s 
perspective are shared with the narrative perspective. 
Whether a figure, or a perspective on a story that a figure may hold, is 
internal or external depends on whether or not the figure or 
perspective in question is located within the narrated events.  To 
illustrate this, let us think about the narrators of stories who might 
possess each of these kinds of perspective; a narrator with an internal 
perspective will be one who features in the events of the story they 
tell, a narrator with an external perspective will not feature in the 
events of their story.   
Dr. Watson of Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories is a good 
example of an internal narrator.  The stories Dr. Watson tells are of 
adventures that he has with Sherlock Holmes.  Even in the story The 
Gloria Scott in which we learn about Holmes’s first case, the events of 
which occurred long before Holmes and Watson had met, Watson is 
136  still an internal narrator.  This is because The Gloria Scott is a story 
Watson tells of Holmes telling Watson about his first adventure.  The 
story of Holmes telling Watson a story is itself a story Watson is 
intimately involved with.   
It is important to note that Watson needn’t have been an internal 
narrator here.  Had he chosen just to relate the events as Holmes 
related them to him he would have been an external narrator.  
However, because the story he tells involves Holmes telling him the 
story he becomes an internal narrator.  Holmes too is an internal 
narrator in this story, since the story he tells Watson is of events in 
which Holmes was a participant.  Conan Doyle on the other hand is an 
external narrator of both the story Watson and Holmes tell; he tells a 
story in which Watson tells us of Holmes relating the details of his 
first case. 
Internal, first-personal narrators such as Watson, in many cases do 
hold the narrative perspective of the story in which they feature.  
Watson’s perspective on the Sherlock Holmes stories is usually the one 
we share, according to which Holmes is admirable but flawed, 
Lestrade and Scotland Yard are pleasant but often bumbling and 
incapable, with a moral outlook befitting the late Victorian era in 
which the stories are set.  However, there is one aspect of Watson’s 
perspective which is not shared by the audience; that of his own 
intelligence and capability.  Watson presents himself as almost 
comically incapable, but from Watson’s insight, and Holmes’ own 
assessments, we know that he is not as foolish as he thinks himself to 
be. 
Watson, in his underestimation of his own abilities, betrays himself to 
be a mild form of unreliable narrator.  Unreliable narrators come in 
several different forms, and they often unreliable in their perspective 
on the events they relate as much as on the facts of the story they tell.  
Watson, as I said, is a mild case, but far more stark examples exist in 
137  Stevens the butler in Ishaguru’s The Remains of the Day and Patrick 
Bateman in Easton Ellis’ American Psycho.   
American Psycho is the story of a wealthy investment banker Patrick 
Bateman. Bateman, in his late 20s when the story begins, narrates his 
everyday activities, from his recreational life among the Wall Street 
elite of New York to his forays into murder by night.  American Psycho 
is a fascinating book for our purposes here, since it is likely to give rise 
to both Transmission Failure and Disparate Response in much of its 
audience.  This is because the response sought by the work includes 
some degree of sympathy for the protagonist, who is presented as 
something of a victim of the capitalist excesses that have made him 
successful.  His murderous activity is itself presented merely as the 
taking of Bateman’s ultra-capitalist dogma, for which he has been 
consistently rewarded, to its logical extremes.  Bateman, by the end of 
the story, is presented as a pathetic and pitiable figure; torn between 
his helpless compulsion to kill, scared by his own lack of remorse and 
how easily he gets away with his own crimes.  He is conflicted in that 
he is desperate to be caught and punished, though he still works hard 
to avoid capture, and is bemused to find himself still protected and 
rewarded by the society that has fomented and encouraged his 
psychopathic behaviour. 
Significantly for our current purposes, there is no character in the 
work that shares this perspective on the events of the story, and 
certainly not Bateman himself, who narrates it; he is alternately proud 
and scared, but never sees himself as pitiable; he is too self-involved to 
think of himself as befitting any particular judgement of others.  The 
perspective according to which Bateman is to be pitied, then, must be 
one external to the story, as there are no figures available with an 
internal perspective that provokes the required responses. 
American Psycho illustrates two important points.  First, that the 
phenomenon of Unreliable Narrators means that first-personal 
narrators can’t always be the holders of the narrative perspective.  And 
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narrative perspective. 
To expand on the first point, unreliable narrators, as I have 
mentioned, come in several different forms.  It is important to note 
that not all types of unreliable narrator are relevant to our discussion.  
Some unreliable narrators are unreliable on matters of fact, and others 
on matters of perspective.  Within each of these categories of 
unreliability we can further divide narrators between those who are 
deceptive (deliberately unreliable in order to mislead the audience) 
and deceived (unreliable, but not deliberately).  Determining whether 
a narrator is reliable on the facts of a story is both complex and not 
relevant to our current discussion.  The narrator of a realistic or 
purportedly true story may be said to be unreliable by virtue of failing 
to make their story correspond to facts in the world.  If a story is not 
purporting to be true then it is a more difficult matter to determine 
what counts as a narrator who is unreliable on the facts, although 
some clearly are (such as the narrator of Agatha Christie’s The Murder 
of Roger Ackroyd).  However, we are interested not in the ways 
narrators can fail to be reliable on facts, but rather how they can fail to 
be reliable in the way they present those facts, since that is the way 
that a narrator can fail to share the narrative perspective. 
So how, exactly, does a narrator fail to be reliable in their perspective 
on events?  At this stage that notion is in danger of seeming 
incoherent; we do not, in general, think of perspectives as the kinds of 
things that can be held reliably or not.  Certainly we can say that some 
perspectives might be more warranted or appropriate than others, but 
the term ‘unreliability’ suggests that there is a standard of correctness 
to the perspective of a narrator that we would not usually apply to the 
perspectives we ordinarily hold.  Despite this, narrators such as 
Stevens in The Remains of the Day, who consistently sees his 
employer’s moral fall into Nazi sympathy and apologism as noble and 
139  praiseworthy, seems a prime example of unreliable narration, and 
seems to be unreliable only on matters of perspective and not fact.   
I suggest that the best way to make sense of unreliable narrators like 
Stevens and Bateman is to say that they are unreliable in the sense 
that their perspectives depart significantly from the narrative 
perspective of the story in which they feature.  To say that a narrator is 
unreliable by virtue of their perspective is to say that another 
perspective is more appropriate, but importantly that more 
appropriate perspective must be another that is offered as a way of 
engaging with the story.  Consider a situation where we may have a 
narrator who has a perspective that we don’t consider appropriate, but 
where no alternative perspective is offered by the story.  As an 
example, we might think of an analogue of (G) narrated by Giselda, 
like so: 
(G)** “My name is Giselda.  In killing my new born daughter, I did the 
right thing.  After all, it was a girl”. 
As we have discussed, such stories are liable to result in Transmission 
Failure.  However, it does not seem right to put this failure down to 
the unreliability of Giselda’s perspective; her perspective seems to 
accord with that of the story as a whole.  In such cases we do not want 
to say that the narrator is unreliable, rather that the perspective 
offered is flawed for some other reason (such as that it is too far 
removed from our own to make engaging with the story worthwhile). 
In cases where we can say of an internal narrator that they are 
unreliable on matters of perspective, it seems that we must postulate a 
further perspective with both has primacy over theirs (in that the 
audience will prefer it), and that differs in some significant way.  The 
second point illustrated by American Psycho and others, that no other 
character in the story necessarily holds such a perspective, gives us 
another reason to think that the narrative perspective is both a 
significant part of our engagement with stories, and not identifiable 
with the perspective of any figure internal to the story. 
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One possible response to the second point illustrated by American 
Psycho, that there is no character internal to the story who shares the 
narrative perspective, is that there is one possible internal perspective 
that I have overlooked – that of an ‘effaced’ narrator.  According to the 
view commonly known in the Philosophy of Literature as the ‘ubiquity 
thesis’, in every work of fiction there is some fictional narrator who 
tells it.117  I am interested here in all stories, not just fictions, but for 
the sake of argument let us allow for the moment that the Ubiquity 
Thesis can also be taken to apply to non-fictional stories, such that 
every story that is told is embedded within another story told by a 
character internal to the story.  That narrator is ‘effaced’ because they 
are not explicitly mentioned by the story.  
In opposition to the ubiquity thesis, we can point to the unfamiliar 
imaginative activity that would be necessary if it was true; especially in 
cases like American Psycho, where we must imagine not only that we 
are being told a story by Patrick Bateman, but that the story of Patrick 
Bateman telling us a story is also being told by some further figure in 
the story of whom we are not otherwise aware.  It has also been argued 
that the ubiquity thesis cannot cope with ‘mindless’ fictions: fictions 
that explicitly state that there is nobody in the fictional world of the 
story, or that the events of the story left ‘nobody alive to tell the tale’.  
An early defence of the ubiquity thesis from Gregory Currie points out 
that there are stories “that generate games of make-believe in which 
we are called upon to make believe that P and to make believe that 
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141  not-P.”118   This is not uncontroversial, but even if it is true there is a 
difference between the claim that it is possible that we imagine 
contradictory things in response to some fictions and the claim that 
we do so as a matter of course in encountering mindless fictions; the 
latter still seems implausible.  The example Currie uses has to do with 
time travel; that we may believe that an event both did and did not 
occur at a particular time according to a science fiction yarn.   It does 
not seem right to draw from the fact that we might, feasibly, believe a 
contradiction to be true according to a fiction that we can thereby 
assume that we believe contradictory things are true of any mindless 
fiction.  There is a great deal of cognitive effort required to 
imaginatively navigate logically troubling stories such as those 
involving time travel paradoxes, and this kind of effort simply does not 
appear to go along with engaging with the mindless fictions Currie 
points to.    Furthermore, it could be argued a similar cognitive 
dissonance is required by Currie to occur as a matter of course when 
engaging with any fiction narrated in the first person. 
When I introspect on my imaginative habits when reading first-person 
narrated fictions, I can find no suggestion that I imagine someone 
other than the explicit narrator telling the story.  Currie may yet insist 
that I do imagine that the story is being told by somebody else in the 
voice of the narrator I recognise.  However, because all I am aware of 
imagining is being told a story by the narrator, Currie’s insistence that 
I am also imagining a Fictional Author who tells the story of the 
narrator telling the story puts me in the position of being mistaken 
about who is telling me the story whenever I read a first-person 
narrated fiction.  I do not suggest that Currie’s view always entails my 
imagining contradictory propositions, that “Watson is telling a story” 
and “the effaced narrator of A Scandal in Bohemia is telling a story”.  
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142  According to Currie the former telling is embedded in the latter, so 
there is no contradiction there.  Rather, the problem comes from my 
attitude about, in this case Watson, that he is the primary teller of the 
story according to the work.  As far as I’m concerned when I read the 
Holmes stories, it is Watson and only Watson who is telling me a story 
in the fiction (though of course I also believe that Conan Doyle is 
telling me a story at the real world).  When I read Sherlock Holmes, 
Currie’s view seems to accuse me of being mistaken not just about the 
fact that there is an effaced narrator, but also that it is this effaced 
narrator, and not Watson, who is my primary source of engagement in 
the world of the fiction.  
Possibly the most significant problem with the Ubiquity Thesis as it 
stands, however, is that it fails to adequately account for unreliable 
narrators (which is one of the reasons we turned to effaced narrators 
as potential holders of the narrative perspective in the first place).  
While a defender of the Ubiquity Thesis might claim that we do not 
need to habitually postulate an effaced narrator, but only do so where 
there is either a) no narrating character or, b) we have reason to think 
the narrating character is unreliable, this will not do.   
Bonomi and Zucchi propose exactly this in order to overcome similar 
difficulties in Currie’s theory to the ones I outlined here.  They claim 
that a presumption of reliability is “at work” when we engage with 
fiction, and that we only question the reliability of the narrator when 
there are “reasons intrinsic to the [story]” that we should do so. 119  We 
are justified in, say, questioning Stevens’ view of Lord Darlington 
because Stevens shows himself to be subservient to his master’s 
perspective on the world.     
There is certainly something correct about this view; as a description 
of how we approach first-person narratives I think it does justice to 
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143  our intuitions.  However, it falls short of a cure-all for dealing with 
unreliable narrators.  The presumption of reliability faces the problem 
that in order to discern what reasons “intrinsic to the [story]” are 
sufficient to question the reliability of the narrator, we must already 
have some beliefs regarding what is an appropriate perspective on the 
narrator’s story.  In the case of Stevens’ view of Lord Darlington, we 
must already have some idea that the appropriate perspective on the 
story is such that Stevens’ is at odds with it. 
In other words, for a presumption of reliability to work we need to be 
justified in operating under the assumption that the world of any story 
is somewhat like our own.  We need to be able to justify the 
conditions at which our narrator becomes unreliable, and in order to 
do this we must know how much of our intuition about what it would 
be reasonable for a narrator to report apply to any given fiction.  As an 
example, imagine that Orwell had chosen to write 1984 in the first 
person, with Winston Smith as the narrator.  Smith would certainly 
appear to be paranoid, which would count as a reason ‘intrinsic to the 
text’ to suspend our trust in the narrator’s version of events.  If we 
were to know that, in fact, Smith is to be trusted in this case we would 
have to have a justified belief that the world of 1984 is sufficiently 
unlike our own that reports of what at the actual world would be 
chronic paranoia can be taken as reliable fact in the world of this 
fiction.  Of course, in this case, we could not come by that belief 
without believing Smith’s narration, and so we are stuck.  A fortiori, 
consider the case of an impossible fiction told in the first person (in 
which Smith and Jones square a circle, for instance) – a presumption 
of reliability would be immediately suspended in such a case, leaving 
us to unfairly label the narrator a liar.  A presumption of reliability, 
defeasible where the narrator exhibits certain characteristics (intrinsic 
to the fiction which make the narrator seem unreliable), will make 
false predictions whenever the world of the fiction is sufficiently 
144  unlike our own that the narration given would be thought unlikely if it 
was told as fact at the actual world.   
To drive the point home, let us imagine a fiction that was primarily 
narrated by such a character as Currie thinks we imagine in addition 
to any explicit narrator in the ordinary case.  Suppose we are being 
told the story of Hamish by, according to all appearances, Hamish 
himself.  However, at the end of the novel it is revealed that Hamish 
died during the events of the story and actually the narrating character 
is Dougal, who was adopting Hamish’s persona for dramatic effect but 
nonetheless believes everything he reported was an accurate account 
of events.  According to the Ubiquity Thesis we would in such a case 
have to postulate yet another character in the story, on the off chance 
that Dougal could have been mistaken about his beliefs.  The possible 
iterations of this wisely underused narrative flourish border on the 
absurd, but however absurd the story itself the insistence that a reader 
must posit a further character, just for the sake of having a reliable 
perspective somewhere internal to the fiction, is even more difficult to 
swallow. 
We might be able to forgive the Ubiquity Thesis for its clumsy 
handling of mindless fictions, given that they are something of a rarity.  
However, the insistence that a mindless fiction entails readers so often 
being mistaken about who is the primary source of their perspective 
on the story, together with its continued inability to deal with 
unreliable narration, leads me to conclude that the idea that the 
narrative perspective is always held by a character internal to the story 
is false. 
5.1.5 Hypothetical and Implied Figures 
The Ubiquity Thesis fails to provide us with a figure who necessarily 
holds the narrative perspective, but this is arguably due to features of 
the Ubiquity Thesis that we might be able to change.  The Ubiquity 
Thesis was initially formulated in order to address the venerable 
question in analytical aesthetics of what makes something true in a 
145  fiction.  A strand of thought, beginning with Currie and continuing 
until now, has it that the best way to analyse truth in fiction is in 
terms of the beliefs of a reliable narrating agent internal to the fiction.  
If we are not altogether interested in fictional stories as much as 
stories per se, however, there does not seem to be a binding reason 
why we shouldn’t use the Ubiquity Thesis, should it prove useful, but 
stipulate that the ubiquitous narrating figure need not belong to 
anything as difficult to manage as a character internal to the story. 
A weak version of the ubiquity thesis claims that in engaging with a 
story, the audience postulates a ‘minimal narrating agency’ who is 
telling that story; as Seymour Chatman has it, “every narrative is by 
definition narrated”.120  If every narrative is narrated by definition, 
then by definition every narrative is narrated by some narrating 
agency.  So much constitutes conventional wisdom, and those who 
criticise this notion tend to only do so because they think that the 
minimal narrating agency that we take to exist by definition is 
insufficient as a means of answering various philosophical questions 
about the nature of engagement with stories.121 
I will argue here that this minimal narrating agency is the holder of 
the narrative perspective, that the minimal narrating agency that 
audiences postulate as a part of engaging with any story is 
psychologically rich enough to hold things like perspectives, and that 
such an agency serves as the target of empathy. 
In the previous section, I made a great deal of the fact that characters 
in a story can’t be the holders of the narrative perspective because 
their perspectives are necessarily internal to the story, whereas the 
narrative perspective is not.  I want to clarify at this point that, 
although the narrative perspective is not necessarily internal, neither 
is it necessarily external. 
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146  The narrative perspective will usually be external; it will usually be 
held by a figure who is not a part of the story they tell.  We know this 
because, as we have seen, the narrative perspective usually cannot be 
identified with the perspective of any character explicitly named in a 
story, and the idea of implied or effaced internal narrators turns out to 
be very troublesome.  However, there are cases where the narrative 
perspective is clearly an internal one. 
I have in mind autobiographical stories of various kinds.  The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X, to take a prominent example, is a case 
where the perspective of the narrative is clearly framed from the 
perspective of one who is involved in the story, and so the narrative 
perspective is internal.  Similarly, for any story I tell about a party I 
attended, or the funny thing that happened to me on my way over 
here, the narrative perspective will be internal, since I am telling a 
story about a thing that happened to me.  Not only are these cases 
most simply described by recognising the narrative perspective as 
internal, but some responses that audiences have to stories of this 
kind require that the perspective they adopt is internal also. 
For instance, suppose I'm telling a story about a party I attended.  At 
the time I thought I was being the life and soul, the very picture of 
bonhomie.  On sober reflection I realise I was actually being 
insensitive and boorish through the whole night.  The story I tell 
about my evening expresses a shamed perspective on the events of the 
party, particularly highlighting the pride I took in my 'wit'. 
We might expect that an audience of this story would respond with 
the kind of interesting ‘cringe’ response that is so often associated with 
embarrassing stories, and comedy figures such as Alan Partridge and 
David Brent.  Furthermore, the cringe will be directed at me, the 
storyteller, and not merely at the version of me who misbehaved at the 
party.  Such a response, I think, is only appropriate if a couple of 
conditions are met.  First, my behaviour at the party must be 
recognised as embarrassing by the audience.  It is recognised as 
147  embarrassing by the audience because when I tell the story, I tell it 
with the benefit of hindsight, in the knowledge that my behaviour was 
in fact embarrassing, and not sociable as I thought.  Second, and most 
importantly, the audience must recognise that I have an internal 
perspective on the story, in that I am involved in the story that I am 
telling, in order that they can properly direct the response at me, the 
figure who was both at the party and is telling the story. 
The lesson to take from this, I think, is that the narrative perspective 
must be capable of moving between being internal and external to a 
story.  The narrative perspective is sometimes internal to a story, and 
sometimes external, and so the figure who holds the narrative 
perspective must not be restricted to only being able to hold one or 
the other. 
This consideration allows us to rule out one of our final candidates for 
the holder of the narrative perspective, that of an implied or 
hypothetical audience.  An audience’s perspective will almost 
invariably be external to a story, and so is not capable of the flexibility 
that we now require.  Furthermore, hypothetical or implied audiences 
are inadequate for the equally significant reason that the perspective 
of a hypothetical audience would be determined by the way an 
idealised audience would respond to an idealised author.122  This is 
because a hypothetical audience would need to be described in terms 
of its ability to respond in a way appropriate to the content of the 
story, and the appropriateness of any response to a story would, in 
turn, be likely to be described in terms of the intentions of the actual 
or implied author of that story.  If a hypothetical audience holds the 
narrative perspective, therefore, a hypothetical author would hold it 
too, making the claim that the hypothetical audience holds the 
narrative perspective explanatorily redundant. 
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148  Now we come to my recommendation for the figure that we should 
take to hold the narrative perspective, and with whom an audience 
empathises during their engagement with a story.  That is, an implied 
storyteller, encompassing the ‘minimal narrating agency’ that is 
present by definition in all narratives.  I will expand on my reasons for 
this choice shortly, but first I want to clarify why I think an implied 
storyteller, and not an implied author, is the right option. 
The implied author is a concept developed in 20th century literary 
criticism, most notably by Wayne Booth.123  Booth’s theory was largely 
a response to notion popularised by Flaubert, Lawrence and others 
that there was something at the best unappealing, and at worst 
downright immoral, about an author’s own judgements about subjects 
of a novel weaving their way through the narrative.  In contrast Booth 
holds that such objectivity is neither especially desirable nor possible: 
“However impersonal he may try to be,” writes Booth, “his reader will 
inevitably construct a picture of the [author] who writes in this 
manner”.124 
Although the usefulness of the implied author as a heuristic device has 
never been successfully impugned, the ontological commitments 
associated with it have often been queried.  Is the implied author the 
kind of thing that can communicate?125  If so, implied authors are 
going to need to carry significant ontological costs.  How far should we 
take the apparent anthropomorphism of the concept?126  If implied 
authors are people, are they fictions?  Simply imagined?  Are they 
created by authors or by readers?  If the former, how can they be truly 
independent of a work’s flesh and blood author in the way that seems 
to be required?  If the latter, does that mean there are one or more 
implied authors for each reader? 
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149  Choosing the implied narrator rather than the implied storyteller 
allows us to evade all of these tricky questions (provided we can show 
that the implied storyteller is capable of the psychological refinement 
necessary to hold perspectives).  More than that, however, it is unclear 
whether an implied author has the right kind of attitudes to their 
(implied) work such that an audience who empathised with them 
would come away with the attitudes and responses that we would 
want to predict.  An implied author, for instance, might be assumed to 
have an authorial concern for their characters, or similar attitudes 
towards the story that come along with having authored it.  We would 
generally not want to suggest that an audience, in empathy, would 
subsume these traits into their perspective.   
An implied narrator, on the other hand, carries with it all the relevant 
benefits of an implied author, in that they are somebody an audience 
already has in mind when they engage with a story, and they have the 
right kind of relationship to the story itself to allow their perspective 
to be internal or external as each case requires.  However, an implied 
storyteller comes with very little of the associated ontological cost of 
an implied author, largely because we are already committed to a 
minimal narrating agency who can fulfil the role of an implied 
storyteller.  An implied author, on the other hand, can’t be easily said 
to exist in every story by definition. 
To conclude this section, then, let me summarise the reasons why an 
implied narrator is the figure we can take to hold the narrative 
perspective in any given story.  First, an implied storyteller is a figure 
that uncontroversially exists across all kinds of story, in that any 
narrative is narrated by definition.  Secondly, since the perspective of 
an implied storyteller can either be internal or external to the story 
they tell, we can account for the narrative perspective of 
autobiographical stories.  Third, implied narrators evade the problems 
of unreliability that prevented internal narrator-characters from 
necessarily sharing the narrative perspective.  This last is due to the 
150  fact that implied narrators, by virtue of encompassing the minimal 
narrating agency entailed by narratives, serve by definition as the 
primary point of engagement with any story.  As such, an implied 
narrator also serves as the standard of reliability for any other 
narrating figures embedded within the story they tell, and are 




5.2 Demonstrative Ascription in Narrative Engagement 
 
My task in this chapter has been to show that engagement with stories 
involves making a demonstrative ascription to a target, in order to 
secure the idea of empathy being a central way that audiences engage 
with stories.  I have identified the most plausible target of empathy, 
the implied narrator of the story, by virtue of its having the right kind 
of relationship to the story to plausibly hold the narrative perspective.  
There is only one thing which remains to be argued for; that we 
routinely make demonstrative ascriptions to implied narrators in the 
course of engaging with stories. 
I will begin discussion of this point by way of anticipating an objection 
to the idea that we need to ascribe the narrative perspective to any 
figure at all.  Currie has recently argued that there is no need to attach 
the narrative perspective (or, in his terms, the narrative framework of 
a story) to a figure such as an implied narrator.  Stories, according to 
Currie, express their perspectives in the same way as someone who 
shakes a fist expresses anger.  If the person shaking their fist is 
obviously not angry, we can still say that anger is expressed (perhaps 
151  ironically), but we do not feel the need to ascribe the expressed anger 
to anyone.127 
According to Currie our principal mode of engagement with stories, 
and in particular their perspectives, is one of imitation, not empathy.  
We imitate the expressed perspective of a story, and this is why we 
respond to that story in a way that accords with the perspective so 
expressed. 
However, I doubt that we can account for our responses to stories by 
relying solely, or even principally, on our tendency to imitate 
(although I don’t doubt that such a tendency is prevalent in us.)  
Currie acknowledges that: 
“We are so prone to imitate and so little aware of what we are doing 
that I expect that empirical studies, if they could be undertaken with a 
suitable fineness of discrimination, would reveal a vast amount of 
imitative activity as a part of narrative engagement, very little of which 
is conscious but any part of which has the capacity to contribute to 
our conscious sense of how interesting, effective and valuable the 
narrative is.”128 
The problem this reveals is that our imitative habits, in Currie’s view, 
guide far more than our imitation of a narrative’s perspective.  There is 
no doubt that many things other than the narrative perspective 
influence our immediate responses to a story; we might think of jump 
scares in film or spoken stories, for instance.  So relying on imitation 
as an explanation for our engagement with stories, without a way to 
discriminate between the imitation of the narrative perspective and 
the imitation of other things that might lead to responses for which 
the narrative perspective is not responsible doesn’t offer us a 
satisfactory explanation of the role of perspective itself in engaging 
with a story.  In preceding sections, for instance, I have discussed the 
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152  ways in which our adopting the narrative perspective explains how 
some of our responses are in tune with ‘the story’ as a whole, while still 
differing from the responses we might expect to have if we were 
imitating the perspective of some character or other within a scene.  
For instance, if Falstaff is, according to the narrative perspective, a 
laughable figure, then that explains why we enjoy his suffering, rather 
than imitating his sorrow at his misfortune. 
Conceiving of narrative engagement as empathising with the holder of 
the narrative perspective gives us a way to discriminate between those 
characters whom we may imitate, empathise or sympathise with, and 
those who we disregard.  Engaging with a story isn’t just a matter of 
imitating whatever imaginative fodder the narrative provides for us.  It 
involves the characterisation of scenes in particular ways, in 
accordance with the perspective from which the story is told. 
Empathising, then, in virtue of being a way to adopt another’s 
particular perspective, gives us all the necessary tools to respond to 
characters and events in stories in ways that are consistent with a 
relatively stable perspective on those stories. 
So why, in the end, do I think that narrative engagement is a matter of 
empathy?  Where empathy, on my terms, is a demonstrative ascription 
to a target of the form ‘[the target] feels like this’.  The evidence for 
this notion is, I think, fairly straightforward once we have fixed the 
implied narrator as the target of the empathy; it essentially consists in 
the fact that the empathy model of engagement with stories predicts a 
familiar phenomenology of stories, predicts the responses that we in 
fact have to stories, and accords with our experience of engaging with 
stories of all kinds.   For instance, some evidence for the empathy view 
is revealed by our habit of describing stories themselves in terms that 
we would also apply to perspectives.  We might say that a story is 
pessimistic or optimistic, sentimental, romantic or naïve.  The best 
way to make sense of this habit is to suggest that we are ascribing 
those perspectives to the story itself, by way of ascribing them to the 
153  narration of those stories from a particular perspective which shares 
those characteristics. 
With this in mind, I propose the following as a theory of empathic 
engagement with stories: 
When we engage with a story, we empathise with the implied 
narrative agency of that story.  In doing so, as per the Complex Theory 
of Empathy, we engage in proto-empathic imaginings consisting in (a) 
doing-with (wherein we entertain the idea that the facts of the story 
hold for the purposes of engaging with the story), (b) being-with 
(wherein we adopt the narrative perspective of the story) and (c) 
feeling-with (wherein we emotionally respond to the story in a way 
congruent with (a) and (b)).  All this is done with the aim of making a 
demonstrative ascription to the implied narrator of the story of the 
form ‘the narrator of this story feels like this about this story’.  The way 
we can characterise ‘this’ will also be an appropriate characterisation 
of the story. 
To show that the above model is an accurate one, I will conclude with 
two final points.  First, I need to claim that we, as audiences, have the 
right attitude towards the implied narrator.  And second, I need to 
illustrate that the above model will avail us of appropriate and 
predictable responses to the stories with which we engage. 
On the first point, it is clear that when we engage with a story we are 
aware that we are engaging with a story authored by some person for 
some purpose; we are involving ourselves in the institution of 
storytelling in the role of audience.  Furthermore, it is also clear that 
in engaging with a story we are non-trivially concerned with the 
attitudes of the storyteller (identified here as the minimal narrating 
agency).129  We look to the storyteller to tell us the facts of the story, 
and we also look to them to show us how we should respond to those 
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154  facts.  Usually we look to the storyteller by way of looking at the story 
they provide us with, which is the expression of their pronouncements 
about what is true in the story, and also the result of their perspective 
on it.  To say that S is a sad story is to say that the narrator of S told a 
sad story.  We can go further, in fact, and say that to respond to S as a 
sad story is to respond to the narration of S in a sad way.  If our 
narrator tells a sad story, it is fair to make a demonstrative ascription 
such that they also think that story is sad.  Because we are interested 
in what our storyteller thinks and feels about the story, since a 
narrator’s expression of what they think and feel about the story 
constitutes the storytelling, we are liable to ascribe to them the 
thoughts and feelings we take their story to betray. 
Once we have succeeded in empathising with our storyteller, however, 
we need no longer wonder so much as to what our storyteller feels 
about the story, since we have already adopted what we think is the 
appropriate perspective for the story they are telling (i.e., the one that 
matches theirs).  Once we have successfully empathised with the 
implied narrator of the story, we will respond to the story (all things 
being equal) in the way that the narrator intends, by virtue of sharing 
that narrator’s way of seeing the story.  They will direct us to which 
characters and events we are to take as especially prominent, which 
characters we are intended to sympathise with, and which we are 
supposed to dislike, all by virtue of the perspective the narrator lets us 
know is the one we should share. 
  




6.1 Empathic Engagement and Moral Persuasion 
 
We often credit artworks, especially narrative fictions, with having 
some significant role in the evolution of our moral attitudes.  Assume 
that we are not mistaken, and that reading these works did in fact 
change something in our moral outlooks.  If that is the case, then we 
are confronted with the question of under what circumstances and to 
what degree I can hold the works themselves responsible for those 
changes. 
Shen-Yi Liao has argued that much of our theorising on this point has 
been contaminated by a tendency to focus on realistic fictions as 
examples of how fictions in general can morally persuade.130  Liao 
limits the relevant sense of realism to the realms of the psychological 
and the moral, so that a work counts as ‘realistic’ if the characters 
think and act in ways that could occur in real life, and the moral facts 
of the fictional world are identical to those that hold at the real world.  
What counts as realistic fiction for these purposes, then, may well 
include works in the genre of science-fiction, fantasy and the like, 
provided that psychological and moral facts in these works are 
presented as realistic. 
Liao advocates a theory, Persuasion Variantism, which challenges the 
dominance of what he calls Persuasion Invariantism.  Persuasion 
invariantism is the view that: 
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156  “a fiction is responsible for getting us to really adopt a moral (or 
immoral) real-world outlook when it is responsible for getting us to 
imaginatively adopt a similar moral (or immoral) make-believe 
outlook.”131 
With variantism just being the view that the invariantist thesis is false. 
Liao defends a version of the former which he calls Genre Variantism. 
A couple of notes on terminology before we proceed: ‘Moral outlook’ is 
intended to be a broad term capturing not just moral judgements and 
associated cognitive states, but also ways of organising our thoughts 
about particular topics and situations as well as our emotional and 
other responses to them.  Bearing in mind the preceding chapters, we 
can think of moral outlooks as those parts of our perspective which are 
relevant to our moral life.132  Secondly, the sense of ‘being responsible 
for’ here importantly has to pick out a moral as well as a causal 
responsibility. We're looking for a way to hold a work morally culpable 
for persuading people to hold (im)moral perspectives.   
A key consideration in determining whether or not a work is morally 
responsible for my adopting a perspective will be whether my 
adopting that perspective was a predictable result of my engagement 
with the work.  Persuasion invariantism, Liao claims, is insufficiently 
sensitive to the diversity of fictions, and as such often incorrectly 
predicts what perspectives we can hold works responsible for 
persuading their readers to adopt.  Liao claims that different genres of 
fiction avail themselves of different ‘modes of persuasion’, some of 
which do not operate according to the general principle outlined by 
the persuasion invariantist view.  In particular, he highlights satire as a 
genre that tends to morally persuade not by getting the audience to 
imagine a moral perspective, m, but rather by getting the audience to 
imagine holding a perspective antithetical to m. 
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157  In this section I will offer arguments to show that, although Liao is 
right to draw attention to the variety of ways works of fiction can 
morally persuade, these can be accommodated by persuasion 
invariantism.  I will also give some reasons for thinking that 
persuasion variantism of the sort Liao advocates is not in a good 
position to explain how works can morally persuade, nor to provide 
general principles according to which we can hold works responsible 
for their moral effects on readers. 
6.1.1 The Case Against Persuasion Invariantism 
Liao endorses an interpretation of Catch-22 posited by James Harold 
according to which certain views we would find horrifying in the real 
world are, in the world of the novel, not reprehensible.133  Catch-22 is, 
therefore, not realistic (in the sense picked out by Liao), since 
according to this interpretation the moral facts in the world of Catch-
22 differ from those at the actual world.  Liao claims that “persuasion 
invariantism would tell us that Catch-22 is morally corruptive because 
it is responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt an immoral 
make-believe outlook.”134  Since Catch-22 is generally considered, if 
anything, a morally praiseworthy book it would indeed be a problem 
for persuasion invariantism if it predicted that Catch-22 would be 
morally corruptive.  However, it does not.   
Persuasion Invariantism, as stated by Liao, merely says that for any 
real-world moral perspective possessed by an audience of a work, that 
work is responsible for it when it prescribes the audience to adopt a 
make-believe version of a similar perspective.135  Persuasion 
Invariantism does not claim that every make-believe perspective 
prescribed by a work results in a similar real-world attitude being 
                                                 
133 Harold (2007) pp 149-50 134 Liao (2013) p.273 135 I would add to this that if what we are trying to pin down is a work’s capacity for moral persuasion, then we should stipulate that the work is only responsible for a real-world outlook if the audience did not possess the outlook in question before engaging with that work. 
158  adopted.  This would be clearly false: there are many characters whose 
moral perspectives we are prescribed to imaginatively adopt, but 
whose moral perspectives are perverse even according to the world of 
the fiction they inhabit.  We might think again of Patrick Bateman in 
American Psycho, with whom we are called upon to empathise at 
points during the story, but whose perspective is not the same as the 
narrative perspective of American Psycho, the latter being the 
determinant of the moral perspective of Bateman’s world.   
Persuasion invariantism does not need to claim that whenever a work 
prescribes that we adopt a make-believe perspective it is thereby 
attempting to persuade us to adopt a similar real-world perspective.  It 
does need to claim, however, that absent the prescription for an 
audience to make-believe a perspective, that work cannot be said to 
have attempted to persuade us to adopt a similar real-world 
perspective.136   
The focus of our investigation should not be, as Liao takes it to be, 
whether it is possible for us to adopt one make-believe perspective 
during the course of engagement with a fiction but come out being 
persuaded of a quite different real-world perspective.  Rather, the 
point of disagreement for variantists and invariantists is whether in 
order for a work to recommend a real-world perspective to its audience 
(attempt to persuade its audience to really adopt a particular 
perspective), the work must represent that perspective to its audience 
(prescribe that its audience imaginatively adopt a similar perspective).  
                                                 
136This is not to say that it is impossible for a work to cause us to adopt a moral outlook without representing it to us, nor even that it could be held responsible for doing so.  A novel featuring an unintentionally irritating geography teacher might reliably turn people against geography teachers without the work ever representing that outlook.  However, in such a case the work hasn't tried to persuade us that geography teachers are bad, it has merely had the accidental effect of giving people that opinion.  
159  A counter-example to persuasion invariantism, then, would be a work 
that recommended a perspective without representing it. 
Liao offers three different explanations of how Catch-22 could 
recommend a perspective to its audience as a non-realistic fiction.137  
The explanations are different in terms of how they suggest the work 
prompts us to imagine the moral facts in Catch-22 to be non-realistic 
but the details of these differences aren't important for our purposes.  
We can grant Liao the assumption that there are morally non-realistic 
fictions, and that Catch-22 is plausibly among their number.  The non-
realism of a morally persuasive work is not in itself sufficient to show 
that invariantism is false, however.  In such a case invariantism could 
still hold provided the work prescribes imagining a realistic moral 
perspective in addition to any non-realistic ones (and that it is this 
realistic perspective that we are persuaded to adopt).  Liao might 
respond that assuming an additional make-believe perspective here 
just looks ad hoc.  However, without it we are going to have a hard 
time predicting which perspective is being promoted by which works 
in a reliable enough way to secure the moral responsibility we want. 
One very attractive feature of the invariantist view is that the content 
of a persuasive make-believe perspective will be very similar to that of 
the real-world perspective it is trying to persuade us to adopt.  It is 
easy to explain why we ended up with real-world perspective m (as 
opposed to m1 or m2) if we started off with an imaginary perspective 
whose contents were identical to m.  This model makes it very easy to 
talk about works being responsible for our possessing certain 
perspectives.  Firstly, because there is an obvious connection between 
the imagined perspective the work is responsible for and the real-
world perspective we are claiming the work is responsible for.  
Secondly, since we are familiar with the idea of imaginative states 
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160  causing non-imaginative states with a similar attitude and content,138 
the mechanism of persuasion is amenable to explanation by a number 
of plausible theories of the imagination.139 
6.1.2 The Symmetry of Satire 
If invariantism is true, then we can say that a work is responsible for 
the fact that I hold perspective m but is not responsible for the fact I 
hold m1 because m is similar to an imagining prescribed by the work 
but m1 is not.  Variantism, on the other hand, has it that an imagining 
prompted by a work can be responsible for a real-world perspective 
that has neither contents nor attitude in common with it.  So that, to 
take one of Liao's own examples,  
"When engaging with [Catch-22], we readers are prescribed to 
imaginatively adopt a make-believe outlook that treats the morally 
absurd as normal and sensible... [Despite this] it persuades us to really 
adopt a real-world outlook that questions and challenges the moral 
absurdities that are associated with real wars, militaries, and 
bureaucracies."140 
The work, on this model, has used an imagined perspective to 
persuade us to adopt a real-world perspective with no apparent 
features in common.  Variantism needs to explain how we can move 
from the imaginative perspective that treats the morally absurd as 
normal, specifically the moral absurdities detailed in Catch-22 (call 
this m) to the real-world perspective that views militaries and 
bureaucracies as dangerously absurd (call this m1).  In particular, 
variantism needs to explain how we will move from imagining m to 
                                                 
138 I have in mind straightforward cases such as: I imagine that I eat fish fingers and then I imagine that I find them disgusting; from this I form the belief that eating fish fingers will disgust me.   139 Particularly those that emphasise simulation.  See, for instance, Goldman (2000) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). 140 Liao (2013) p. 274  
161  adopting m1 (rather than m2 or m3) in a reliable enough way to allow 
us to hold the work responsible for our adopting m1. 
Liao's proposed solution is that the import/export rules determined by 
a work's genre make it possible for an audience to be persuaded to 
hold a real-world perspective m1 by being prescribed to imagine 
having make-believe perspective m.  The concept of import/export 
rules is indeed a helpful one here.141  The idea of ‘import’ captures the 
fact that in engaging with a fiction we, as audience, do not only 
imagine what is explicitly presented to us in the text.  We also often 
import imaginative counterparts of our real-world beliefs into our 
collection of imaginings about the fiction.  The case we are discussing 
here is an instance of export; we are taking a moral perspective we 
were prescribed to adopt in engaging with Catch-22 and applying it to 
the real world. 
The import/export rules for a work are symmetrical: the domain of 
legitimate imports to a work is the same as the domain of legitimate 
exports from it.  Liao rightly states that it is the symmetry of the 
relation of similarity that legitimises import and export of the same 
kind of attitudes in works that are realistic in some form or another.142  
So, for instance, a work that is physically realistic legitimises import of 
beliefs about the nature of the physical world because if world w is 
similar to fictional world f with respect to physics, then if we have 
reason to believe a physical law holds in w we have a reason to believe 
it holds in f.  Similarly, for export, if a physical law holds in f we have a 
reason to believe it holds in w. 
Similarity, however can’t serve as the relation governing the import 
and export of moral perspectives from Catch-22.  Because Catch-22 is 
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162  morally unrealistic according to Liao the perspective represented by 
the work cannot be exported on the grounds of similarity.  Liao's 
answer to this is to point out that similarity is not the only 
symmetrical relation.143  If genres that are realistic in some respects 
can make use of the symmetry of similarity to legitimise certain 
import and export rules, then other genres can make use of other 
symmetrical relations between their fictional worlds and the actual 
world in order to legitimise different import and export rules.  Liao 
thinks that satires like Catch-22 have certain import and export rules 
based on the opposition relation, which is also symmetrical.  So that, if 
in the world of Catch-22 a moral proposition is true, we have reason to 
believe that its opposite is true in the actual world, and vice versa.  
Morally non-realistic fictions then, according to Liao, can reliably 
persuade us to adopt m1 by prescribing that we adopt m because m 
and m1 are opposites.144   
The problem with appealing to opposition as the symmetrical relation 
governing the import/export rules of moral perspectives is that it isn't 
clear that moral perspectives as such are the kinds of things that have 
opposites.  The symmetry of the similarity of perspectives is secured 
by the fact that for any perspective there will only be relatively few 
others that can count as similar to it.  Opposition is supposed to also 
secure the same symmetry for the export of perspectives, but it is 
difficult to say what would even count as two perspectives being 
opposites.  Perspectives are not propositions; the opposite of the 
proposition that militaries and bureaucracies are dangerously absurd 
might be its negation, but a perspective that includes a disposition to 
accede to that proposition isn't the kind of thing that can be negated.  
For instance, the opposite of a perspective that questions militaries 
and bureaucracies is not just a perspective that does not question 
militaries and bureaucracies.  There are countless moral perspectives 
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163  that do not dispose their holder to question militaries and 
bureaucracies but are nonetheless very distinct from each other in, for 
instance, their accompanying reasons for not questioning militaries 
and bureaucracies.  Is the opposite of the perspective recommended 
by Catch-22 a perspective that does not question militaries and 
bureaucracies out of fear, out of loyalty, or out of apathy?145   
Opposition, as I understand it, is a relation that requires its relata to 
contradict; indeed, this is what makes it an initially attractive option 
here.  If we are recommended to adopt the opposite perspective to 
that represented in Catch-22, then we can easily predict exactly what 
the adopting perspective will be.  This makes it easy for us to praise or 
blame the work for the audience’s adopting of that perspective.  
Perspectives, however, seem like they can at most be contrary to one 
another, and not contradict.  If opposition were, counterintuitively, 
understood as a relation among a potentially huge number of contrary 
relata, it would be harder to pin responsibility on any work that made 
use of it in the way Liao proposes.  However, I simply cannot see any 
way to sensibly define what should count as an opposite of a moral 
perspective, where opposite is understood as implying contradiction.   
In order to contend with persuasion invariantism Liao needs to 
provide a model whereby we can reliably get from make-believe 
perspective m to real-world perspective m1 and the opposition relation 
isn’t up to that job.  The mechanism needs to be reliable because in 
order to praise or blame a work for an effect it has on an audience that 
effect needs to be predictable.  Opposition, although it is a 
symmetrical relation, doesn’t in this instance provide that kind of 
predictability.  If it even makes sense to say that perspectives can have 
opposites, which I doubt, it is certainly false to say that perspectives 
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164  can have few enough opposites that we can fairly say that it is the 
work that is responsible for its adoption in its audience. 
6.1.3 Empathic Engagement and Persuasion Invariantism 
I have argued against Persuasion Variantism as espoused by Liao, but 
there remains the question of how Persuasion Invariantism can 
adequately handle cases like Catch-22.  Although Persuasion 
Invariantism was formulated by Liao as a foil with which to show that 
current theories of how stories can morally persuade don’t take 
adequate account of genre conventions, I will offer some thoughts 
here suggesting how an empathic model of engaging with stories can 
make Persuasion Invariantism plausible on its own terms, as well as 
accommodating the observations about genre that Liao points to. 
According to an empathy model of engagement with stories, the 
narrative perspective encompasses the moral ‘outlook’ that a story, if it 
is to be morally persuasive, will both represent and recommend to us.  
Earlier I offered arguments to show that, in many cases, a perspective 
over and above that held by any internal narrating character exists in a 
story.146  I suggest that Catch-22 is an especially interesting instance of 
this phenomenon. 
I disagree with the interpretation offered by Liao and Harold of Catch-
22 as a story whose perspective is one which treats the morally absurd 
as sensible.  It strikes me as a far more plausible reading to suggest 
that in Catch-22, and indeed of all morally educative works of satire, 
the narrative perspective treats the absurdities of the story and 
characters as just that – absurdities.  That is why we find Catch-22 
funny rather than impossible to engage with by virtue of what 
Matravers identified as coherence failure.147  We do not try to reconcile 
the absurdities in Catch-22, we merely accept them as absurd and treat 
the story accordingly. 
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165  Catch-22, therefore, does not count as morally unrealistic on Liao’s 
terms, since the narrative perspective is actually in tune with the 
moral outlook of the majority of its readership.  I do not doubt that 
there can be works that are genuinely morally unrealistic on Liao’s 
terms, but those would consist in stories whose narrative perspective 
was so far removed from our own that they would likely result in 
Transmission Failure. 
I would like to conclude by noting, however, that the empathic theory 
of engagement with stories is very well served by Persuasion 
Invariantism as a way of describing how stories can morally persuade.  
According to the empathic theory of engagement, we always 
ultimately adopt the narrative perspective of a story, which in turn 
determines how we evaluate the moral features of the story we engage 
with.  As Persuasion Invariantism states, a story will have morally 
persuaded its audience when they adopt a perspective in real life that 
is similar to the narrative perspective they adopted in engaging with 
that story. 
Furthermore, I want to suggest that the empathic engagement view 
can incorporate the varieties of moral persuasion found in different 
genres of story.  Although the psychological mechanism of persuasion 
remains the same for any story, as per Persuasion Invariantism, the 
empathic engagement view can happily incorporate the idea that 
different genre conventions are partially manifested in differences in 
narrative perspective.  Indeed, the expectation that one is about to 
engage with a work in a certain genre may well prime one’s empathic 
engagement in a way that will cohere with the expected perspective of 
a work in that genre.  If I read a fantasy novel, for instance, I will be 
more ready to adopt a perspective according to which evil is 
uncomplicated and must be thwarted, whereas if I am reading a 
political thriller I will be prepared to adopt a perspective of a different 
kind.  The empathic engagement view even allows that such genre 
expectations play a role in how works in different genres might each 
166  morally persuade in a slightly different fashion.  Having primed my 
empathic faculties for engaging with a particular genre, an author may 
choose to indulge or frustrate my expectations in a way which teaches 
me that the narrative perspective I have adopted is equipped to a 
greater or lesser degree to handle the moral judgements I find myself 
making.  If I find the narrative perspective I associate with fantasy to 
be unable to comfortably evaluate the story I engage with (as so many 
find when they encounter Game of Thrones for the first time), that will 
certainly count as a genre specific method of moral persuasion.  
However, it is a method that is both permitted and facilitated by 
Persuasion Invariantism.  
  
167  7. VIDEOGAMES, EMPATHY AND THE ROLE OF THE PLAYER 
 
 
So far I have largely focused on written and spoken stories, and how 
our understanding of them might be improved by adopting an 
empathic theory of narrative engagement.  While, as I have 
mentioned, more literary narratives are likely to provide greater 
opportunity to flex our empathic muscles, the ‘literary’ label covers 
only a relatively tiny proportion of the stories we are likely to engage 
with in the course of our lives.  Although it is certainly the case that 
non-fictional written stories can be ‘literary’ in the same sense as 
fictional ones, stories presented in other media can’t adopt that 
mantle quite as easily. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the world of videogames.  
Although videogames offer new and intriguing ways of telling stories 
(new and intriguing to audiences, philosophers and critics), they have 
so far garnered little attention in academic circles.  They are very 
relevant to my concerns in this thesis, however, since there are good 
reasons for thinking that, prima facie, videogames offer an excellent 
example of empathic engagement with stories.  This is because 
videogames, to a greater degree than any other medium, often put the 
audience of the story directly in the position of the protagonist. 
Before we can discuss the extent that empathic engagement is 
involved in playing videogames, however, we need to spend some time 
discussing what exactly an audience does when they engage with a 
videogame.  As yet, there are no extant theories in analytical aesthetics 
that offer any analysis of this.  I hope to rectify that in what follows, 
and conclude with some thoughts about what the nature of videogame 
artworks and the role of the player tells us about the prospects for a 
special theory of empathic engagement with interactive artworks.    
 
168  7.1 The Extra Credits View 
 
 Surf around the innumerable games related internet forums for more 
than a few minutes and you are more or less guaranteed to come upon 
a thread on the subject of the artistic value of videogames.  Among the 
more common of the ‘pro’ arguments concerns the supposedly unique 
role that players have in determining the features of their own 
experience of a videogame when compared to the audiences for any 
other kind of work.  One of the most eloquent expressions of this idea 
is to be found in an early episode of the excellent online video series 
Extra Credits entitled The Role of the Player: 
“Videogames are unique…Because of their inherently interactive nature 
we, as developers, ship products that are by necessity incomplete.  A 
painting on a wall is a finished work, a movie on a reel is whole and 
complete, a novel on a shelf is what it will always be, but a game without 
a player is nothing.” (Portnow et al. 2011) 
I take this to be a decent exemplar of the common view that part of 
what makes videogames artistically interesting is the supposed 
creative role of the player.148  James Portnow, the writer of the series, is 
himself a games developer and an influential voice in the industry.  
With that in mind his view, while worthy of being treated simply as an 
expression of a commonly held ‘folk’ view, becomes even more 
deserving of critical scrutiny.  Portnow, in the episode described as 
well as in some of his other writings (Portnow and Grip 2011) uses this 
analysis of the role of the player to advocate for a theory of design that 
would place player creativity at the forefront.  If Portnow’s view turns 
out to be false, which I believe it does, designing games on the basis of 
its truth might turn out to be counterproductive.  If artistic merit 
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169  cannot be derived from the creative role a player has in a videogame’s 
production, then designing games that foreground this apparent 
creativity will probably not help make those videogames better 
artworks.   
We ought not start out being too pessimistic though, and Portnow’s 
view has many attractive qualities that may give us pause.  That part of 
any videogame that we experience (the work’s display149) certainly 
does not exist without some sort of player input.  There is a very real 
sense, especially in certain genres, that players feel as if we are telling 
our own story, and indeed the narrative of any particular playing of a 
game is not, cannot be, fixed until it has been played.  My Commander 
Shepard is female where yours is male; a renegade where yours is a 
paragon; a soldier where yours is an engineer, and takes a left turn 
where yours takes a right.  It seems true that we experience decidedly 
different narratives between our two playings of the Mass Effect series, 
and Mass Effect is hardly atypical in this variability.  The only 
fundamental difference between our games is that I am playing one 
and you the other, so it also seems true that we are each responsible to 
some degree for the differences in our experience.  That we, as players, 
are responsible for the presence, absence or form of significant 
features of the narrative that we experience as the game does seem to 
make plausible the thought that players are creative partners in their 
own experience. 
Despite Portnow’s expertise in the field of game design, however, his 
view as stated is not quite precise enough to provide an adequate foil 
for philosophical analysis.  The next order of business then, must be to 
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170  clarify the claims made by views such as Portnow’s, which I will 
collectively name ‘The Extra Credits View’. 
The Extra Credits View, under any interpretation, takes the form of a 
claim about the source of artistic value in videogames: 
EC: Videogames are artistically valuable because X 
Where the Extra Credits View is in need of some reconstruction is 
when it comes to deciding what is being claimed to stand for X.  I take 
it that there are two interpretations of what the Extra Credits View 
claims to stand for X, neatly matching the descriptions of a stronger 
and a weaker claim respectively: 
X*: such works are always, in part, created by their audience. 
And, 
X**: an audience’s experience of such works is partially determined by 
their own actions. 
I believe both X* and X** are plausible interpretations of the Extra 
Credits View.  Although supporters of the Extra Credits View and its 
ilk do often speak of videogame players as ‘creative’, or ‘artists’ in some 
sense, it is far from clear that those descriptions need to be taken in 
the strong sense implied by X*.  There are, after all, ways of describing 
a player of a game as acting ‘creatively’ without thereby implying that 
anything is ‘created’.  Rather, they could just be using some ingenious 
strategy or taking a novel approach to a problem.  Equally, seemingly 
unequivocal talk of players as ‘artists’ is often accompanied by 
descriptions of what such ‘artistry’ entails as crafting not ‘works’ but 
rather ‘experiences’.  While it makes some sense to colloquially equate 
the player of a videogame crafting his or her own experience with an 
artist crafting a work, the strength of that metaphor depends entirely 
on whether we take the ‘experience’ crafted to be a work in its own 
right.    
171  Are both X* and X** suitable substitutions for X in EC?  A statement 
that makes a suitable X in EC will be one that is, firstly, plausible in 
itself, and secondly be such as to plausibly make EC true.  First, let me 
say that I am taking for granted the notion that if we could establish 
that videogames, or any other art form, had unique features of any sort 
that gave rise to distinctive and artistically valuable experiences for its 
audience, that would show that the medium was of artistic value to 
the extent that such experiences are artistically valuable.  Both ECX* 
and ECX** rely on the truth of this general principle, and while I do 
not have the space to defend it here I take it to be a reasonable 
assumption to make.150 
To take the weaker claim first, X**, I do not think that it would make a 
persuasive case for EC to have such a claim stand in for X.  The reason 
is that while it is almost certainly true, it would not make EC true – or 
at best, if it did make EC true, it would make it trivially true.  The 
reason why has to do with the definitions both of videogames and of 
interactivity.  Portnow bases his argument on the premise that 
videogames are an inherently interactive medium, and this is certainly 
true.  There have been several plausible definitions of videogames 
offered by philosophers and ludologists alike, and there are few that 
do not give interactivity as a necessary condition.151  Interactivity itself 
has been persuasively defined by Dominic Lopes as occurring in two 
forms, strong and weak interactivity respectively:  
“In weakly interactive media the user’s input determines which structure 
is accessed or the sequence in which it is accessed…[whereas] strongly 
interactive artworks are those whose structural properties are partly 
determined by the interactor’s actions.” (Lopes 2001 p. 68) 
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172  It is clear that of the two, videogames will squarely fall into the 
category of strongly interactive works: players of videogames do not 
merely determine which parts of the work are accessed or in what 
order, they also partly determine significant structural features of the 
display of the work they engage with.  As it happens, the fact that 
videogames are strongly interactive, or even the distinction between 
strong and weak interactivity, are not what causes problems for the 
explanatory value of ECX**, but rather the fact that videogames must 
be defined partly in terms of their interactivity.  Portnow explicitly 
states, and I think he is right, that the value that he is suggesting 
derives from the apparently creative role of players of videogames 
follows directly from their status as interactive works.  This means that 
any interactive artwork that may not meet the conditions to be 
properly called a videogame, but which nonetheless prescribe that its 
audience determines some features of their own experience of the 
work, will also be able to supply a similar kind of artistic value. 
This presents a problem with X** as an interpretation of the Extra 
Credits View, since it then becomes possible to rephrase EC as: 
EC*: Interactive Artworks (including videogames) are artistically 
interesting because X. 
Meaning that interpreting the X in EC* as X** will result in the 
following: 
EC*X**: Interactive Artworks (including videogames) are artistically 
interesting because an audience’s experience of such works is partially 
determined by their own actions. 
Or, alternatively, by substituting the phrase ‘interactive’ with 
something like Lopes’ definition of interactivity: 
EC*X**: Works that prescribe that their audience’s partly determine 
their experience of the work are artistically interesting because an 
audience’s experience of such works is partially determined by their 
own actions. 
173   This rephrasing reveals the problem with EC under the weaker 
interpretation.  As mentioned above, either strong or weak 
interactivity entails that the audience (user) of an interactive work at 
least partially determine their own experience of it.  The resulting 
claim becomes merely that what makes interactive artworks special is 
that they are interactive.  This is doubtless plausible – if there is 
anything distinctive about the artistic powers of interactive artworks it 
will surely derive from their status as interactive objects, but this alone 
cannot establish that there is in fact anything artistically significant 
about the inherent interactivity of videogames; we would need to 
establish that there was some further feature of interactivity that 
entailed, or permitted, that interactive works possess some distinctive 
artistic value.  Even having shown that videogames, and indeed most 
interactive artworks, must be termed strongly interactive, the weaker 
reading of EC nonetheless fails to do anything more than restate one 
of the necessary conditions of strong interactivity.  EC then, on the 
weaker reading, by itself lacks much in the way of explanatory value.  
The stronger reading, on the other hand, makes a completely different 
sort of claim.152  Artistic value, on this reading, is not purported to 
derive merely from the brute fact of the interactivity of interactive 
artworks.  Rather, it is claimed here that the interactivity of 
videogames entails a fundamental ontological difference between 
strongly interactive and non-interactive artworks.  Strongly interactive 
works are, it is claimed, literally incomplete until they are interacted 
with, and this unique feature allows us to describe players of 
videogames as, again literally, artists.  A medium, a mass medium no 
less, that so completely redefined the traditional roles of artist(s) and 
audience(s) would be very likely to claim some distinctive artistic 
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174  value by virtue of that fact.  The next section will investigate the 
plausibility of this second, stronger reading.  
 
 
7.2 The Role of the Player 
 
The weaker reading of the Extra Credits View, it turns out, is not by 
itself of sufficient explanatory value to determine why videogames 
might be artistically valuable.  We are left with the stronger 
interpretation of the Extra Credits View, which I will hereafter refer to 
as ECV, which can be summarised as follows: 
ECV: Interactive artworks, including videogames, are artistically 
interesting because such works are always, in part, created by their 
audience. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the stronger reading is certainly 
the interpretation that Portnow and his compatriots at Extra Credits 
would support.  Even so, it is somewhat harder to see the plausibility 
of the stronger reading prima facie for a number of reasons.  For one 
thing, when we play videogames, or engage with any interactive 
artwork, it really does not appear to us that we are creating art, so 
much as consuming it.  In fact, our cultural practices around 
interactive art all seem to bear against the stronger reading of EC 
being the default position: we tend to give videogame players neither 
credit nor blame for the qualities of the games they play, videogames 
are bought and sold in a way that implies that the players are buying 
works to be enjoyed rather than tools with which to create, and 
gamers tend to very much see themselves as audience rather than 
artist.  Another reason we might balk at taking ECV at face value is the 
counterintuitive consequence that each individual playthrough of a 
game counts as a work entirely of itself.  It does not seem initially 
plausible that my playing of Mass Effect 3 and yours are not instances 
of the same work, despite the obvious differences in the actions, 
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there then any reasons to take ECV seriously at all?  I believe there are, 
and possibly the most persuasive comes in the form of an examination 
of what we know of the respective roles of artists, audiences and 
videogame players.  Are players of videogames performing a role that 
is more similar to that of the artist to that of an audience member?  If 
we have a reason for believing that they are then we will have at least 
one good reason for accepting ECV. 
Traditionally there are two or three roles to be filled in the course of 
the creation and consumption of a work of art (let us call them art-
roles).  These roles are the artist, the audience and, if the kind of 
artwork calls for it, the performer.  It seems obvious that there is 
nothing to prevent the same person from fulfilling more than one of 
these art-roles.  The writer of a play can also direct and star in it and a 
composer can sit in the audience for a performance of her work.  
Whether the same person can fulfil multiple roles simultaneously is a 
more difficult question.  We might think that the performer of a piece 
of improvised jazz, hearing that particular order of notes for the first 
time as she does, counts as a member of the audience for the music as 
well as a performer.  I am sceptical of this possibility, since listening to 
a piece of music as a performer and listening as audience seem to 
require attending to different and distinct aspects of the piece.  The 
performer listens to the notes played in a way informed by her need to 
decide how to play the next one, an audience may form expectations 
of what sounds will follow what, but that expectation seems able to be 
frustrated in a way that the performer’s decision is typically not.  
Wholly improvised works of music and theatre, it might be argued, 
provide cases where the same person is simultaneously artist and 
performer.  I would be tempted to argue that in these cases there is no 
artist in the sense that we would normally use the word, but I do not 
have space to fully back that up here and the principal thoughts of this 
chapter do not turn on the truth of it.  It would also be rash to dismiss 
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might exactly consist in some mix of those of artist and audience, as 
this view may well be attractive to many.  This scepticism about the 
simultaneous occupation of multiple art-roles does serve a useful 
purpose here, however, since it points us in the direction of a 
framework within which to describe the roles of performers, audiences 
and artists. 
There are some unproblematic cases, as described above, where the 
same person can fill two or more artistic roles, although perhaps not 
simultaneously.  Nonetheless, this shows that their physical or 
historical associations with it cannot suffice to define a person’s art-
role for any particular work.  My having created a work does not 
preclude me from also performing it or engaging with it as audience, 
nor does my simply being within earshot of a piece of music constitute 
my fulfilling the role of audience.  So what facts about a person do 
determine their art-role in a given work?  I suggest, in line with several 
other views that it is a combination of their actions, knowledge and 
intentions.153  Actions because being an artist, performer or audience 
each requires the performance of distinct kinds of actions. Artists 
create, performers play and audiences ‘engage’.  Artists create in the 
sense that they cause something to exist that was did not exist before, 
most often by physically altering something in the world (a piece of 
marble, markings on a page or a canvas), though not always.  Play in 
the sense that performers do it is meant as a term embracing the 
actions typical of stage performance (moving one’s body in accordance 
with the instructions of the work) and musical performance 
(manipulating musical instruments to produce sounds in accordance 
with the work).  Engage is not meant to indicate that an audience is 
especially attentive, rather just that they are in a position to perceive 
                                                 
153 Iseminger (2004), Lopes (2010), Livingston (2005), Davies (2011) 
177  the artwork, as an artwork, in all the ways typical of the medium in 
which the work is presented. 
Doing the right kind of action is not sufficient to fulfil any particular 
art-role, the action must also be done in the right kind of way.  
Suppose I was to sit at the piano and press random keys that just so 
happened to result in a note perfect rendition of ‘A Nightingale Sang 
in Berkeley Square’, and further suppose I had never heard the tune 
before.  This would hardly count as a performance of that song, any 
more than a performance of ‘My Country ‘Tis of Thee’ would also 
count as a performance of ‘God Save The Queen’, despite the fact that 
the tunes are identical.154  The best explanation for why these tune-
makings don’t count as full-fledged performances of their sound-
identical works is that the people making the tunes do not have any 
intention that they should count as performances of that work.  So, in 
order to fulfil the role of a performer I must not only play the melody 
of ‘A Nightingale Sang in Berkeley Square’, but I must also intend to 
perform that song by my playing. 
There is one further requirement we must make of somebody before 
we can say that they can fill the role of a performer, that is that they 
must know what would count as a performance of the relevant work.  
It is probable that without that knowledge it would be impossible for 
me to form the intention to perform, but even if the intention can be 
formed it would be impossible (or so unlikely as to practically amount 
to impossibility) to successfully carry out that performance.  I suggest 
that these three criteria, the right action, done with the right 
intention, with the required knowledge to properly form that 
                                                 
154 There are those who may dispute this.  Philosophers who are ‘sonicists’ about the ontology of music have the view that musical works just are the sounds that make up a performance of it (Dodd 2010), and would therefore claim that works that sound the same are identical.  I find the arguments against this view very persuasive (Davies 2008), but I don’t believe the truth of sonicism would count against the view that the mere making of certain sounds does not constitute a performance.  
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necessary and sufficient conditions for art-roles.   
Recall that my aim in this section is to determine how the role of the 
player of videogames provides a reason why we might think ECV 
initially plausible.  Following our previous discussion, can we 
determine whether the role of the player is more like that of an artist 
or an audience member?  We have already seen what specific actions, 
intentions and knowledge are required to successfully perform ‘A 
Nightingale Sang in Berkeley Square’: I must play the piece, with the 
intention that my playing constitute a performance of that piece and 
know what action would constitute a performance of the piece.  What 
of the roles of the artist and audience?  In the case of the artist they 
must create, that is perform some action that brings an artwork into 
being, with the intention that a work should be created by their 
action, and some knowledge of what the work will be.  An audience 
must engage with the work in the sense described above, with the 
intention that the work be engaged with as an artwork (that is, that it 
must be attended to as an object of aesthetic appreciation) and no 
knowledge of the work is necessary, save possibly the knowledge that 
it is an artwork, or what kind of work it is. 
Which of these roles best describes the player of videogames? Could 
they be classed as performers?  The thought might be initially 
tempting, indeed it has been suggested by Aaron Smuts (2009) that no 
clear distinction can be drawn between the roles played by the 
performers of musical works and those of videogame players. If this 
was true it might be troubling for those, like Portnow, who wish to 
find some distinctive artistic value in the role carried out by 
videogame players.  This is simply because if it turned out that players 
of videogames and musical performers are fulfilling the same art-role, 
then anything artistically valuable to be found in the playing of a 
videogame will not be distinctive of videogame players; musicians will 
have been accessing the same value for centuries.   
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do not possess the required knowledge or intention to count as 
performers.  A musician’s necessary knowledge of the work to be 
performed, as I have suggested, essentially consists in knowledge of 
the rules the following of which would constitute a performance of 
that work.  Unlike with musical works, when I play a videogame I do 
not have to be aware of the rules that constitute a playthrough of it 
before I play; those rules are encoded in the fictional world of the 
game in what Grant Tavinor (2009) calls affordances for fictional 
action.  Affordances in videogames are presented to the player in the 
shape of, for instance, doors that can be opened, locations that can be 
explored, enemies that can be killed and health potions that can be 
drunk.  Affordances, unlike prescriptions for musical performance, do 
not require any prior knowledge of themselves in order to be fulfilled – 
if I come across a glowing red button in Portal, then I can press it, but 
I do not need to be aware that my fictionally pressing the button is 
necessary for me to continue in the game; it may not be, it is just 
presented to me as an opportunity for the fictional action of pressing 
it.  Because of this difference from musical performance, in terms of 
prior knowledge of the constitutive rules of the work, affordances in 
videogames can be acted upon by players-as-audience, without the 
intention we would require of player-as-performer.  To play a 
videogame, then, is to follow the constitutive rules encoded in 
affordances for prescribed fictional action programmed as part of the 
videogame, and generate the videogame’s displays by so doing.  To 
perform a musical work, by contrast, is to intend to generate a display 
of that work by following constitutive rules the details of which you 
know in advance. 
It could be objected here that a player could grow to know a 
videogame so well that their every move would be deliberate enough 
that their playing could constitute a performance. I think this is a 
completely reasonable consequence of my views as stated, since I see 
180  no reason why a videogame playthrough couldn’t be a performance in 
the right circumstances; the typical playthrough of a game, however, 
will not be. It may also be objected that distinguishing the roles of 
players and performs in this way would leave the way open for players 
of chess, as well as other games the rules of which need to be known in 
advance in order to be played, to be considered performers. I have no 
particular problem with characterising players of chess as performers, 
and anyone wishing to do so will not find it impacts on my general 
line of argument, but the idea might seem peculiar to some. To those 
people I can only say that there may yet be further differences in 
intention marking the performer of Summertime from the player of 
chess, not least of which might be that the primary considerations of 
chess players are not aesthetic, but grounded in a desire for a 
victorious game outcome. My distinction is only meant to support the 
claim that the interactivity present in videogames is distinctive of 
videogames and substantially different to how musicians may interact 
with musical works during live performance. I believe I have shown 
this, and we are therefore safe to infer that artistic merit gained 
through such interactivity is the sole preserve of the gamer, and not 
also of the musical performer. 
Players of videogames are not performers then, or at least not 
typically, but are they more like audiences or more like artists?  What 
are the knowledge, acts and intentions necessary and sufficient for a 
person to fulfil the art-role of a player?  An artist requires significant 
knowledge of the work she is about to, or in the process of, creating.  
An audience requires far less, indeed no specific knowledge of the 
work is necessary in order for an audience to appreciate, say, a novel, 
or a play as works of art, save that they are meant to be appreciated in 
that way.  Players of videogames are not clearly one or the other.  A 
player need not know the future details of the plot of the game she is 
playing, but on the other hand it is true that a player may well know 
the kinds, if not the specific, choices that her character will make; 
181  whether they will be ‘good’ or ‘evil’ for instance.  A player will know 
that her avatar is about to turn left, open a door or throw a punch in a 
way that a designer of the game will not necessarily know.  
Furthermore, the knowledge barrier of entry for players of videogames 
is considerably higher than that which we would usually require of an 
audience of any other kind of artwork.  Even the most cursory playing 
of a videogame requires the mastering of certain commands, usually 
involving a degree of motor skill.  To play a videogame a player must 
know how the game works, and even when this amount of knowledge 
is relatively little, it is still considerably more than is required for any 
other medium.  A viewer of Picasso’s Guernica might well be, in some 
sense, a better audience if they know something about the history of 
art, or the history of Spain, but it is still entirely possible to appreciate 
Guernica as art knowing nothing of either of these things.  While the 
player of Bioshock need not know anything about Randian objectivism 
to engage with it as art, though that will certainly make the experience 
a richer one, a player must at the very least know the appropriate way 
to manipulate a controller in order to play the game at all. 
While the amount of knowledge necessary to play a videogame is 
greater than that needed to engage as an audience with many other 
kinds of work, it is not clear that the required knowledge is of a 
sufficiently similar kind to that we would normally require of an artist 
to settle the question of whether players are audiences or artists right 
now.  Players may know, and indeed decide, features of certain 
characters or the plot, but they do not and cannot know other 
important aesthetic features of the work that an artist might be 
expected to; the style of art, the specific dialogue, the twists in the plot 
etc.  On the other hand, since the vast majority of videogames are 
collaborative works, there is no expectation that any of the individual 
artists have knowledge of all these things as they are creating the work 
either.  Indeed, if ECV is to be plausible at all, it must necessarily be 
understood as claiming that players are collaborative artists, so 
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features to their experience, there need be no requirement that they 
know more than that. 
In short, the very nature of interactive media means that players of 
videogames are going to bring more knowledge to the work than other 
kinds of audience, but not so much as to unquestionably make them 
artists.  There are two other features of different art-roles we have to 
investigate that may yet provide a solution.  There is some intuitive 
support to the idea that playing videogames requires a creative 
intention of some description; when one plays a game one intends to 
bring into existence something that did not exist before, namely a 
playing, or playthrough, of that videogame.  However, this by itself, 
nor considered in conjunction with the evidence concerning the 
knowledge requirement for the role of the player, does not suffice to 
show that players are artists.  Performers have a similar creative 
intention; they also intend by their actions to bring into existence 
something that did not exist before: a performance of a work.  Now, 
we already know that players are usually not performers, so it is 
unlikely that what players of videogames create is a performance.  The 
mere fact that playings of videogames are not performances, however, 
does not guarantee that they are certainly artworks. Whether the 
creative intention of the player is of the requisite kind to count as an 
artistic intention depends entirely on what kind of thing it is that the 
player intends to create. 
A similar concern forces us to withhold judgement on whether the 
kinds of actions that players perform have more in common with the 
traditional artistic role or that of the audience.  It is perhaps obvious 
that players do more than traditional audiences, but does what they do 
involve the creation of a work of art?  This is where we come to what I 
believe is at the centre of this debate, the ontological claim at the 
heart of the Extra Credits View.   
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7.3 The Fridge Magnet Poetry Problem 
 
The Extra Credits View rests on an ontological claim about videogame 
works, that is, the things we appreciate when we appreciate 
videogames as art.  We have seen this claim manifested in three 
formulations so far: 
1) Videogame works do not exist without some contribution from a player  2) The art-role of the player requires a creative intention, the end of which is to bring a videogame work into existence  3) The art-role of the player requires a creative action which brings a videogame work into existence  
The crux of all these claims is that ECV takes videogame works to have 
a particular ontological status.  A videogame work, according to ECV, 
is not the thing we buy in our local game store, or download from 
Steam.  It isn’t the sum total of the programming code or of the 
Tavinor-esque affordances for fictional action.  A videogame work, 
according to ECV is what happens when a player interacts with those 
things.  Let us create some terminology to discuss this potentially 
confusing component of ECV.  Because according to ECV, the 
videogame work doesn’t exist until after some player interaction has 
taken place, that thing that we might normally think of as a 
videogame - a single work with many possible displays - is not a work, 
but rather a device for creating new works.  Let us call a device of this 
sort an Extra Credits Machine, and the works created using it Extra 
Credits Games.  The truth of ECV, then, turns on the question of 
whether those objects we buy from game stores, download from 
Steam, or what have you, are videogame works in their own right, 
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for creating many different works with a single display each. 
This is an instance of the problem that Lopes calls ‘the ontological 
challenge of Frigidaire poetry’.155 The poetry kits commonly found 
adorning fridge doors consist of magnetic tiles with words or, in some 
cases, single letters printed on them that can be arranged into lines of 
verse. The thought is that if we were to consider the ontology of the 
fridge magnet poetry kit, we surely wouldn’t see each magnetic poetry 
kit as a ‘work’ with many different displays – one for each assembled 
poem – rather we would understand the kits as devices for making 
individual works with one display each. If our intuition here is right, 
then do we have any good reason for supposing that videogames are 
different? It seems like we must accept that either a fridge poetry kit is 
one work with many displays (like a symphony), or that videogames 
are tools for creating individual works (like an Etch-a-Sketch).  
Lopes attempts to answer the point by bringing up an interesting 
parallel with musical works. George Gershwin’s ‘Summertime’ has 
been performed by many people, among them Ella Fitzgerald and John 
Coltrane. Their two performances are certainly not identical, but they 
are nonetheless instances of the same work – the intuition is that they 
are different displays of the same work. What makes the song 
Summertime (and any given videogame) single works with varying 
displays, according to Lopes, is that when we attend to the different 
displays of such works our appreciation of them is informed by the 
fact that they are individual displays among other possible ones 
derived from the same work. Part of the reason we might consider 
Coltrane’s interpretation of Summertime a worthy one is that we know 
of other ways that Summertime can be performed, and the choices 
made by Coltrane in how he performs the piece become relevant to 
our appreciation of it. The difference then, Lopes claims, between a 
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185  device for creating many works and a single work with many displays 
is that when we appreciate the displays of the latter, we do so “as one 
of a range of possible performances.”156  
The consequence of this claim for the problem at hand is that in the 
case of fridge poetry we do not appreciate the poems we create as 
among a range of other possible poems, but rather solely as works in 
their own right. However, I do not believe that Lopes is correct in that 
assertion. Our appreciation of fridge magnet poems is surely informed 
by the fact that the poets have had to make choices more limited than 
if they were simply working with the English language as a whole.  
Furthermore, we will also compare works from the same kit not in 
isolation from one another, but as works from the same kit. 
Lopes also suggests, however, that when appreciating a work created 
by a device such as a poetry kit we do not do so in a way that “implies 
appreciating the [device] itself” and takes this as a further feature of 
the difference between devices and works. If this is true, then my 
above objection may be questioned on the grounds that we do not, in 
fact, appreciate the poetry kit in the same way as we would the work 
(as opposed to the performance of) Summertime.  However, it is far 
from certain that an aesthetic appreciation of devices such as musical 
scales and instruments does not go hand in hand with appreciating 
the works created using them (one might appreciate the dissonance of 
the Dorian scale, or the ‘woodiness’ of the oboe’s tone as one is 
listening to the music created using them).  Because of this it seems 
that Lopes is in danger of labelling scales and instruments works with 
multiple displays rather than devices for creating musical works. It 
appears therefore that neither of Lopes’ proposed criteria of difference 
adequately match our intuitions about what should count as a work 
and what should count as a device for making new works. 
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186  Is there a better way to answer the ontological challenge from fridge 
poetry?  Consider the different aims of those who make and use 
objects like fridge magnet poetry or musical scales and those who 
make and use objects like videogames or songs.  The aim of those who 
make devices to create works is to provide new ways of creating works 
in an existing medium.  One can still make music without following 
the requirements of a particular tonal system, but those systems can 
regulate the making of music and in doing so, make the work 
produced a distinctive kind of music (e.g. modal music) just as 
following the rules of the road results in a distinctive kind of driving 
(legal driving).  Similarly, with fridge poetry, the point of it is not to 
simply allow its users to be poets (we don’t need fridge magnets for 
that), but rather to restrict the syntactic options available to its users, 
from the whole of the English language to just those letters, words and 
phrases printed on the magnets, so that creative use of the available 
magnets will produce a new and distinctive form of poetry.  The role 
of the device for creating new works can therefore be described as 
imposing regulative rules on a pre-existing activity. John Searle has 
famously distinguished between rules of this sort – rules that regulate 
pre-existing activities, and constitutive rules.157  
Constitutive rules don’t regulate pre-existing activities; rather they 
create the possibility of new activities taking place. To again take chess 
as an example, the rules of chess do not regulate the pre-existing past 
time of pushing pieces of wood around a chequered board. The rules 
of chess constitute the game, so if one is following the rules of chess 
then one just is playing chess. Just as devices for making new works 
seem to play a regulative role in creative activity, the things we want 
to describe as single works with many displays appear to play a 
constitutive role in such activity. When Gershwin composed 
Summertime he created a series of prescriptions concerning the 
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187  melody, rhythm etc. the following of which count as a performance of 
that work – the rules for what counts as a performance of Summertime 
create the possibility of playing Summertime in exactly the same way 
as the rules of chess create the possibility of playing chess. Now, when 
a design team create a videogame like Bioshock they are certainly not 
regulating a pre-existing activity as in the case of fridge magnet poetry. 
What they are doing is creating a situation in which it is possible to 
play Bioshock at all, by supplying the fictional environment in which 
the game takes place (the Randian dystopia of Rapture) and 
prescribing the rules and actions that constitute its playing.158  Just as 
the rules of chess create the game by limiting the legal moves of the 
pieces, so the possible experiences delineated by a videogame’s 
designers are limitations of the possible actions in the fictional world 
of the game. In Bioshock, to play the game is just to work your way 
through Rapture, and to work your way through Rapture is to play the 
game. In Flight Simulator, to play the game is just to pilot the virtual 
aircraft with which you are presented in the game, and to pilot virtual 
aircraft presented to you in Flight Simulator is to play the game. In 
both cases, the rules that govern these fictional activities (concerning 
physical interaction, choices of aircraft etc.) are the same rules that 
make it possible to engage in them. If one were to hack the software of 
Flight Simulator to enable the player to walk from place to place, one 
would no longer be playing Flight Simulator, just as if one were 
randomly pushing chess pieces around a board one would no longer 
be playing chess. Similarly, to play Summertime is to follow 
Gershwin’s prescriptions, and to follow Gershwin’s prescriptions is to 
play Summertime. However, when it comes to devices for making 
multiple works, the prescriptions are regulative, so while to create a 
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188  fridge poem is to create a poem, to create a poem is not necessarily to 
create a fridge poem. In sum, when the rules imposed by a thing 
regulates an antecedent form of creative action that thing is a device 
for making new works, but when a thing prescribes rules the following 
of which are constitutive of a non-antecedent activity, it is a single 
work with many displays.159 
With this understanding of the ontology of many-displayed artworks 
we can comfortably say that videogames belong in that category, and 
that because videogames have a constitutive function (they create the 
possibility of new experiences) rather than regulative (they do not 
regulate pre-existing activities), they do not count as devices for 
making new (single displayed) works.  Note that, if one prefers an 
appreciation-focused view of the ontology of art such as the one 
offered by Lopes, and would rather apply his criterion to the problem 
of whether videogames are Extra Credits Machines, he would come up 
with the same answer.  When I play Bioshock a part of my 
appreciation of the game is precisely the fact that I could have played 
it a different way; the rich variety of options is precisely what makes 
some games more fun to play than others, and Lopes is absolutely 
correct that this kind of appreciation would not be possible if 




7.4 Videogames as Artworks 
 
ECV, on reflection, must be false.  The view that videogames are 
possessed of distinctive artistic value by virtue of the creative role that 
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189  their audiences play in their experience of the work, it turns out, 
depends on an implausible view of the ontology of videogame works.  
Videogames are not Extra Credits Machines because they encode 
constitutive rules, allowing a new activity to take place.  They do not 
regulate pre-existing activities and are therefore works with many 
displays and not devices for creating new works.  Furthermore, as 
Lopes points out, a significant part of our appreciation of videogames 
turns on the fact that our individual playing are only one of a range of 
possible ones.  The story we help to tell by guiding our characters 
through a game, although it may be the only source of our aesthetic 
engagement with the work, is not the work itself. 
In closing, I offer a word of encouragement.  I do believe that 
videogame works are artistically valuable, and furthermore I believe 
that this derives from distinctive artistic capabilities rooted in their 
inherent interactivity.160  It is on this premise that the most persuasive 
cases have been made to support the value of videogames as an artistic 
medium.  More than anything, therefore, I think it is incumbent on 
those of us who want to see videogames taken seriously as an art form 
to place their interactivity at the centre of any theories of their artistic 
value that we may offer.  While ECV is, obviously, inspired by that 
interactivity, it has an unwelcome consequence in that Extra Credits 
Games, the objects that are the artworks according to ECV, are not 
interactive.  According to ECV, a player interacts not with the Extra 
Credits Game, but with the Extra Credits Machine; an Extra Credits 
Game has a single display, and has no room for interactivity in its 
appreciation.  This last consideration demonstrates how a poorly 
considered ontological claim can have far reaching unintended 
consequences for how we can argue for the artistic merits of different 
kinds of artworks.  It also provides a good reason, I think, for those 
who might have been attracted to the idea of players-as-artists to feel 
                                                 
160 I have argued for this view in detail in Baker (2012) 
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7.5 Videogames and Empathic Engagement 
 
Following from my analysis of the role of the player in videogames and 
its consequences for videogame ontology, we are in a position to 
describe how my views on empathic engagement with stories might 
shed light on our experiences with interactive artworks. 
The conclusion that players of videogames are not artists is good news 
for an empathic account of videogaming.  As I have suggested earlier, 
one of the roles of artists in the empathic engagement of stories is to 
construct the narrative perspective with which the audience engages.  
This might require some understanding of the ways that empathy with 
particular perspectives can be finessed so as to achieve the desired 
result, but it does not require empathy per se in principle.  If it turned 
out that videogame players were artists, then, it would look like they 
were not empathising as a part of their engagement at all, but rather 
constructing an opportunity for empathy for someone else, or 
themselves, to engage in later 
I want to finish here by just sketching some thoughts on how a theory 
of empathic player engagement might be developed from all of the 
preceding arguments and observations.  The first, and I think most 
interesting, thing to say is that I don’t think that empathy for the 
player’s character will turn out to be nearly as significant an impact on 
a player’s experience as might first be assumed.  For one thing, in 
many cases the player’s character simply acts as an extension of the 
player into the world of the game; many characters are deliberately 
empty vessels, not targets for empathy so much as blank canvases that 
we can think of as we please.  There is no room for empathy in such a 
191  relationship, since there is nothing to understand about the other 
person. 
Another reason empathy is likely to be surprisingly rare in video 
games is because, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, a large part of 
the distinctive artistic capacities of videogames lie in representing 
things about the player’s character to the player, by virtue of 
manipulating the way the player interacts with their avatar.161  Such a 
representation might consist in my character suddenly being unable to 
move as quickly as before; this might represent to me that my 
character is injured or unhappy, but that is unlikely to encourage me 
to feel in empathy for that character, I would be more likely to be 
frustrated.  Such interesting representational capacities, however, do 
have the potential to leverage the narrative perspective to new and 
engrossing levels of audience engagement.  It is even a promising 
thought that videogames, by leveraging representations of this kind, 
can make use of a perspective of a different kind, call it a ‘game 
perspective’, with which players can empathise.  Game perspectives 
might generate ways of seeing that are distinct from those with which 
we have become familiar, characterising scenes not in terms of their 
prominence in a story, but in terms of their relation to the player’s 
efforts to play the game well. 
 
  
                                                 
161 Ibid. 
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In this thesis I have offered and defended a conception of empathy, 
and also offered a theory of narrative engagement based on that 
theory of empathy.  The idea that empathy is connected to narrative is 
nothing new, but I hope that I have found a way to show that empathy 
is plausibly central to storytelling practices in a way that has been 
dismissed by many up until now. 
The thesis argued for two headline proposals; the Complex Theory of 
Empathy and the Empathy Model of Narrative Engagement.  While I 
did not make it explicit during the main body of the thesis, I should 
point out that I do not think that either one of these proposals relies 
on the success of the other.  If someone were to find one persuasive 
and the other not, I see no problem in that.  Having said that, the form 
that I suggested Empathic Engagement with Narratives takes is 
certainly inspired by the Complex Theory of Empathy, and in 
particular the centrality of being-with imagining to the reliability of 
the process.  Indeed, of the many insights which contributed to the 
formation of the preceding ideas and arguments, the one I think is the 
most significant is the thought that Perspectives, or something very 
like them, play an undeniably powerful role in our lives; in the stories 
we tell, and in the stories we tell about our own lives.  If there is any 
idea that counts as a running thread through all the disparate chapters 
of this thesis (save perhaps the last), it is this.  Given that fact, it would 
be remiss of me not to mention the great debt I owe to the work of 
Richard Wollheim and Peter Goldie, who made similar thoughts so 
central to their own philosophy.162 
                                                 
162 Wollheim (1985), Goldie (2012) 
193  If the importance of perspectives to our psychological lives is the 
single most important theme in the preceding work, there are several 
other key claims that I would like to emphasise along with it.   
The first is that I sincerely believe that much that was interesting, 
useful and remarkable about the concept of empathy has been lost due 
to the modern fixation with seeing affective matching as its sole or 
principal purpose.  If there is one point I wish taken from my 
discussion of empathy, let it be that. 
Having said that, there is much to recommend the Complex Theory 
when set against its competitors.  The focus on empathy as a means to 
understand, to a significant degree, the inner life of another person is, 
I think, the right way to go.  And once you have decided to go that 
way, although the psychological effort I described as a part of the 
Complex Theory of Empathy is significant, it is by no means 
insurmountable.  Crucially, I think it is better to describe a faculty like 
empathy in terms of what it is capable of, and not just what it typically 
results in.  Since we can come to understand other people by the 
means described in the Complex Theory, it seems trite to me to play 
down its capabilities just because we often won’t avail ourselves of its 
full potential.  The Complex Theory also has the distinct advantage of 
treating successful empathy as a justified ascription, rather than an 
affective match, and so we might find that empathy succeeds more 
often on the Complex View than it might on some other less complex, 
but equally cognitive views of empathy.  The success condition on the 
Complex View seems to me eminently sensible in any case; providing 
we can justifiably come to some understanding of another person 
through our empathy, what reason is there to say we failed? 
A further key point that I want to emphasise in closing is the central 
place of perspectives in stories especially.  Even if one does not buy 
into the empathy model of empathic engagement, I hope I have been 
persuasive in arguing that we are far better served in thinking about 
our emotional (and other) responses to stories as continuous parts of a 
194  whole story-length response to the narrative, and not merely as 
discrete events prompted by individual sentences.  We should treat a 
story as a whole thing, especially for the purposes of analysing our 
mode of engagement with it, which we should also treat as a whole 
thing.  Incidentally, though, if we are persuaded that perspectives play 
a key role in determining how our responses to stories develop and 
change, then an empathy model of narrative engagement, by virtue of 
its affinity with perspective shifting, will be a natural next step. 
In closing, let me leave you with an excerpt from a story I was reading 
towards the end of writing this.  It serves firstly as a nice series of 
thoughts with which to stop, secondly as a decent summary of a future 
question that someone interested in the thoughts expressed herein 
might investigate, and finally, as an excellent part of a great story, 
whose feelings I enjoyed sharing immensely. 
 
“I think the act of reading imbues the reader with a sensitivity toward 
the outside world that people who don't read can sometimes lack. I know 
it seems like a contradiction in terms; after all reading is such a solitary, 
internalizing act that it appears to represent a disengagement from day-
to-day life. But reading, and particularly the reading of fiction, 
encourages us to view the world in new and challenging ways...It allows 
us to inhabit the consciousness of another which is a precursor to 
empathy, and empathy is, for me, one of the marks of a decent human 
being.”  
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